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Abstract 
kkkMy thesis examines Shelley’s usage of Islamic tropes and Qur’anic symbolism in order to 
further poeticise his belief that through the revision and combination of mythic patterns 
poetry could produce an ameliorative effect on the evolution of human consciousness. By 
combining his Eastern-inspired poetics with his ruminations on interanimation, Shelley 
consolidates the faith within a mythographic schema where concepts are reinterpreted 
through the meandering lineage of tradition. I argue a deeper understanding of the Islamic 
tradition on a theological and philosophical level will help contextualise his mythopoetics as 
an exploration of how communal sign systems can meaningfully revise previous myths 
without dogmatic overtones. The structure of the thesis is centred on Shelley’s poetic 
engagement with Islam during the years of 1814-18; part one examines The Assassins from 
an Ismaili perspective and draws links between Shelley’s melodic strain of poets and the 
Imamate chain of hierophants whilst also investigating the significance of using Muslim 
figures as a means of expressing his own enthusiastic world-historical call for reform. Part 
two explores Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude from a sufistic perspective by offsetting the 
paradoxical relation between lover and Beloved in Hafez and Rumi’s poetry against the 
Shelleyan dynamic between poet and muse whilst offering a comparative analysis of 
Shelley’s allegorical commentary on material idealism with Ibn Tufayl’s natural mysticism. 
Part three delves into The Revolt of Islam as a revolution of, rather than against, the titular 
faith by assessing how Shelley reimagines two concepts (the Book of Fate and Holy War): 
the former transfigures Ash’arite fatalistic atomism where Power and miracles rule into a 
Lucretian materialistic form of atomism where birth and decay is not governed by 
transcendent forces but fissures within organic processes; the latter adapts Sunni 
historiography regarding the conquest of Mecca and rewrites Muhammad’s revolution into 
Laon and Cythna’s Oriental uprising. 
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Introduction: Recognising Islam in Shelleyan Scholarship 
kkkThe depiction of Islam that occupies the pages of Romantic scholarship can be read as 
both accurate and intellectually shallow, from a philosophical and theological perspective.
1
 
This lack of depth in characterising Islam is not the result of any academic deficiency but, to 
echo Edward Said, ‘[Romantic] Orientalism is a discursive phenomenon, internally consistent 
and self-perpetuating’2 and thus, coming to grips with Islamic intellectual heritage becomes 
irrelevant (in terms of context) or superfluous (in terms of literary analysis). I am not 
suggesting that Romantic scholars seek to reinforce these stereotypes since such conceits are 
employed as interpretive tools to understand Romantic engagement with the Orient (and by 
extension Islam); instead, I argue for critical license in allowing Islam to articulate itself by 
introducing Islamic texts that were historically situated on the periphery of the Romantic 
imagination. If Said’s central thesis is that ‘Orientalism overrode the Orient’3 then I suggest 
that Romantic Orientalism overrode Islam. As scholars of Romanticism continue to analyse 
the interconnections between Islam and either Romantic faith or colonialism, it is important 
to employ a conceptualisation that is not simply descriptive but recognises Islam as a living 
faith that is at once heterogeneous, ambivalent, and paradoxical. Professor in comparative 
religion, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, offers a cogent and striking definition of this unity in 
diversity by acknowledging that ‘Islam’ might lend itself to a rather neat systematisation had 
it not: ‘existed in such abundant actuality, at differing times and in differing areas, in the 
minds and hearts of differing persons, in the institutions and forms of differing societies, in 
                                                          
1
 Peter Cochran serves as an ideal example of a scholar who understood the need to refrain from a monolithic 
conception of Islamic thought and practice but was so dedicated to providing a contextually sound portrayal of 
Romantic Orientalism that he allowed the ignorance of the Romantics to curtail any theological research of his 
own that might potentially expand the discussion. For example, he writes, ‘there are as many interpretations in 
Islam as to exactly what predestination involves as there are in Christianity. But neither Christian or Islamic 
theology was a discipline which Byron studied.’ (Byron and Orientalism (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar Press, 
2006), p. 50). In this instance, Byron is given the final word as to the extent of his engagement with Islam. 
2
 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 5. 
3
 Ibid, p. 96.  
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the evolving of different stages.’4 A valuable definition of Islam, if it is to be used as a 
heuristic tool for comparison in literary analysis, is required to allow Islam an expansive, 
composite and discordant nature inherent in any historical phenomenon which stems from the 
human encounter with Divine Revelation. Given the range of Muslim thinkers that I refer to 
throughout the thesis (incorporating Shi’i, Sufi and Sunni thought) it is important that I 
provide an interpretation of Islam that does not limit the scope of my discussion to legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of Islamic expression but rather, in allowing more voices to speak 
authentically on behalf of (and within) the tradition itself, I intend to allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between Islam and Percy Bysshe Shelley.                    
kkkIt is useful, therefore, to reiterate Shahab Ahmed’s tripartite distinction of Islam as ‘Pre-
Text, Text, and Context’ in order to gain a systematic understanding of how both Muslim and 
non-Muslim thinkers can engage with the Book of Islam to uncover meanings that are 
intrinsically Qur’anic and deeply personal: 
By conceptualizing Islam as meaning-making for the self in terms of 
hermeneutical engagement with Revelation to Muḥammad as Pre-Text, Text, 
and Con-Text—that is, with the entire phenomenon and matrix of Revelation, 
rather than just the Text of Revelation—we are able, once and for all, 
conceptually to account for, accommodate and understand the relationship 
between variety and unity in human and historical Islam—and thus to 
conceptualize Islam in terms of coherent contradiction
5
  
kkkIn this schema, Islam is composed of a Context which relates to local knowledge that is 
subject to change, a Text which relates to Revealed knowledge that is eternal, and a Pre-Text 
which relates to the communus sensus and possesses the potential to reveal either universal or 
                                                          
4
 William Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 145. 
5
 Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2016), p. 405. 
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particular knowledge subject to human understanding. These terms expand the number of 
avenues through which other traditions can be authentically appropriated. In instances where 
Greek thought was assimilated into Arabic philosophy, it would be fair to say that Aristotle 
and Plato become Islamic not simply due to the fact that their ideas are being filtered through 
the Arabic language but, more specifically, any issues they are tasked to resolve will be 
unique to Islam, as opposed to Christian Platonism, because of the fundamental differences 
within their theology. These elements which might easily be dismissed as heterodox or 
plagiarised from external sources are instead, revealed to be responding to questions that 
were central to the formation of, ‘historical societies of Muslims as discursive’,6 in a 
constitutive relation with other systems of thought through which the scope of available 
identities expanded on either side through an accommodative and reiterative process. Hence, 
interpretative liberties are not necessarily malicious attempts at discrediting the founding 
texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah rather they internalise, adjust and re-produce these forms of 
revelation as both meaningful for themselves but also, because it is rooted in and wrestles 
with Islamic sources, reproduces meaning for the faith as a whole through its ongoing 
development.                                                                                                                                 
kkkWhen discussing Romanticism, it is less relevant whether the individual reimagining and 
reinterpreting the content of Islam is Muslim because what matters is demonstrating a 
commitment to engaging with the text, or context, of Islam. After a foreign idea has been 
translated, by Muslims or non-Muslims, into terms that are meaningful within the faith it 
becomes etched onto the walls of dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) whose basis is the 
exegetical lineage of Qur’anic scholars searching for new ways to decipher that immutable 
message. When analysing the relationship between Romanticism and Muslim thought, I urge 
scholars to employ this conception of ‘Islam’ as a ‘community of discourse’ with a ‘mutually 
                                                          
6
 Ibid, p. 97. 
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intelligible language in which [to] agree [and] disagree meaningfully’7 because, doing so, 
would help forestall a tendency to dismiss the faith as nothing more than a branch of Oriental 
studies, or an amalgamation of other, more prominent, streams of Romantic thought such as 
Christianity and Platonism. As Romantic critics, we do an injustice by preventing ourselves 
from apprehending and benefiting from what those Islamic existences and endeavours have to 
offer us by way of making meaning for ourselves when in dialogue with the Romantics. In 
attempting to generate a more theologically minded approach to the relationship between 
Romantic and Muslim thought, I suggest that influence is not causative but reciprocal as a 
prior idea is reconstituted in the act of being responded to.                                                           
kkkMore generally, this study is driven by the same impulse that led McGann to write The 
Romantic Ideology (1983), a belief that Romantic scholarship concerning Islam is deeply 
Romantic in character which is not to indicate that there is an overreliance on commonly 
accepted tropes as points of interest when discussing the topic (the sublime, the individual 
consciousness, the natural world) but rather a reluctance to explore outside the purview of 
those Islamic texts within the collective conscience of the Romantics. An unwillingness to 
examine works which inspired the Arab and Persian texts that were in circulation during this 
period. The call being made is not for New Historicist approaches to the Romantic period to 
be discarded entirely, as their critique of the traditional history of ideas approach to literature 
is largely correct in its assertion that there is no body of work which exists in a vacuum free 
from the influence of external, socio-political forces. At the same time, however, such rigid 
commitment to uncovering literary meaning by closely scrutinising contemporary definitions 
of words is not entirely an objective practice since those interpretations are themselves 
products of subjective interpretation, often sourced from eighteenth-century writings on 
literature, sociology, or history. Scholars unwilling to accept the unavoidable consequences 
                                                          
7
 Ibid, p. 292. 
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of presentism on any reading of past texts run the risk of uncritically adopting a period’s self-
conceptualisation and thus, both Islam and Romanticism need to be equally appreciated as 
complex, contradictory, and subject to internal ideological and political tensions. 
Nevertheless, as McGann himself has acknowledged since the publication of The Romantic 
Ideology in 1983, in completely doing away with the synthesising efforts of criticism like 
those offered by Abrams, one risks abolishing an object that is particularly useful to scholars 
of comparative literature (a historical-critical model) through which to compare and contrast 
the products of European Romanticism. Models or historical theses, such as the one 
suggested by Abrams, are necessarily limited in their verisimilitude but, without them, both 
literary history and comparative literature might cease to be possible. It is clear, therefore, 
McGann does not advocate steering wholly clear from the self-understanding of any group 
when attempting to make sense of the worldview that critical consensus acknowledges they 
inhabit but rather, the true value lies in using those ideas to assess individual expressions 
alongside one another as well as being unafraid to express our position as contemporary 
critics open to new avenues of thought. The depiction of Islam or the Prophet within 
Romantic poetry should not be dismissed as apathetic purely on the basis that borrowing 
information and icons second-hand from translations creates disingenuous viewpoints given 
the blind-spots these resources possess. To assume a real faith might be accessible if freed 
from prejudice but remains unavailable during the period in which the Romantics were 
writing can lead to the notion that the only version of Islam which possesses critical 
importance is the popular eighteenth-century Orientalist rendition and any discussion that 
introduces texts unknown to the writers themselves produces baseless speculation unable to 
meaningfully modify our understanding of Romantic engagement with Islam. Rather, I argue, 
the decision to employ Islamic motifs and personages (positively or negatively) is an 
intrinsically interested act with such symbols lacking meaning when divorced from context 
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until an author interprets and grants significance to them through their text. As meaning 
builds around a work through the dissemination of various readings, new perspectives begin 
to outweigh the original to the extent that there are more thoughts about the text than it is 
seemingly capable of sustaining which indicates influence is not necessarily causative as its 
originary form is inevitably read through the lens of its offspring. Particularly when analysing 
poetry, hermeneutical attempts to decode words, images, and ideas as rigid literary signs runs 
the risk of assigning a fixed meaning to them and, thereby, bringing an end to a potentially 
endless process of new readings. This notion of engaged misreading can offer a more 
productive approach to the perception of Orientalist poetics not as spiteful appropriations but 
responses in line with prior readings (i.e. interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah) that 
similarly sought to employ these images and ideas to question their own socio-political 
milieu. To accept this argument is to appreciate how, in becoming more aware of prior 
conceptions situated within a tradition, comparative analysis becomes less dualistic and 
antagonistic as each interpretation is an attempt to engage with a predominantly spiritual 
lineage to better understand their own predicament. It should not be misconstrued that the 
expanded scope of this study is meant as a vaccine to immunise the field from so-called 
harmful Orientalist approaches but rather I posit a different goal to strive for within that niche 
by arguing that the Romantic poeticisation of the East must be balanced with a definition of 
Islam that is neither overly ambiguous nor zealously stringent, incorporating Muslim 
responses to Islamic thought in a complementary fashion to the Romantic communities. As a 
result, we might better understand how moral, aesthetic and intellectual debates shape the 
discourse either about, or through the lens of, the Qur’an and Sunnah.                                   
kkkkkkConceiving Romantic interest in Islamic themes and imagery as merely part of a 
larger imperial desire to codify or critique the East reduces literature to simply being a 
commentary upon unfolding events and confines poets to the role of political activists 
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divorced from their theological or philosophical backgrounds. Those writers thought to be 
sincere and capable of achieving a level of authenticity in their assessment of the East, remain 
a product of their time perpetually distanced from the other due to divisions caused either by 
imperial hierarchies, financial instability or race relations (the exact dynamics and boundaries 
of which are determined by their context) and thus, whenever drawing from another culture’s 
beliefs and practices, are not depicted as writing within a tradition but simply about a 
tradition. It is no surprise that historicist readings attempting to delineate a link between 
Britain’s imperial interests in the East, including British writers’ imaginative involvement in 
religions of the East, deny little to any critical engagement on behalf of the authors to Islam 
as an intellectual lineage since the notion of legacy remains largely absent. In seeking to 
ground what is perceived in Said as an inattentiveness to contextual readings in favour of 
ideology but, in focusing primarily on colonial or economic factors, it reinforces a devotion 
to historicism as the superior methodology for discerning facts and in turn, acquiring a 
greater understanding of the day-to-day reality of a people. An overly historicist approach to 
Romantic Orientalism tends to prioritise detailing the dialogues taking place within, and 
immediately around, the period whilst refusing to accept their responses as also being an 
extension of Islamic history with a transferential dynamic being the connective tissue. This 
method inevitably instils an incommensurable duality within the Eastern allusions 
themselves; on the one hand, interweaving contextual evidence to add nuance across every 
facet of representation whether it be discerning Romantic circles in which a particular 
depiction became prevalent or tracing intellectual dialogues through letters which pinpoint 
authors who may have proved useful in shaping a work; on the other hand, magnifying, to the 
point of stultifying, a point of time and downplaying any sense of these thinkers as part of a 
philosophical or theological tradition transcending geographical and temporal bounds. The 
use of Islamic concepts or personages in Romantic thought is not simply related to questions 
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of canon formation but also participates in questions surrounding identity formation in the 
moral sphere. As Bryan Turner notes, the fear with regards to Oriental despotism and ‘the 
absence of civil society in Islam’ was ‘a reflection of basic political anxieties about the state 
of political freedom in the West’,8 particularly in relation to Locke and Mill’s debates 
surrounding individualism versus communitarianism and the extent to which a person can 
determine their own liberty without the aid of government interference but with the help of 
equally disenfranchised individuals. I raise this topic to merely indicate that even negative 
depictions which surfaced during the period should not abolish any hope for a genuine 
engagement, mediated by a scholar, between Romanticism and Islam since there is an 
intellectual history that subsists beneath these tropes which is being invoked as an act of soul 
searching carried out by certain Western writers for the benefit of making sense of their 
social, theological, political reality. Indeed, taboo imagery depicted in Islamic poetry from 
khamr (wine) to zina (fornication) can be dismissed as unorthodox on the basis that it 
promotes ideas that contradict the Qur’an but these motifs have also been critically refigured 
as intently engaging with the text of revelation and as such, increasingly come to constitute 
part of the context of revelation.  
Embedded Spirituality  
kkkThere is a sense of ideational belatedness characteristic of Romantic Orientalism 
recognising itself not as, ‘unique but merely one of many’, acknowledging, ‘those of the East 
being older and, perhaps, its source’,9 which I shall expand upon through my analysis of 
Shelley’s metahistorical reframing of Islam. Belatedness, as I characterise it in this study, is 
an awareness of the complexity of historical development as not necessarily an Hegelian 
                                                          
8
 Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism & Globalism (Oxfordshire: Routledge, London & New York, 
1994), p. 34.  
9
 Timothy Fulford and Peter J. Kitson, ‘Romanticism and colonialism: texts, contexts, issues’, in Romanticism 
and Colonialism: Writing and Empire 1780-1830, eds. by Timothy Fulford and P. J. Kitson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-13, at p. 10. 
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drive towards higher levels of enlightenment but a complex overlapping of intertwining 
narratives born out of a genuine human interest in the collective search for meaning, from a 
period which became synonymous with: ‘comparative mythography, [the] notion of world 
literature [and] the contemporary order of interacting sovereign nation states’.10 Within this 
framework, it becomes reasonable to suggest that there is a level of Romantic engagement 
with Muslim thought (however brief or expansive) which can be seen as a continuation of 
that Islamic act of making meaning from the Qur’an and Sunnah to respond to contemporary 
issues internally or communally. It is within the particulars of this thesis that Islam can speak 
through the traditional body of work available without reducing the investigative scope solely 
to those works known to the Romantics themselves and in turn, remain attentive to the 
countless manifestations of each concept passed down, adapted, and reinterpreted through the 
lens of disparate legal and theological schools. In doing so, I hope to lessen some of the 
binary rhetoric surrounding religious influence with respect to being, or not being, part of a 
community. It is important to avoid judging Romantic thinkers on the basis of a sterile, one-
dimensional reading of Islam given that Shelley, for instance, did not seek to be assessed by 
standards which practitioners differ over and, in any case, belief is not the only way to 
participate in the truths of a tradition. This transhistorical approach must be coupled with the 
understanding that temporal denominations such as Romanticism, are useful critical tools but, 
realistically, the entire period is more akin to ‘a theatre for the conflicts and interactions of 
the ideologies of Romanticism’.11 I cite McGann not to comment on the multivalent nature of 
Romanticism as a self-enclosed system, for that reiterates the same monolithic terms under 
question on a wider scale, rather to admit that not only might Islam be conceived in the same 
                                                          
10
 Jared Hickman, Black Prometheus: Race and Radicalism in the Age of Atlantic Slavery (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2017),  pp.77-78. 
11
 Jerome McGann, ‘Rethinking Romanticism,’ in The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New 
Perspectives, ed. by Lawrence Besserman (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 165. 
10 
 
way
12
 but these two realities are not mutually exclusive. The significance of certain symbols 
and folklore that persist in the form of cultural memory – like a palimpsest haunting and 
colouring new systems of thought – modify, amend and appropriate ancient wisdom into 
relevant knowledge. For instance, the conceptual building blocks of Avicenna’s system is 
composed mainly of Qur’anic, Platonic, Aristotelian and Plotinian terminology but they are 
subjected to critical analyses: some are rejected, some are accepted in their original form; 
others are modified, rethought and expanded on. Akin to the Romantic self-fashioning 
through the composite remains of disparate ideologies, Avicenna’s system is an integrated 
whole that has a character all its own and yet, in consolidating these divergent traditions, 
reimagines new forms of identity available within each worldview by reconceptualising what 
it means to be a Muslim, a Platonist, an Aristotelian.                                                                                
kkkI am gesturing towards a form of thinking between cultures which would involve a 
sharing of concepts and categories that refrains from allowing either side to render the other 
mute during comparative analysis and instead, by involving both voices (appreciative of the 
mediatory role a critic unavoidably adopts when engineering such a discussion), trace how 
the significance of indigenous concepts is re-negotiated when displaced within a new context. 
My central focus revolves around Shelley’s usage of Islamic ideas to examine the mechanics 
behind his transvaluation and discern how he is engaging with a tradition in a way that 
coheres with his poetic sensibilities but that he may not have considered. In citing texts 
Shelley was more readily exposed to as a means of introducing lesser known thinkers, I 
consciously exercise my position as a contemporary scholar to call upon the wide assortment 
of Islamic sources available for the sake of mitigating a critical depiction of the faith that 
wholly conforms to Shelley’s self-conceptualisation since this approach would produce a 
reading where all images can be collapsed into one viewpoint. 
                                                          
12
 In other words, every Muslim community since the time of the Prophet each serve as individual theatres for 
the conflicts and interactions of the ideologies of Islam.  
11 
 
The Dynamics of Shelley’s Mythography 
kkkThe scope of worldviews alluded to throughout Shelley’s corpus is evidence of his 
mythographic schema’s malleability. His ideational universality could potentially be critiqued 
for lapsing into relativism since the Romantic poet reimagines each ideology to cohere with 
his own ideals as part of a larger call to free tropes, images and values: ‘from the bondage of 
religious dogma [so that they may] become the property of the mythmaking poet’.13 There is, 
however, an inner logic to this schema necessitating each worldview to be exceptional in 
some way as the varied expressions constituting the history of ideas from religion to 
philosophy help contextualise how the One Mind has developed by offering patterns not only 
to predict how certain intellectual strands might evolve but assess whether they are more 
likely to create harmony or confusion for mankind. Just as there is scepticism inherent in 
Shelley’s idealism, there is a compulsion towards historiography embedded within his 
universalism that is tied to poetic language as not only a reflection of thought but a 
structuring and restructuring of rhythm, metre and even tropes, which express rather than 
simply imitate the subtle motions governing the Spirit of Nature. A visionary structure is 
inherent in Shelley’s conception of mankind as an Aeolian harp that is at once in sync with 
the universe, passively internalising its melodies, as well as serving a generative role by 
establishing harmonies of their own. Shelley emphasises the embodied nature of myth-
making accumulated over time as part of our collective consciousness whilst acknowledging 
how an individual creative mind must engage with pertinent social issues by composing 
messages that appeal to contemporary sensibilities. Artwork as it relates to the artist, clarifies 
the way its author perceives the world by unlocking the sonorous and metaphorical potential 
of language in order to linguistically re-enact the links already perceived mentally not only in 
the hopes that their reconceptualising of reality resonates with others but that they contribute 
                                                          
13
 Spencer Hall, ‘Power and the Poet: Religious Mythmaking in Shelley’s ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’’, 
Keats-Shelley Journal 32 (1983), 123-49, at p. 140. 
12 
 
their own voice towards an expanding cosmic symphony rather than devolving into a group 
of followers who all sing from the same hymn sheet, devoid of tonality or texture. There is a 
level of universality, or de-orientalising as Andrew Warren terms it, where a particular 
worldview is not dismissed purely on the grounds of its geographical or historical origins 
since the Sophia perennis (possessed by spiritual visionaries, poets and philosophers) is 
praised for not only pertaining to truths that transcend existence but also enacting a 
democratising effect on knowledge. This wisdom becomes synonymous with a culturally 
disparate lineage of legislators who, through written, visual or spoken messages, inspire 
others to seek the beatitudes and bring infinity into actuality. Shelley’s depiction of 
mythology is far from ahistorical for the symbols that a particular community develops to 
express universal values are interesting precisely because of how their tropes (adapted in 
response to a diverse host of immediate concerns) offer perpetually shifting angles of vision 
for conceiving otherwise perennial questions.                                                                                 
kkkDue to an aversion of being stigmatised with a narrow set of preconceptions associated 
with radical atheism, coupled with his poetic identity as part of a tradition which idealises 
immateriality and deals in metaphors, Shelley is led to include religiously charged language 
alongside instances in which the Promethean spirit denies being indebted to a transcendent 
order reclaiming self-autonomy by exposing such supranatural figures as being merely 
shadows. Douglas Bush cites those moments of human exaltation as exemplifying an overall 
disengagement with any core principles fuelling those worldviews he subsumes within his 
grander mythography so that Christian allusions are emptied of their previous significance 
since Shelley’s humanistic ideals overpower and contradict the form of humanism which 
Bush believes to be indicative of Christ’s teachings, arguing that, although ‘Shelley does 
certainly glorify a Spirit of Good […] there is a difference between being the father and being 
13 
 
the child of one’s deity.’14 This narrow understanding of religious allegiance reduces 
communal belonging to orthodoxy by affixing essential truths to a higher, immutable order 
instead of acknowledging how such atemporal attributes are continuously moulded in a 
process of meaning-making whereby concepts, images, allusions and allegories can develop 
via seminal texts engaging with contemporary issues. From this experiential angle, an 
individual’s worldview constitutes, as much as it is constituted by, the ongoing self-
conceptualisation of those traditions it takes from and the barrier for entry with regards to 
influence becomes more open-ended. Kenneth Neill Cameron dismisses Shelley’s use of 
religious language as hollow gestures due to a lack of devotional undertones: ‘when these 
passages are examined […] they are found to be essentially non-committal and not to go 
beyond his own agnostic definition of the Power infused in the universe’,15 but I would argue 
that principles of faith need not be logically sound to be believable as Shelley expands the 
scope of acceptable belief to include both arguments that appeal to reason and notions which 
he would like to believe
16
 alongside concepts he feels compelled to internalise as part of an 
unspoken poetic creed: ‘to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word, the 
good which exists in the relation[al aspects of existence]’.17 These forms of conviction 
(reasoned, inspirational and poetic) supply a wider dialogical frame within which 
practitioners and non-practitioners can converge by acknowledging, to varying degrees, a 
mechanism within religious or philosophical worldview’s to spiritually (i.e. emotionally) 
rejuvenate all classes of people. A paradoxical middle ground is carved out between Shelley’s 
sceptical side which actively seeks to dismantle deep-seated misconceptions regarding the 
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nature of reality caused by myth’s power to delude and his poetic identity which revels in the 
fictitious as true precisely because it originates from the genuine human need to tell stories. 
Neither common folk nor visionaries can create from nothing but, in producing symbols, they 
are able to expand their search for meaning when confronted with life’s obscure mysteries 
(i.e. phenomena tinged by sceptical uncertainty due to an insufficiency in our finite senses) 
and thus, Shelley foregrounds this sublime capacity to both dismantle and rebuild sign 
systems as a way of elevating poetic language to the level of humanistic prophecy.  
Shelley’s Islam 
kkkExamining Shelley’s engagement with Islam in relation to the ethics, mindset and rules 
underpinning his mythography helps foreground the Muslim intellectual tradition as similarly 
concerned with theological as well as philosophical issues being poeticsed from fatalism to 
revelation. This methodology not only curtails the need to rely solely on geopolitics as the 
source and circumference of all discussions regarding the faith but also prevents a discussion 
centred on belief from devolving into a diatribe on orthodoxy.                                                               
kkkIt serves to assess the comparison made between Christ and Muhammad in a piece of 
prose entitled ‘The Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ’, in which Shelley characterises the 
essence of both religions as an attempt to ascribe, or rather inscribe, divinity onto an object of 
devotion (whether Jesus or the Qur’an) from which to derive correct moral behaviour and, in 
the poet’s mind, erect strict laws for the general public. It is unsurprising that there is a 
marked emphasis on Shelley’s part to insist that divinity is conferred upon these icons by 
either the church council or Muhammad himself and there is nothing intrinsically divine in 
the sense of them actually being the Word made flesh or the uncreated Word of God made 
scripture: 
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[t]he preachers of the Christian religion urge the morality of Jesus Christ 
as being itself miraculous and stamped with the impression of divinity. 
Mahomet advanced the same pretensions respecting the composition of 
the Koran and, if we consider the number of his followers, with greater 
success
18
  
kkkShelley presents an image of Islam that, as an extension of Christianity, replicates the 
same myth of ‘urg[ing]’ or ‘advanc[ing]’ the ‘same pretension’ of a miraculous conception 
whether in reference to the ‘preachers’ belief in Jesus’ virgin birth or the unlettered prophet 
who ‘compos[es] the Koran’ in order to ‘stamp’ them ‘with the impression of divinity’. 19 In 
tracing these similarities, it becomes more tenable to posit a Shelleyan reading of Islam by 
assessing his comments on Christianity; at his most virile, Shelley perceived the deification 
of a single human being as creating a monopoly on divinity that limited the scope of the 
sublime potential he wanted to believe humanity possessed. This reduction of human value 
was, Shelley felt, compounded by the doctrine of original sin and atonement which he viewed 
as actively discouraging people from maturing spiritually and even chastising their lowly 
state due to an uncontrollable event, leading him to label the doctrine: ‘inconsistent with 
justice and subversive of morality […] Certainly this is a mode of legislation peculiar to a 
state of savageness and anarchy; this is the irrefragable logic of tyranny and imposture.’20 In 
his more positive conceptions of Christianity, the divine nature of Jesus is configured as 
sharing in the natural sublimity available to all but, considering his visionary teachings, 
elevated to the degree of other thinkers (e.g. Shakespeare, Lucretius) to be ranked amongst 
the ‘sublimest and most holy poet.’21 Similarly, depending on the period Shelley is writing, 
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the Qur’an’s inimitable quality as the pinnacle of speech could potentially be construed as 
dissuading originality since if the mythographical function of creativity is to uncover deeper 
truths and the ultimate creative act has already been revealed then the only remaining use for 
imagination is to clarify that monolithic interpretation in different ways. Furthermore, the 
new versions cannot even be said to surpass the core revelation because, unlike Christian 
scriptures whose apostolic origin admits the potential for formal error, the Qur’an purports to 
exhaust the most perfect form. In conceiving language as equally obfuscating and 
enlightening; maintaining a Humean scepticism regarding cause and effect;  promoting an 
essentially positive conception of mankind as representatives (i.e. representations) of a 
greater force accommodating both ideals and necessity; rejecting the notion of trinity as well 
as atonement, a number of affinities emerge between Medieval Muslim thought and Shelley’s 
intellectual interests through which to engage in more thorough examinations regarding 
Shelley’s transvaluations of Islam. The iterative core of Islam as reforming alterations made 
to previous messages is briefly touched upon in an unpublished Prologue to Hellas the play, 
depicting a debate between Jesus and Satan which concludes with Christ chastising Satan for 
prioritising the false delights of materialism and hedonism in favour of a spiritual and 
contemplative life, ‘[t]rue greatness asks not space, true excellence/Lives in the Spirit of all 
things that live,/Which lends it to the worlds thou callest thine’.22 To close the metaphysical 
dispute, however, Shelley introduces Islam through a soliloquy by Muhammad:  
Mahomet: Haste thou and fill the waning crescent/With beams as keen as 
those which pierced the shadow/Of Christian night rolled back upon the 
West,/When the orient moon of Islam rode in triumph/From Timolus to the 
Acroceraunian snow./[next stanza]Wake, thou Word/Of God, and from the 
throne of Destiny/Even to the utmost limit of thy way/May Triumph/[next 
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stanza]Be thou a curse on them whose creed/ Divides and multiplies the 
most high God
23
  
kkkSurprisingly this rendition of the Islamic prophet as a revolutionary fatalist with a 
universal message that both supersedes and extends the influence of Christianity is not 
dissimilar to the image that Gordon Nickel suggests surfaces in his reading of classical 
Muslim hagiography where: ‘Muhammad's authority includes the right to determine both 
theological truth and political power. The narratives have intertwined conquest and 
controversy so tightly as to make them virtually inextricable’.24 Just as Shelley foregrounds 
the prophet’s Eastern origin with a recognition of the universal aspirations of his message: 
‘the orient moon of Islam rode in triumph/From Timolus to the Acroceraunian snow’, Islamic 
hagiography contextualises the Prophet’s life through anecdotes that detail tribal politics for 
the sake of reinforcing Muhammad as a distinctly Arab messenger dealing with issues 
pertinent to a particular time and place despite the universal nature of his call. The split 
affinity underlying Shelley’s, ‘ambivalent relationship with Islam’, emerges where 
Muhammad is figured as: ‘[a]dmonishing the Christian “creed”’, even while seeking to rouse 
Christ to, ‘[t]riumph […] ambiguously appeal[ing] to the “Word/of God” [but 
simultaneously] heralding his own religion’s victory.’25 Nevertheless, the affinities of 
Muhammad’s teachings with eighteenth-century radicalism would not have been lost on 
Shelley who was fully aware that Trinitarian preachers typically evinced a conservative 
political outlook that sought to maintain the power of the elite whereas, to be a radical 
thinker, ‘virtually meant to be a rationalist, a Deist, an Arian or a Socinian: at any rate, an 
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anti-Trinitarian’.26 Accordingly, Shelley, in a letter to Elizabeth Hitchener regarding his 
pamphlet An Address to the Irish People (1812), shows not only an awareness but a clear 
affinity with those who sought to spark political change by exposing the illogical nature of 
the Trinity, explaining that the work is:  
intended to familiarise to uneducated apprehensions ideas of liberty, 
benevolence, peace and toleration. It is secretly intended also as a 
preliminary to other pamphlets to shake Catholicism at its basis, and to 
induce Quakerish and Socinian principles of politics without objecting to 
the Christian Religion
27
 
kkkImplanted within this wider context of Shelleyan mythography, it becomes important not 
to pathologise Shelley’s engagement with Oriental thought in the hopes of determining 
whether he falls short of replicating an Islamic worldview but rather explore affinities and 
disparities in his usage of certain tropes. Shelley, in line with his mythographic schema, does 
not necessarily have to know or even believe that his reimagining of motifs and concepts 
constituting a particular tradition are directed towards the same ends for this generates the 
unreasonable expectation of complete parity, wholly confining validity opinion to synergy of 
thought. The following chapters reassess the Orientalist paradigm which often clouds his 
involvement with the faith in light of, what I deem, the more potent universal and 
intellectually interested undercurrents fuelling Shelley’s poetic transvaluations and taps into 
the more ecumenical ethos that: ‘the only perfect and genuine republic is that which 
comprehends every living being’.28 Despite being problematic, this is a less myopic and 
geographically insular starting point when interpreting his reimagining of Islamic concepts.  
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kkkThe structure of this thesis revolves around three core poems in Shelley’s oeuvre 
spanning 1814 to 1818 as a means of tracing Islam’s role in granting the Romantic Poet a 
host of motifs, characters and settings through which to poeticise his own development and to 
posit that, just as he might invoke Zoroastrian or Platonic myth in a subversive manner, his 
decision making with regards to depicting Islam should be considered from an intellectually 
engaged standpoint. I argue not on the basis that Shelley was steeped in Muslim thought but 
rather to recognise his allusions often gesture towards an interpretive history which is left 
unheard despite undergoing drastic alterations across the span of his Oriental poetics. 
Humberto Garcia has characterised this trajectory as a, ‘short-term infatuation with [the] 
faith’,29 born from a Bonaparte-esque interest in an Islamic republic of politically and 
spiritually minded revolutionaries which culminates in the anti-Islamic rhetoric of The Revolt 
where he prioritises a secularised eschatology signalling the end of all religions, commencing 
with the fall of a Muslim dictator. During this four year window between The Assassins and 
The Revolt, Muslims are presented as: enthusiastic radicals committed to proclaiming 
Nature’s Oneness without fear of upsetting the status quo; martyrs who uphold the sanctity of 
the sublime in a world fixated on icons; freethinkers preserving the human quality of the 
creative imagination by grounding it within historical cycles of prophetic-legislators; as well 
as deterministic despots whose iron law reflects the iron pen of an equally tyrannical 
Transcendent figurehead reified to the position of an abominable Will. A faith driven by the 
potency of language as the isthmus between humanity and divinity, guided by a principle of 
universal brotherhood, or an organised religion which cultivates political hierarchy and 
inculcates slavishness. However, in either instance, Islam is not suddenly removed from the 
transvaluative dynamics of Shelley’s mythography rather the terms of engagement shift to 
variously articulate the desired register and thus, whether syncretic or philhellenic in spirit, 
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my study seeks to overcome the scholarly bias that Shelley’s disdain or presumed 
disinterestedness justifies critical amnesia with regards to Islamic intellectual history as a 
theologically and philosophically rich tradition. Rather than assuming interest only in those 
images which positively affirm Muslim identity, I seek to highlight how Islam plays a 
pertinent role in thinking through Shelley’s split affinities; whether caught between quietism 
and radicalism or monistic materialism and materialistic idealism, Muslim thought granted 
him a lexicon through which to express or contrast his conceptual solutions from 
interanimation via the Gnostic group of Shi’is to Cythna’s mental Book of Fate as a Qur’anic 
inversion of the One Mind. Given that the most immediately available texts included Edward 
Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, William Jones’ Persian 
translations and Romantic Orientalist literature such as Robert Southey’s Thalaba the 
Destroyer, Shelley was exposed to Islam on a historical, metaphysical and tropological level. 
From these sources, he was driven to subsequently exercise his creative authority and 
summon them accordingly within his poetry in order to place them in dialogue with other 
Western schools of thought from rewriting Islamic determinism into a Lucretian void or 
embedding Sufistic devotional poetry into the framework of a bildungsroman governed by 
Lockean empiricism and Humean scepticism. This line of thought might appear to strip 
representation of its particularity by reducing all Oriental motifs to hollow vessels gesturing 
towards an irrelevant system or event and yet, I argue, this approach critically reconstructs an 
identity forgotten or drastically altered through transfiguration and reinstates this more 
historically substantial and intellectually weighty figure back into the web of his 
mythography. Indeed, the investigative spirit underlying readings which explore Shelley’s 
subversion of Christian imagery in Prometheus Unbound and ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’30 
is not wholly dissimilar to my own exploration of how an understanding of Shelley’s Islam 
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can be elucidated through his Eastern-inspired poetry from The Assassins to The Revolt of 
Islam despite the fact that the different metaphysical frameworks within which the Islamic, 
Christian and Shelleyan worldviews are situated naturally result in rather different 
implications.                                                                                       kkk                                         
kkkBy poeticising aspects of the Muslim faith, whether amongst his radical circle or the 
general public, Shelley is contributing to the eighteenth-century literary memory of Islam by 
recontextualising its principles into a set of tropes. Shelley’s usage cannot be understood as 
simply neutral or accidental just as the term, “Islam”, can never be said to exist in a vacuum 
for it has come to symbolise a set of values and principles (regardless as to how varied such 
expressions might be) formulating an identity continuously shaped by the responses of those 
who grapple with, or contribute to, its literature, artwork, or exegesis. These expressions are 
all implicated within a network of voices that constitute its image within the public 
consciousness. The connotative force of such nominal terms (e.g. Europe, America and 
Islam) is governed by the self-understanding of the particular era being examined just as 
other writers who invariably flirted with the topic of religion when discussing the East 
(including Byron, Southey, William Jones and Edward Gibbon) all infuse the faith with 
different elements of their own sensibilities whilst also striving to attain varying degrees of 
authenticity. Therefore, to dismiss Shelley’s Eastern work after The Assassins as reflecting 
his disenchantment towards Islam’s revolutionary potential and arguing that he advocates for, 
‘a state of universal Sameness’, where all are homogonised and subsumed beneath, ‘a fantasy 
of the universalism of revolutionary reason’,31 requires a more holistic examination of the 
value judgements being made when re-presenting Islam that explores beyond the scope of the 
political realm. This is an ideological question and thus, benefits from a cross examination of 
philosophical or theological principles generating those policies. Shelley is internalising 
                                                          
31
 British Romantic Writers and the East, p. 89, p. 128. 
22 
 
imagery and terminology that has come to signify the Islamic tradition for the sake of 
conceptualising to the reader his own critiques regarding idealised revolution or centralised 
power in much the same way he employs Christian allusions in Prometheus Unbound and 
whilst it can be argued a geopolitical reading uniquely haunts any seventeenth or eighteenth 
century appropriation of Eastern faiths, the notion of Western values was no less politicised 
or contested. By attempting to move away from an antagonistic discourse surrounding 
Shelley’s later usage of Islam, I seek not to depoliticise Shelley but rather harness those 
insights as stepping stones towards discerning why the Romantic might have had an affinity 
with a faith whose adherents were known as the, ‘outlaw Ismael[s]’, due to being perceived 
as exiles in a lineage they claim to most truthfully represent and whose entire output was 
subconsciously fixated on, ‘the portion of inheritance [i.e. recognition] of which [they] had 
been unjustly deprived’.32 The question as to whether this revised Islam is less a sincere 
gesture of Shelley’s cosmopolitanism and more a familiar reference point to eventually 
deprive the native entirely of their original beliefs in exchange for a Western veneer remains 
an important concern but, in overly relying on a geographically focused Orientalist approach, 
this language of exploitation risks curtailing any serious consideration of Islam as a 
theological system that Shelley is responding to. In noting the transvaluative decision making 
taking place during his displacing of Islamic concepts for new purposes, I intend to critically 
engage with the same quandaries that his mythopoetics sought to examine such as the 
question of how civilisations generate shared values through disparate narratives and why 
humanity derives icons from principles. Arguing that Shelley did not possess enough 
information to author a valid conceptualisation of Islam is useful insofar as it prompts 
contemporary critics to incorporate primary and secondary sources not with a view to 
invalidating his transvaluation as unorthodox (for that dismisses the creative aspects in his 
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mythography) but rather offer a more nuanced perspective on the nature of his inversions and 
the design behind such choices.                                                                                     
kkkInasmuch as the representations Shelley receives are filtered through specific cultural 
lenses and his own portrayal is modified by personal interests, it might be argued that there 
remains a difficulty in discerning what benefit ushering Muslim voices into the frame of the 
text would have. My methodology, however, refrains from positing the Islamic 
interpretations as more genuine for, in writing a literary as opposed to theological study, the 
focus is not to establish a hierarchy between orthodox and unorthodox because that would 
assume, on the part of Muslim history, a coherent, self-contained and continuous process and 
reduce its identity as a diverse tradition capable of being variously situated and resituated 
over time. There exist divergent scholars associated with Ash’ari, Mu’tazili, Ismaili, and 
Maturidi thought who utilise different rhetorical modes to produce interpretations that vary 
from the abstract to the literal, all of which are in dialogue with external systems from 
Neoplatonism to Zoroastrianism and range from questions regarding the nature of God’s 
transcendence (tanzıh) and immanence (tashbıh) or the synthesis between reason (aql) and 
revelation (naql). Failing to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of Islamic intellectual 
history characterised by dynamism and discrepancy, literary analysis will continue to reduce 
the faith to a static artefact that signifies nothing beyond the tropes provided and although I 
do not assume that reclaiming these voices is an unproblematic process for recognition 
implies an already altered form of cognition, ‘ruin[ing] the power of knowing [because] it 
never lets me cease reaching what I cannot attain,’ and yet, if the ‘ungraspable [is] 
inescapable’, then it is endeavour worth undertaking rather than avoiding.33 Recognition, 
therefore, is at the heart of my study as I attempt to salvage those perspectives from whose 
text, context and pre-text Shelley simultaneously adopts, adapts and embeds within his 
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poetically grounded mythography which similarly reformulates stale perception into fresh 
associations, ‘mark[ing] the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuat[ing] 
their apprehension [within the web of] human intercourse’,34 and thus, attune to both the 
retroactive and forward-facing aspects of inspiration, retracing these intertextual and 
metonymic links should hopefully revitalise critical perception of Islam within the context of 
Shelley’s literature. This struggle for recognition (to be recognised and to recognise others) 
also thematically pervades each part of my thesis: The Assassins revolves around restoring 
awareness of a melodic strain of philosopher-poets (resembling the lineage of hidden Imams) 
in order to remind others of their connection to a forgotten tradition; Alastor explores the 
different ways humanity chooses to recognise what is sensed, but not yet accounted for, 
behind the veil of phenomenal existence; The Revolt of Islam emphasises the need to grant 
martyred voices recognition for their sacrifice which causes them to fade and become tropes. 
None of these instances of cognitive renewal rail against obfuscation but rather intellectual 
obscurantism for the latter implies overindulgent sophistry and religious fanaticism whereas 
the former includes paradoxes, Lucretian voids and Demogorgon-esque shadows which are 
posited as necessary corollaries for motivating enlightenment and revitalising apprehension.  
Thesis Overview 
kkkPart One explores The Assassins by first contextualising Shelley’s rendition of the titular 
Order alongside the opinions of other eighteenth and nineteenth-century Orientalists from 
Silvestre de Sacy to Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall to discern the extent to which Shelley 
echoed those who regarded them as fanatical zealots blindly spreading violence or 
enthusiastic reformers who, facing persecution, stood up to preserve their way of life and the 
sanctity of a spiritual lineage. As both an expansion of the sentiments shared in An Address to 
the Irish People as well as a precursor to The Mask of Anarchy (1819), The Assassins 
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warrants closer eamination for what it reveals about Shelley’s seemingly paradoxical stance 
on violence as a means to achieving a desired end. In having his necessitarian naturalists 
occupy a mountainous region in solitude only to be met by a stranger whose rhetorical 
adeptness enables him to enact an almost supranatural command over this disenfranchised 
community, Shelley not only invokes the image of Hassan bin Sabbah (the Assassin leader) 
but inadvertently draws comparisons to himself with this figure as a poet as well as a 
reformer. By displacing Hassan’s originary aims, the Romantic poet re-envisions the groups 
in line with contemporary attitudes towards secret societies which posed a threat to 
monarchy. Hence, Shelley’s desire for anarchy and gradualism causes him to become 
intrigued by Islamic expressions of the revolutionary spirit he sees as vital to the natural order 
and in turn, through his prose and poetry, entertain such voices from the Wahabees to the 
Hashashin.                                                                                        kkk                                              
kkkIn the companion piece I take a more metaphysical approach, offsetting the esoteric 
doctrine of the Imamate and the Hidden Mahdi with Shelley’s living melody of bards whose 
voices awaken the unenlightened masses in order to discern the extent that Shelley’s own 
theories on inspiration and its embeddedness within creatively deterministic cycles of good 
versus evil reveal an underlying affinity for the occult which finds its expression not simply 
within Christian but also Ismaili Gnosticism. To carry out this comparative analysis, I invoke 
Ross Wilson and Wilfred Dowden’s concepts of interanimation and metempsychosis as 
inroads through which to mediate a comparative analysis between Shi’i theology and 
Shelleyan poetics and, in delineating the overlaps as well as the conflicts, structure a more 
comprehensive understanding of Shelley’s transvaluative decisions when, by writing about 
the sect, he invariably introduced Ismaili thought into the frame of his mythography. 
Emphasising the continued lineage of human responses reveals a shared pattern of successive 
guides who revitalise appreciation for forgotten apprehension as a means of overcoming a 
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temporal retard. I seek to reestablish the sect as being more relevant to Shelley’s 
conceptualisation of mythopoetics than would otherwise be presumed on an understanding of 
Shi’i Gnosticism as an innately authoritarian hierarchy which contradicts Shelley’s radicalism 
as promoting free thinking.                                                                                                                      
kkkIn Part Two, I compare the psychology between lover and Beloved as expounded in 
Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude and expressed in the translated works of mystical poets 
from Rumi to Hafez. I invoke Lacanian neurosis and Derridean aporia as hermeneutical tools 
through which to mediate the Sufistic and the Shelleyan conceptualisations of a bereft 
wanderer yearning for an ideal companion. Each approach emphasises the productive power 
of paradox by disparaging language’s inability to convey that which cannot be expressed. 
Shelley and the Sufi poets analysed in this chapter reject a linear narrative founded upon 
progression and tending towards finality in favour of producing works that warn against 
assigning fixed images to life’s mysteries and appreciate how interpreting the ideal only 
exposes further veils. I utilitse non-contemporary philosophies in order to expand the bounds 
of recognition by looking forward and in doing so, highlight intertextuality as not solely an 
endeavour relegated to the past but a principle which can shed light upon, and be illuminated 
by, subsequent thought. To the extent that my thesis is driven by a desire to add depth to 
Islamic history within Shelleyan scholarship there is a similarly strong impulse to expand that 
depth in the opposite direction through Shelley himself. Throughout this study, I explore 
Shelley’s relation with Muslim thought through his relevant interest in Godwin, Locke, 
Hume, Drummond, and Lucretius, as well as Freemasonry, radical Protestantism and 
syncretism. I am, therefore, compelled to examine how this dialogue might elucidate the 
nature of his psychoanalytic and deconstructive tendencies in order for my reading to be truly 
multidimensional and transhistorical.                                                                                               
kkkThe subsequent chapter presents a comparative analysis between Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 
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Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude and Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan by examining their 
commentaries on the roles of intuition and deduction in discerning Nature’s mysteries. The 
Enlightenment interest in Edward Pococke’s translation of the allegorical novel feeds its way 
into Shelley’s discourse via figures such as John Locke and David Hume. In delineating the 
material and idealist strains permeating both Shelley and Ibn Tufayl’s philosophy –offsetting 
the former’s engagement with Lockean empiricism and Humean scepticism against the 
latter’s reimagining of Ibn Sina’s tabula rasa and al-Ghazali’s occasionalism – a clearer 
picture emerges as to how Islamic thought not only pervades the imagery in Alastor as a 
byproduct of William Jones’s Persian translations but also enters into the frame 
philosophically inasmuch as Shelley’s engagement with eighteenth-century philosophy of 
mind informs his depiction of mental content versus material object. The existence of Hayy 
Ibn Yaqzan within this intellectual milieu provides a new avenue to approach the poem 
through questions relating to the human mind as self-sufficient, the benefit of creative 
imagination when perception proves insufficient, the disregard for religious institutions as the 
sole means to salvation, and appreciating how the eudaimonistic component in insight adds 
tangible value to an individual’s existence.                                                                                      
kkkPart Three revolves around The Revolt of Islam exploring how Cythna is not necessarily 
rebelling against Islam to the extent that she frames herself as an ex-Muslim against the 
canonical, fatalistic interpretation symbolised by Othman; instead, she strives to reformulate 
the collective consciousness with regards to how these concepts are understood as she adapts 
rather than discards the Book of Fate. In other words, she produces a subjective and 
pluralised rendition in contrast to the monolithic and inflexible alternative. The impact of 
revolutionising Islam, as denoted by the title, reverberates even at an atomic level and serves 
as a commentary on Eastern Fatalism as Shelley traverses a path between upholding free will 
whilst recognising how external, non-human forces play a key role in determining reality. In 
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balancing humanity’s inner capacity for reformation alongside Necessity’s compulsion to 
materialise potentialities, Laon and Cythna hope others will remain attune to life’s 
unknowability and unpredictability whilst allowing this existential mystery from hardening 
into dogmatic certainty. Shelley metonymically displaces God’s sovereignty upheld within an 
Ash’arite atomistic worldview in favour of a Lucretian atomistic void shaped by the 
indifferent hand of Necessity, harmonised by the Spirit of Beauty and altered by humanity’s 
actions which inevitably subverts the role of martyrdom. Even though the notion of death is 
key to both atomic systems the significance differs as Muslim occasionalists argue atoms are 
destroyed and recreated in each instance to allow for miracles over creation whilst the 
materialism of The Revolt rests on a Lucretian entropic spontaneity and thus, the former 
foregrounds Allah’s Will as the One who gives and takes life whereas the latter posits the 
ghosting effect of others as the catalyst for futurity.                                                                               
kkkThe Revolt as a reframing of Islam informs the other companion piece for I argue the 
characters are amalgamations of figures constituting Islamic history in an attempt to 
transvalue the notion of holy war. The Muslim enthusiasm to undertake reform driven by a 
unshaken commitment to a principle of universal brotherhood (present in The Assassins) is 
still reflected through Laon and Cythna whose pacifistic rebellion to dethrone a superstitious, 
tyrannical ruler echoes the conquest of Mecca as outlined in Gibbon’s The History of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and thus, it is in offsetting Laon and Cythna alongside 
Muhammad and A’isha that their differences as revolutionary messengers emerges. Although 
the desert sands provide a foundation upon which to establish the likes of Othman’s despotic 
government its shifting nature also opens up a space for instability and flexibility which 
translates to the amorphous gender dynamics at play as Laon is increasingly feminised and 
Cythna assumes a masculine label until becoming interconnected upon death in an allegorical 
afterlife, a transsexual rhetoric that I trace within Sufistic circles as it pertains to female 
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mystics who assume male pronouns and male wayfarers who are positioned in an effeminate 
position relative to their spiritual guides.                                                                                 
kkkUltimately, determining Islam’s place within Shelley’s mythopoetic schema requires an 
understanding of how the idiosyncrasies in his interpretation of the faith constitute a literary 
persona through which he can vocalise and visualise a specific set of values that are 
collectively unavailable via other belief systems he creatively transvalues. My intention is not 
to reduce Shelley’s Oriental poems to discussions regarding a geographical Other but rather 
assess which tenets he deems contemptible, which concepts or images he chooses to 
reimagine, which character archetypes he promotes as respectable blueprints; and, in turn, 
consider what his decision making process (when revolutionising Islam for poetic 
consumption) reveals about his mythographic tendencies at large. Although the aim of this 
piece is not to uncover hidden devotion to a faith Shelley never professed to believe, it is 
interesting to ponder what form Shelley’s ‘Islamite’35 might take and, given his poetic 
tendency to transvalue various religious iconography and concepts as part of his 
mythographic project, it is not surprising the shape it adopts is as deeply paradoxical as the 
sceptical idealist himself. When describing the poetic process Shelley lapses into a 
submission-based transaction with regards to an all-pervading Spirit even as he promotes 
liberty and the interconnected nature of inspiration on a human level. To conceptualise his 
stance of destiny, Shelley maintains a rhetoric of inscription (whether mental or textual) even 
as he attempts to circumvent the metaphysical connotations of the Islamic Book of Fate. 
Despite perceiving fanaticism and patriarchy as oppressive forces, he romanticises 
martyrdom and posits the Orient as a constantly shifting landscape where flexibility regarding 
sexuality is possible. From a revolutionary standpoint, Shelley respects the Socinian 
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rebellious spirit even as he denounces monotheism as leading to monolithic power structures 
and, in terms of philosophy, he coheres with an Ash’arite scepticism regarding any 
empirically verifiable link between cause and effect but refrains from transcendentalising a 
potentially mediating force.  
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Part One: 1814 
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Chapter 1 
Godwinian Quietism or Hashashin enthusiasm? Ismaili Gnosticism as a prototype for 
Shelley’s cosmology of Violence  
kkkThe Assassins (1814) depicts a Shelleyan reimagining of an historical branch of twelfth-
century Persian Shi’i’s (combined with strong allusions to another Christian Gnostic sect that 
moved from Jerusalem to Lebanon around 70 A.D) who live in modest seclusion, committing 
themselves to the universal principle of love, communing with Nature, as well as spurning the 
material obsession for status and wealth sought by the majority of mankind. The result is a 
poetic rumination on how to balance French Radicalism and Godwinian quietism – self-
assertion and selflessness. Shelley’s necessitarian naturalists occupy a space between 
metahistory and mythography as they are chronologically proto-Assassins gesturing towards 
‘a time in which Mount Lebanon “would become the staging-post of world reform”,’1 whilst 
also being imagined retroactively in light of the Ismaili myth. I seek to bridge this conceptual 
gap by expanding the frame of reference to include Shelley’s prose works on reform as well 
as elucidating the Ismaili thought underpinning the Islamic sect in order to move beyond 
Bryan Shelley’s assertion that, ‘Shelley confused a primitive Christian community with a 
heretical Islamic sect’,2 which reduces the title to being simply a foil for Christian Gnosticism 
or an empty vessel for conveying contemporary revolutions and instead, build upon 
Humberto Garcia’s claim that: ‘[t]he Prophet’s teachings preserved a primitive Jewish-
Christian Gnosticism [which influenced] the story of the “Gnostic” Assassins [to revolve] 
about a pseudo-Muslim idyllic community’.3 In delineating various ideological affinities with 
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the Assassins, Shelleyan scholarship can gain a greater appreciation as to how the title is 
more pertinent to Shelley’s cosmology of violence than perhaps is first assumed. 
God as Nature 
kkkShelley initially describes his rendition of the Assassins as, ‘a little congregation of 
Christians [who applied] no laws but those of God [from which] they modelled their conduct 
towards their fellow-men by the conclusions of their individual judgment’, they evince a 
rather typical Shelleyan aversion to manmade institutions signified by the likes of Rome 
which subjugate its population via, ‘the slavery of pagan customs and the gross delusions of 
antiquated superstition’.4 Even during the opening section, the Assassins are presented as 
pious Christians who revolve their lives around Christ’s laws as well as rationalists who 
believed that the mysteries of scripture were not simply meant to be confined within the 
realm of Divine Knowledge but could be explicated through the use of human reason, 
maintaining that: ‘the obscurest religious truth required for its complete elucidation no more 
than the strenuous application of the energies of mind’.5 As a community who followed the, 
‘doctrines of the Messiah concerning benevolence and justice for the regulation of their 
actions’,6 they were dedicated to maintaining ‘social happiness’ which inculcated within them 
a deep-seated aversion towards, ‘the pleasures and the customs of the degenerate mass of 
mankind’,7 and thus, leaving them no other option but to seek isolation in Lebanon free from 
the corrupting influence of Rome that would, ‘not have failed speedily to obliterate the 
magnificence and beauty of their wild and wonderful condition’.8 In the hopes of finding a 
place to call their own in which, ‘Love, friendship, and philanthropy, would now be the 
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characteristic disposers of their industry’,9 they decide to make a home in the valley of 
Bethzatanai since not only does it appear to be an idyllic haven secluded from the perversions 
of high society but it captures their imagination as the abode for an anthropomorphised spirit 
of Nature who: ‘had become an enchantress in these solitudes [collecting] here all that was 
wonderful and divine from the armoury of her omnipotence’.10 Indeed, the awe-inspiring 
sights of their newfound home generate, ‘strange scenes of chaotic confusion and harrowing 
sublimity’,11 which results in an increased appreciation of the Natural Sublime to take shape 
within the hearts and minds of the Assassins and which, over the course of their stay, 
overrides any earlier commitment to Christ with an enthusiastic zeal for the ‘God of nature’ 
who, under the veil of mystery, was believed to possess ‘great intelligence and power’.12 
Their increasing love of nature as the closest approximation of uncorrupted spirit 
apprehensible in this world generated, a ‘new and sacred fire [burning] in their hearts and 
sparkl[ing] in their eyes’,13 and, ‘perfected the singularity and excellence of their character’, 
to the point of causing irrevocable damage to previous ‘religious tenets’ as their initial sense 
of indebtedness which, ‘they owed to the benignant Spirit [who] had not only […] created but 
redeemed [them]’, slowly became ‘less the topic of comment or contemplation’ and instead, 
was conferred to a more amorphous  benefactor, felt ‘among the solitary rocks, and has its 
dwelling alike in the changing colours of the clouds’.14 Having implicitly renounced the 
saving power of Christ and denounced the civilising principles of Rome, Shelley presents his 
Assassins as free from the two great forces of tyranny, revealed religion and imperial politics, 
which both rely on the, ‘assumed kindness of commercial man’,15 to maintain harmony 
within community as opposed to those who follow Nature’s Law and destabilise hierarchies 
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that rely on monolithic forms of power encapsulated by a singular figurehead (e.g. God or 
King). The community desires a natural equality where mankind employ their heightened 
intellectual faculties to produce happiness in others and as a consequence, create a republic in 
which all citizens: ‘labour in unconstrained equality to dispossess the wolf and the tiger of 
their empire, and establish on its ruins the dominion of intelligence and virtue’.16 At this point 
Shelley discusses the role of violence as a necessary evil in order to maintain such peace, the 
Assassins bridge the gap between a type of gluttonous drive for immediate gratification 
promoted in high society and the passive renunciation of desires for delayed reward in an 
afterlife encouraged by the church since they seek to, ‘produce immediate pain or disorder for 
the sake of future [worldly] benefit’, causing them to take matters into their own hands and 
‘wage unremitting hostility from principle’. 17 In a world where the majority would dismiss 
their actions as purely barbaric, they would only become associated, ‘among the vilest and 
most atrocious criminals’,18 due to the ‘bestial’ nature of those under the yoke of human 
institutions preventing them from ‘feel[ing] their chains’ and recognising the unnatural 
restrictions being imposed through civil life, removing any sense of humanity as part of a 
natural order. The Assassins believe that contentment is only achieved when a person 
realises, ‘man is eminently man’,19 which entails recognising oneself as an organic entity who 
is superior, on an intellectual and creative level, to the rest of creation but being both bound 
by necessity as well as miniscule in relation to the grandeur of Nature. In contrast to the false 
sense of supremacy engendered by a cosmopolitan society cut off from any sense of an 
external sublime or the Christian meekness inculcated by a doctrine which transcendentalises 
the natural world to a supranatural degree, the Assassins teach others to recognise the futility 
of challenging nature’s course and instead, in learning to function within the unavoidable 
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impositions of fatalism whilst also cultivating those uniquely humane qualities, work 
alongside nature to attain the closest approximation of human nature perfected, until ‘his 
affections and his judgment pay tribute to the God of Nature’.20 Unifying with necessity 
invariably leads these Gnostics to become a natural force which is principally driven to wage 
war against those who ‘pander to falsehood and desolation’, wiping out anything unnatural 
and becoming martyrs to the greater cause of maintaining nature’s harmony leading to a 
legacy in which their heroic ‘path through the wilderness of civilized society would be 
marked with the blood of the oppressor and the ruiner’.21 In terms of ethics, the group 
occupies a middle ground between being both duty-bound as well as intrinsically compelled 
to be religiously motivated by love of, ‘[c]ourage and active virtue, [alongside an] 
indignation against vice’, is maintained but transfigured into, ‘a hurrying and irresistible 
passion’, which takes the form of those same naturalistic forces that it seeks to replicate, ‘like 
the imprisoned earthquake, or the lightning shafts [hanging] in the golden clouds of evening’, 
all of which are unified under a common law dictated by the God of Nature, ‘the author of 
their felicity’.22 
The Order of Assassins in Romantic Orientalism 
kkkAn examination of Shelley’s understanding of the sect would be incomplete without also 
detailing the assumptions held by eighteenth-century Orientalists with regard to the Nizari 
Assassins as well as providing a brief survey of manuscripts that were accessible to scholars 
in order to ascertain to what extent any biases inherent in these sources might have found 
their way into popular opinion. The main points of reference when studying this Islamic sect 
during the Romantic period came from two equally negative if largely disparate perspectives 
encompassing both East and West; on the one hand, European accounts included documents 
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from theological tracts written by Crusaders who carried out widespread military campaigns 
on the already divided Ismailis spread across Egypt and Syria to travel accounts composed by 
the likes of Marco Polo which, for the sake of commercial scandal, benefitted from weaving 
an overly negative portrayal of Muslims as barbaric; on the other hand, Sunni manuscripts 
available at the time held a number of prejudices towards the Ismailis as an unorthodox sect 
who posed a real threat to the Abbasid caliphate and Sunni rule with the Fatimid empire even 
going as far as to develop the pejorative term hashishis (‘low-class rabble’, ‘irreligious social 
outcast’)23 to describe the Assassins. Consequently, Shelley’s violent but revolutionary 
depiction of the Assassins was a scandalous portrayal of a historical group known as the 
fidais (devotees), popularised by Marco Polo and expanded upon amongst Romantics by 
Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy in Memoire sur la dynastie des Assassins, et sur l'etymologie de 
leur nom, accusing them of drugging and transporting their victims to a real life reimagining 
of paradise, in the form of a beautiful garden, so that they might gain a taste of the pleasures 
awaiting them in the next life.
 24
 Hasan bin Sabbah (founder of the Assassin Order) was 
believed to have incited these practices on the shared understanding that, in following these 
steps, his followers would reach higher levels of spirituality after death which offers a 
pertinent image to analyse Shelley’s fragment given that, as Cian Duffy notes: the ‘natural 
republic [of the Assassins] clearly represents a revision of Hassan’s legendary pleasure-
garden at Alamut’. 25 Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (1774-1856) was amongst the more 
notable Oriental scholars who reiterated the negative stereotypes found in Sunni 
historiography as well as Marco Polo’s work declaring that, ‘what the Byzantines, the 
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Crusaders, and Marco Polo related of them, was long considered a groundless legend, and an 
oriental fiction’, but as developments are made in the study of Arabic and an increasing 
number of manuscripts continue to be unearthed that shed light on the period in which the 
Assassins lived, then ‘the veracity of the father of modern travel, like that of the father of 
ancient history [Herodotus], only shines with greater lustre’.26 The severity and resentfulness 
that pervades von Hammer’s assessment of this group that he deems a, ‘union of impostors 
and dupes which, under the mask of a more austere creed and severer morals, undermined all 
religion and morality,’27 is largely a response to what he perceived, in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, as the increasing influence of, ‘secret societies [from the Freemasons to 
Jesuits] in weak governments, and of the dreadful prostitution of religion to the horrors of 
unbridled ambition’.28 This cultic association stirred within him a very real fear of the mob 
mentality that arises when frail minds are stripped of their will during, ‘various grades of 
initiation[wherein they swear an] oath of unconditional obedience to unknown superiors, to 
serve the ends of the order.’29  In general, this seditious interpretation is largely derived from 
a selection of stories revolving around the assassinations of certain government officials 
which are themselves shrouded in legend with certain scholars, such as the thirteenth-century 
Persian historian Ata-Malek Juvayni who wrote a number of anti-Ismaili texts, interpreting 
their behaviour as acts of terrorism whilst others echoed Shelley’s more positive outlook by 
choosing to reframe such conduct in terms of heroic guerrilla warfare intended for survival 
such as modern Orientalist Clifford Bosworth who argued the Ismailis were attempting to 
maintain peace in a politically hostile environment between the Franks and Sunnis and 
Bernard Lewis who lauded their steadfastness in the face of devastating odds: ‘Hasan [bin 
Sabbah] founded a new way, by which a small force, disciplined and devoted, could strike 
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effectively against the overwhelmingly superior army’.30 The public manner in which the 
fidais either verbally threatened or physically assassinated prominent officials was testimony 
to the fact that their use of force served to undermine government power not purely for the 
sake of killing but to send a message to invaders or rival tribes so that no more blood had to 
be spilled which presents an alternate perspective from which to view the group in a similar 
manner to Shelley’s own poetic transfiguration wherein the oft-repeated narratives of extreme 
violence and unsympathetic brutality are retold not in terms of: ‘[a] despot’s struggle for 
power, but as the Necessary, violent assertion of natural equality in the face of oppression’.31 
Taken in context, they were attempting to uphold the sovereignty of their Ismaili brethren in 
the face of a rising Sunni presence across Iran encouraged by the expanding Seljuk dynasty 
(1037-1192) which they perceived as potentially abolishing not only a sense of religious 
identity but also bringing into question what it meant to be Persian in the same way that the 
conquest in Manzikert by Alp Arslan, the Sejuk empire’s second sultan, is typically cited as 
not simply the catalyst for Byzantines waning influence in Anatolia but also credited as 
laying the foundation for the predominance of Turkish identity in the region. As Alp Arslan 
stormed through the Byzantine Empire on his way to attack the heartland of Ismaili rule, the 
Fatimid dynasty, there lingered a very palpable threat to identity formation and self-
conceptualisation and it lay upon Hasan-i Sabbah’s shoulders to maintain the wellbeing of his 
followers against a rather antagonistic backdrop.                                                                                                      
kkkUnlike von Hammer who used the Assassins as an example of how secret societies 
abused the weak infrastructure generated during times of political turmoil by providing a 
sense of belonging in the name of extremism, Shelley envisions their fictitious republic as a 
defence against conservative, religious accounts of nature’s sublimity that judges intelligent 
design as proof of a transcendent Creator in a missassociative flight of fancy which Shelley 
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would have interpreted as unnecessarily projecting mankind’s true essence as something 
beyond creation and drawing attention away from the organic bond of Anthropos as 
constituted by a more immediate Spirit of Nature. Rather than produce a contrived 
perspective of the world based purely on a desire to conform to popular discourse, the 
Assassins are lauded as being in direct opposition to Shelley’s schoolboy qualms regarding 
the superstitious nature of Christianity which promotes uncritical belief in immaterial entities 
including tales, ‘of the Devil, and Eve, and an Intercessor [that are] irreconcilable with the 
knowledge of the stars’, unlike these engaged spectator of nature who: ‘rightly feels its 
mystery and grandeur [and] is in no danger of seduction from the falsehoods of religious 
systems, or of deifying the principle of the universe’.32 In every aspect of their existence the 
Assassins either experientially or physically rail against a status quo that demands conformity 
in a manner that grants insight into Shelley’s views on gradualism since, free from the 
imposition of hierarchical systems, the Assassins strive to maintain equality amongst 
themselves with each member being appreciated as a necessary part of a large organic whole 
and generating a sense of undifferentiated unity that is reflective of the self-contained solace 
of their surrounding valley. Nevertheless, far from cultivating a natural or passive outlook, 
constant exposure to the awe-inspiring sights of the Natural Sublime exposes the insincerity 
characteristic of modern life as governed by monarchical or ecclesiastical rule which obliges 
them to right wrongs by force if necessary and although they: ‘were innocent […] they were 
capable of more than innocence; for the great principles of their faith’.33 As a community 
they are guided by reason, their beliefs and behaviour are determined by personal 
assessments irrespective of tradition or societal pressure, this elevation of rationality and self-
will over the dictates of custom even extends to their religion (in a lose sense of the term as 
defined by worship of an amorphous spirit intuited in nature) which is a doctrine that 
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commands little authority within itself or, at the very least, without the supreme power of 
intellect to discern what should be followed or ignored:  
they could not be persuaded to acknowledge that there was apparent in 
the divine code any prescribed rule whereby, for its own sake, one action 
rather than another, as fulfilling the will of their great Master, should be 
preferred
34
  
Mirroring an Epicurean understanding of eudaemonia, the Assassin’s association of virtue 
with pleasure leads them to seek moral goods with actions that generate the most delight: 
‘[t]he path of virtue and felicity was plain and unimpeded [...] They could not conceive an 
instance in which it would be their duty to hesitate, in causing, at whatever expense, the 
greatest and most unmixed delight’.35 A danger arises, however, when lives are governed by 
a compulsive drive for pleasure as this self-indulgent attitude can easily devolve into 
selfishness or a general inconsideration for their own wellbeing and the wellbeing of others. 
Nevertheless, the wholehearted willingness to destroy for love was a principle that Shelley 
could at least respect theoretically, if not also relate to practically,
36
 which is why he conveys 
them as misunderstood by a superficial society overly concerned with outward horror of their 
methods (whether violence or hedonistic) rather than making the effort to understand the 
beliefs from which they stem: ‘[s]ecure and self-enshrined in the magificence and 
preeminence of his conceptions, spotless as the light of heaven, he would be the victim 
among men of calumny and persecution.’37                                                                                   
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kkkIndeed, in direct opposition to the likes of von Hammer, Shelley’s reading at the time of 
composing The Assassins, particularly Abbe Barruel's Memoirs Illustrating the History of 
Jacobinism,
38
 highlights how Shelley’s depiction of the Shi’i sect was closely aligned with 
his understanding of eighteenth-century secret societies  as bastions of an undying 
revolutionary spirit which railed against monarchy and clergy. Philosophers from Voltaire to 
Jean Jacques Rousseau were condemned for their sustained attack on the church and critiqued 
for destabilising Christianity’s power under the false names freedom and equality. 39 These 
thinkers provided the rationale for certain secret societies to undermine any conservative 
opposition that sought to curtail the advancement of the French Revolution inspired by works 
such as Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws and Rousseau's Social Contract which had: 
‘[birthed] that disquieted spirit which fought to investigate the rights of sovereignty, the 
extent of their authority, the pretended rights of the free man, and without which every 
subject is branded for a slave – and every king a despot’.40 It was this ‘disquieted spirit’ 
compelled by a particular scholar, or group of intellectuals, that imparted to their followers a 
kind of sceptical doctrine through maxims such as, ‘[s]uperstition sets the whole world in 
flames; philosophy quenches them’,41 which comes closest to replicating the organising 
principle of the Imamate when it comes to prompting the real life Assassins to action even 
though, historically, this leadership was not entirely free from the deification or negative 
stigma various enlightenment radicals associated with a priesthood who hypocritically called 
to God whilst engaging in illicit acts. Critics, like Barruel, preferred to interpret the Jacobin 
mission of disarming monarchies of their power as indicative of a larger disregard for 
authority or structure ushering them to squash, ‘underfoot the altars and the thrones in the 
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name of that equality and that liberty which summon the peoples to the disasters of revolution 
and the horrors of anarchy’,42 as opposed to emphasising their disdain for imperial 
colonialism as a system of dispossession. The devout followers in question from the 
Freemasons to the Order of the Illuminati who are characterised as being, ‘the adepts of 
impiety, the adepts of rebellion, and the adepts of anarchy’,43 are useful approximations of 
Shelley’s Assassins since they too were sects believed to hold a potentially violent, if elitist, 
desire to deconstruct any form of concentrated power by, ‘extirpating this infamous 
superstition [of Christianity and monarchy among those] worthy of being enlightened’,44 and, 
as a result of their fervent campaign to redistribute rights in opposition to traditional 
prejudices governed by superstition, they were condemned as: ‘all zealous for the Revolution, 
and all ready to rise at the first signal and to impart the shock to all others classes of the 
people’.45 Notably, in extreme cases, the call for an uprising was elitist in the sense that only 
those ready and willing to develop alongside the shift in power structure (both politically and 
cosmologically) would survive the radical intellectual onslaught but, due to the far-reaching 
nature of such a complete societal reboot, the consequences would be felt amongst all classes 
who would be shocked into conformity for their own benefit or risk become as equally non-
existent and disenfranchised as those before them. Caught between the paradox of quietism 
and insurrection, the Assassins are depicted equal part radical sect and secret society 
providing Shelley with a balance between the enthusiastic, rebellious fervour he admires in 
the Wahabees alongside a Gnostic element in the form of the Imamate which echoes his own 
belief in poets as unacknowledged legislators who are brought to, as well as shaped by, their 
age to challenge falsehood through a deeper appreciation of the natural order. 
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A Middle Path Between Pacifism and Insurrection 
kkkHaving provided context for the socio-political milieu in which Shelley was writing the 
Assassins, it is useful to assess the validity of Cian Duffy’s assertion that not only is, ‘the 
stranger who enters the Assassins' valley’, a poetic reflection of the real Assassin leader, 
Hassan bin Sabbah, but he would also have functioned as, ‘the violent antithesis of a 
Godwinian steward, transforming the dormant sect into precisely the kind of revolutionary 
secret society that Godwin feared.’46 Shelley’s politically minded works, particularly during 
the early 1800s to 1819, exhibit a split personality with change being driven at times by a call 
to gradualism and passive resistance which require individuals to determine their own 
livelihood by first taking a hold of their inner life as well as morally shaming those in power 
by refraining from adopting the same underhand tactics to which they are subjected to whilst, 
at other times, Shelley champions violent overthrow of tyranny as a necessary expression of a 
universal spirit of nature that redresses imbalances or inequality in the natural order.  To 
better understand how this complex amalgamation of pacifism and rebellion characterises 
Shelley’s use of the Assassins it serves to assess the plight of another religious minority, the 
Irish Catholics, who Shelley sought to advise in an An Address to the Irish People (1812) 
alongside an examination of his response to the Peterloo Massacre within the prose piece A 
Philosophical View of Reform (1819) which raised questions as to the utility of passivity as a 
force for revolution in the face of indiscriminate brutality carried out by the government. In 
order to dissuade the Irish from seeking violent revenge for the injustices enacted upon them 
by the Protestants, Shelley reminds his audience of the historical persecution that Protestants 
had endured during the Inquisition not as a means of burdening either side with past sins for, 
‘you are not answerable for the faults of your fathers any more than the Protestants are good 
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for the goodness of their fathers’,47 but to warn them of the pitfalls of righteous vengeance 
wherein either side seeks divine reward in exchange for upholding God’s Honour at any cost 
without recognising that ‘was the very worst way for getting into favor with a Being who Is 
allowed by all to be best pleased with deeds of love and charity’.48 The principle of pursuing 
justice for the sake of upholding honour is not an emotion that Shelley strives to suppress 
entirely for even he acknowledges ‘the warm feelings of an Irishman sometimes carries him 
beyond the point of prudence’ but this ‘honorable warmth’ should be ‘moderate[d]’ rather 
than ‘root[ed] out’ for it is only under the influence of institutions (either political or 
religious) that such fervour is taken to an extreme as was the case with the atrocities 
committed by the Roman Catholic Clergy under the Pope’s commands. Shelley feared that 
even the most logical human being could be persuaded by poverty and charismatic leaders to 
denounce their belief in pacifism as a force for change in favour of retaliation since: ‘even 
though rational people are very good in their natural state, there are now, and ever have been 
very few whose good dispositions despotic power does not destroy’.49 It is at this point that 
the potential origins of Shelley’s interpretation of Hassan bin Sabbah in The Assassins can be 
traced not only to the historical personage but to the Romantic poet who perceived himself in 
similar terms: an outsider fighting for a disenfranchised community driven from high society 
who possessed a command over language through which he connected to a strain of forgotten 
poetic voices who all similarly attempted to persuade an entire nation into action on a world-
historical level in exchange for complete trust.
50
 Both leaders promise to remain committed to 
the plight of those whose company they inhabit but only on the understanding that their 
dedication is reciprocated; the only difference is in degree rather than kind as Shelley’s 
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request for conviction, ‘[i]f you will not repose any trust in me I shall lament, but I will do 
every thing in my power that is honorable, fair, and open, to gain it’,51 is seemingly less 
overbearing than the stranger’s pleas which can be read as verging on totalitarian and yet, 
given the fragmentary nature of the piece, it remains ambiguous enough to be a genuine call 
for acceptance, ‘[your partner] must love me more dearly than a brother. I must be the 
playmate of your children; already I regard them with a father’s love’.52 It could be argued 
such ambiguity indicates that the stranger is a foil for ‘[t]he Monks and the Priests of old’ 
who Shelley despised for abusing the confidence of their followers
53
 but the stranger is 
described as speaking in a poetic register with, ‘tones [that] were mild and clear as the 
responses of Æolian music’, allowing him to assert control over his listeners not on the level 
of religious incantation or deceptive political jargon but rather in the spirit of a true poetic 
legislator who activates within their audience a greater attunement to self by cultivating their 
emotional intellect: ‘[t]hey floated to Albedir’s ear like the warm breath of June that lingers 
in the lawny groves, subduing all to softness’.54 As a poet legislator, Shelley challenges the 
partisan politics of religious leaders by arguing on the basis of faith as an epistemological act 
that any attempt to defend a position  that goes against a person’s own belief system is 
ultimately futile and would only lead to hypocrisy or hostility regardless as to whether it 
would be in their best interest to do so, for if ‘you have a friend of whom you wish to think 
well [and] he commits a crime, which proves to you that he is a bad man,’ despite attempts to 
think well of him afterwards, ‘to secure your own peace of mind […] your attempts are vain’, 
indicating that man, ‘cannot believe what he does not think true’.55  
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It is not the case that Shelley’s disdain for retribution and discouragement of blind hatred is 
born entirely from a disinterested belief in the relativity of truth or falsehood  rather he 
intends to disrupt the obsession on outward forms, which are contingent, in order to praise or 
condemn more universal expressions of good and evil: ‘[d]o not inquire if a man be a heretic, 
if he be a Quaker, or a Jew, or a Heathen ; but if he be a virtuous man, if he loves liberty and 
truth, if he wish the happiness and peace of human kind’.56 Despite Shelley’s atheistic 
outlook, there exist immutable ethical principles underlying reality that, if disregarded, lead 
to a rise in social inequality as an expression of the disequilibrium felt across the natural 
world and thus, no man made law has the power to essentially alter morality: ‘no act of a 
National representation can make any thing wrong, which was not wrong before; it cannot 
change virtue and truth’.57 Radicals who fight on the side of the Catholics against the British 
Parliament are protecting universal values as opposed to solely protecting the interests of 
those immediately involved: ‘I am no less desirous of the reform of these evils [inequality 
and prejudice] than for the Catholic Emancipation [itself]’.58 Rather than convincing himself 
of the need to uproot the forces of evil by any means necessary, this blend of naturalism and 
essentialism is the impetus for Shelley’s pacifism since they are not simply giving their 
persecutors a taste of their own medicine but partaking and in turn, promoting the spread of 
evil behaviour on a transhistorical scale which makes them culpable for the wrongs 
perpetrated both against their own people as well as any disenfranchised communities that 
replace them: ‘[i]n no case employ violence, the way to liberty and happiness is never to 
transgress the rules of virtue and justice. Liberty and happiness are founded upon virtue and 
justice, if you destroy the one, you destroy the other’.59 Nevertheless, the same line of 
reasoning directs Shelley away from wholly advocating isolationism or quietism since the life 
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of a slave is equally as unnatural as the repressive existence of a violent dictator for: ‘the poor 
man does the rich no service by obeying him — the rich man does the poor no good by 
commanding him,’60 rather it remains imperative for the slave to either help reform the 
oppressor, or at least the subsequent generations, by exemplifying correct conduct otherwise 
the vicious Hegelian cycle will continue wherein workers grow independent of their masters 
only to eventually forget the consequences of their wrongdoings and succumb to the traps of 
decadence. To emulate the underhand tactics used by those in power to maintain control is to 
put one’s own immediate interests over and above subsequent communities which is the 
reason for any righteous cause advanced at the cost of dignity and self-preservation being 
dismissed as counterproductive since, as Shelley dictates to the Irish in his address, any use 
of ‘violence and intolerance among[st] yourselves can leave an excuse to your enemies for 
continuing your slavery.’61 The most notable reason for Shelley’s decision, ‘to raise a 
Rebellion’, and make the Catholics, ‘dissatisfied with [their] present condition’ as opposed to 
an insurrection whereby the disenfranchised, ‘take something from the rich man's store by 
violence’, is driven by his recent memory of the French Revolution which serves as a 
warning rather than a blueprint, ‘it is the renewal of that unfortunate era, which I strongly 
deprecate, and which the tendency of this address Is calculated to obviate’.62 Regardless as to 
whether its advocates had good intentions, their efforts were marred due to employing 
excessive force as opposed to fostering discussion amongst one another in a calm and 
deliberate manner: ‘you can in no measure more effectually forward the cause of reform than 
by employing your leisure time in reasoning, or the cultivation of your minds’.63                                        
kkkHowever, what initially might be dismissed as a tension between Shelley’s enthusiastic 
tone and gradualistic message becomes decidedly less ambiguous in A Philosophical View of 
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Reform as his strong sense of duty towards humanity prompts him to internalise the lessons 
of recent events in a reactionary manner which results in mutually contradictory positions 
being held simultaneously. For instance, the brutal massacre at Peterloo fuels a tirade against 
the army as an institution that destroys the moral fibre of a society by indoctrinating the lower 
classes into believing that officially sanctioned killing is somehow more palatable than cold-
blooded murder, ‘[a soldier] is more degraded than a murderer; he is like the bloody knife, 
which has stabbed and feels not; a murderer we may abhor and despise; a soldier is by 
profession beyond abhorrence and below contempt’,64 whereas, just a few pages earlier, 
Shelley actively promoted increasing government spending on the navy to keep, ‘our ships 
manned by sailors well-paid and well-clothed, [so they might keep] watch round this glorious 
island against the less enlightened nations’.65 Likewise, Shelley scrutinises events such as the 
French Revolution and Peterloo with a level of tenacity on par with his commitment to 
gradualism and pacifism evinced in The Address whilst also failing to uphold other, less 
contemporary, revolts to the same degree of introspection if it serves his narrative to depict 
them as successful, even stripping away details that otherwise would clash with his 
revolutionary ideals. Shelley’s admiration of the American Revolution is an instance in which 
he presents an overly sterilised depiction of a more tumultuous event by arguing for, ‘[t]he 
just and successful Revolt of America’,66 with a large majority of its civility stemming from 
the Declaration of Independence established as a response to the injustices faced by the 
colonies at the hand of George III for the purpose of securing free election. Revolution, in 
these terms, becomes a human right for those who suffer political discrimination. Although 
the number of casualties incurred was relatively miniscule given the magnitude of the event, 
there were ten thousand deaths as a result of battles spanning each of the thirteen colonies 
including The Battles of Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts and The Battle of 
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Yorktown in Virginia. Shelley fails to critique such skirmishes for derailing the original 
plight of the colonists despite bemoaning the French Revolution for devolving into violence 
because it contributed to the realisation of a greater cause in the form of a ‘Republic governed 
by one assembly’, which has, ‘no chamber of hereditary aristocracy which is at once an 
actual and a virtual representation of all who attain through rank or wealth superiority over 
their countrymen’.67 Another early instance in which Shelley justifies violence for the sake of 
overturning tyranny appears in ‘Essay on Christianity’ (1817; 1859) where he lauds those 
who killed Julius Caesar because, unlike dictators who threaten punishment as a means of 
being praised for restraint, the Assassins understand virtue and civilisation thrives as a 
consequence of freedom from such oppressive fear-mongering and thus: ‘[t]hey destroyed the 
usurper of the liberties of their countrymen, not because they hated him, not because they 
would revenge the wrongs which they had sustained.’68                                                                 
kkkI do not intend to suggest that, in these instances, Shelley is necessarily contradicting his 
overall message as to the dangers of quietism, ‘[t]he advocates of Reform ought indeed to 
leave no effort unexerted, and they ought to be indefatigable in exciting all men to examine 
[their current state]’,69 and the futility of employing violence for the sake of liberty:  
a republic, however just in its principle and glorious in its object, would 
through the violence and sudden change which must attend it incur a 
great risk of being as rapid in its decline as in its growth
70
  
kkkHis seeming inconsistencies instead reveal a willingness to deemphasise the disastrous 
consequences of certain uprisings if the outcome is perceived to overshadow such immediate 
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suffering and generate a positive impact on a world-historical level.
71
 In particular, Shelley 
entertains the notion that force might be a necessary evil for instigating change when 
discussing the East; for instance, he excitedly awaits the moment that the Turkish Empire, 
including Asia Minor and Greece, will be ruled by more freethinking colonies and yet, 
Shelley is not simply advocating for its overthrow via the forceful imposition of Western 
thought rather he champions a violent uprising from within the East itself by the ‘Wahabees’ 
who have themselves been roused by the ‘spirit of human intellect’ to maintain ‘the Unity of 
God, and the equality of man’ whose ‘enthusiasm must go on “conquering and to conquer”’, 
so that they might awaken the East from apathy.
72
 In his discussion regarding the Eastern 
nations’ current state of barbarism it becomes clear that Shelley’s fatalism plays a key role in 
his ambiguous outlook on political violence as the spirit of Nature, or Necessity, is a 
compelling force equated with time that is driving all to a reclamation of a natural harmony 
which has long been subsumed under the yoke of monarchy and is part of the organic 
inoculation to tyranny (in its various forms) against which Mother Nature’s immune system 
generates both intellectual and physical antibodies. Shelley attributes this heroic martyrdom 
to the Assassins who, out of a similar necessitarian impulse to fulfil the will of an 
undecipherable Natural force, are compelled by immutable principles to protect the lives of 
others in order to extend not only the lifespan of an individual but to propagate love and 
equality over acquiring personal gain with no forethought as to how self-autonomy might 
contribute to universal freedom: ‘[w]ho hesitates to destroy a venemous serpent that has crept 
near his sleeping friend, except the man who selfishly dreads lest the malignant reptile should 
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turn his fury on himself?.’73 Unfortunately, the dormant state of Shelley’s Assassins prevents 
them from enacting this theoretical enthusiasm without a poetically versed leader who can 
remind them that their communal boundaries expand beyond the sect to encompass 
humankind regardless of efforts by contemporary society to sever these connections. 
Uncovering and deciphering both the message and authenticity of hidden guides will enable 
them to harness their own commitment to enacting Nature’s Will in a creative rather than 
apathetically peaceful or carelessly destructive manner. Both Shelley and the Stranger are 
outsiders who confront a marginalised community as an Other in order to circumvent their 
isolationist tendencies whilst nurturing any tendency towards aggression into a passionate 
zeal against injustice on the understanding that such righteous indignation against inequality 
signals a person who is innately attuned to the order of Nature. Therefore, whilst traces of 
Godwinian gradualism persist in Shelley’s advice to the Irish, ‘[t]he public communication of 
this truth, ought [not] impede the established usages of society; however, it is fitted in the end 
to do them away [in a manner which] must be gradual, however rapid, and rational’,74 it is 
always ignited by an exuberant sense of immediacy whereby each day they live in servitude a 
portion of the true selves is subsumed beneath the weight of slavishness: ‘[a]re you slaves, or 
are you men? If slaves, then crouch to the rod, and lick the feet of your oppressors, glory your 
shame, it will become you if brutes to act according to your nature’. The only recourse that 
Shelley has to combat against this misrecognition wherein the general publish assume 
slavishness and passivity to be essential is to call those downtrodden by institutionalised 
oppression to act without reacting: ‘employ resistance of the mind’.75                                                         
kkkConsequently, Shelley’s various examples of the slavish state of both Western and 
Eastern nations evince a belief in an eventual cure stating that the Indians who have been, 
‘enslaved and cramped in the most severe and paralysing forms [of hierarchical power],’ will, 
                                                          
73
 The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, p. 132.  
74
 Ibid, p. 28.  
75
 Ibid, p. 18.  
53 
 
through the rise of Christianity, learn to adopt, ‘social forms modelled upon those European 
feelings,’ which, ‘when the time for complete emancipation shall arrive [is going to facilitate] 
their disengagement [from superstition and hierarchy]’.76 Likewise, in Constantinople the rise 
of Osman I signalled a new era of civility foregrounding the importance of art, 
‘Constantinople I under the government of Ottoman Bey, a person of enlightened views who 
is introducing [his people to] European literature and art’, but, more importantly, Shelley 
emphasises the fact that his rule is contingent upon context inasmuch as his ascendancy has 
coincided with a society equally open to receiving such ideas for he is but a singular 
component in instigating a much grander, ‘change which Time the great innovator, will 
accomplish in that degraded country’.77 Shelley categorises needless violence and violence 
generated through oppression differently, often acknowledging how a large portion of 
uprisings begin from a place of sincerity before being hijacked by opportunists which 
indicates the Spirit of Nature can be found behind both successful and unsuccessful 
revolutions, creating a moral or tangible change. The Spirit of Nature interacts with the Spirit 
of the Age as visualised through artwork as well as being granted a voice by contemporary 
poets who, given Shelley’s creatively deterministic outlook, could be described as chosen by 
time to respond to the ills of the age in which they live even if fate is anthropomorphic in that 
humanity itself carves out a future via a past composed of countless human responses to 
nature’s trials. This universal component of emotional intelligence as a transhistorical 
phenomena defended by separate communities is the reason why Shelley can appreciate the 
enthusiastic zeal of Wahabees in rising up and fighting for human equality in service of 
Qur’anic appeals to Divine unity whilst also allowing his civilisational interest in areas such 
as Germany to situate these Western nations as further along the line of civility at a point 
where creative zeal transforms into self-reflection: ‘the bold and Aeschylean vigour of the 
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imagery of their poetry [is met by a] sincere, bold and liberal spirit of criticism’.78 The 
example of Osman I foregrounds the interdependence of, a ‘comprehensive and all-
penetrating spirit’, simultaneously evolving as well as shaping the characteristics of each 
country and the volition of individuals within such a context to create pieces which awaken 
mankind to their true nature. Poetry can offer the highest form of expression from which the 
Spirit of Nature can spring forth across every age as a reminder to those who have drifted into 
debauchery and lost sight of their essential goodness resulting in the high station of Poetic 
luminaries as: ‘priests of an unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of gigantic shadows 
which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they conceive not; the 
trumpet which signs to battle and feels not what it inspires’.79 In other words, the revelation 
of poets is as much given to them as it is a product of their genius which results in times of 
hardship necessitating the production of equally steadfast leaders of sensibility to contribute 
to raising morale whilst maintaining morals by intellectually and emotionally elevating those 
in power who risk abusing their station as well as those downtrodden who might fall into 
either apathy or resentment. Shelley proposed that whenever England is at a ‘crisis in its 
destiny’ there will always be, ‘philosophers and poets as surpass beyond comparison any who 
have appeared in our nation since its last struggle for liberty’,80 and who shall communicate 
the need to maintain love and freethought.                                                                                                    
kkkShelley’s understanding of creative reform is vital to appreciating how his split 
personality regarding a poetic endorsement of the mythologically violent Assassins and his 
prosaic indictments of destructive revolutions should not be viewed in terms of hypocrisy but 
rather as a byproduct of two alternating perspectives coming in and out of focus; on the one 
hand, striving not to dismiss the short-term effects of social instability created by warfare; on 
the other hand, acknowledging the potential long-term benefits that accompany either a 
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drastic exchange of power or the honour gained from standing up for one’s rights. These 
viewpoints generate Shelley’s damning, yet future facing, remarks concerning the French 
Revolution,  
[t]he usurpation of Bonaparte and then the Restoration of the Bourbons 
[left] the heart of every lover of liberty […] struck as with palsy on the 
succession of these events. But […] it may be the good which the 
Revolutionists did lives after them, their ills are interred with their 
bones
81
  
kkkShelley might argue, in discussions surrounding Catholic emancipation or the Peterloo 
Massacre, that the ends do not justify the means but, at numerous points in A Philosophical 
View of Reform, he displays a willingness to forget that ideal or even deny its utility in severe 
cases where the collective conscious among either the elite or the oppressed is sufficiently 
cultivated to benefit from such reasoning. I am referring here to his support for the navy; his 
decision to neglect the violent aftermath of the glorious revolution; his dismissal of American 
history as built upon slavery and dispossession of land; his willingness to discuss colonisation 
as a model for enlightening Eastern nations; his support for the plight of the Wahabees; and, 
his authorial decision to poetically romanticise a Medieval sect that was disparaged by his 
contemporaries for their aggressive tactics. Clearly, even as he acknowledges that violence in 
an unsuccessful revolution only serves to distort the real motives of liberty and happiness 
there remains an underlying uncertainty prompting those moments in which he advocates 
action bordering on the aggressive. If violence leads to, or is only the immediate consequence 
of, events that generate positive change on a world-historical level (i.e. the Bill of Rights, the 
creation of America, or civility in the East) then Shelley is led to question whether the 
concept of Necessity render all previous suffering an ultimate good by being reducible to an 
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organic expression of discomfort within a universe no longer aligned and struggling towards 
reunification. Shelley’s sceptical idealism once again creates a paradox wherein he argues 
that, ‘[i]f there had never been war, there could never have been tyranny’,82 which suggests 
freedom can exist independently of oppression whilst oppression requires the privation of 
liberty in order to exert control; and yet, if despotism is a break in the natural order of things 
it still remains an irreducible part in the development of the One Mind as both contingent and 
atemporal. In a fatalistic sense, moments of strife equally serve to awaken the collective 
consciousness to new forms of equality as much as positive events can be said to usher new 
forms of oppression resulting in a perpetual dialogue between freedom and despotism 
summed up by Shelley as: ‘[the conflict between] the unextinguishable spirit of Liberty, and 
the ever watchful spirit of fraud and tyranny’.83 Simply put, if tyranny and freedom are 
inseparable and war is an outcome of such cruelty then violence is a valid, if less beneficial, 
response to the human predicament and a contributing factor to the development of humanity 
on an archetypal level as indicated by the way in which Shelley describes how the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 led to the establishment of the Bill of Rights where, at least theoretically, 
the ruler should be chosen freely according to the will of the People, signalling the 
‘commencement of a new epoch in the history of the progress of civilisation [generated 
through a compromise] between the spirit of truth and the spirit of imposture’.84 By praising 
1688 as a watershed moment in democracy, Shelley reduces the subsequent bloody aftermath 
between supporters of James II and advocates of William III to a single sentence despite the 
numerous casualties incurred during the Williamite War, the Battle of Killiecrankie, Dundee 
Rising and, particularly pertinent given the surrounding discussion regarding the terror of 
Peterloo, the massacre at Glencoe. Therefore, the fact that he praises the overall results of 
William’s revolution whilst downplaying the nationwide rupture that developed alongside 
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these constitutional advancements indicates a willingness to overlook, ‘the selfish passions 
and temporizing interests of men’,85 when it results in the ability for, ‘[p]eople to change their 
government [as] an acknowledged right in the Constitution of England’, and the freedom to 
protest, ‘against religious dogmas which present themselves to [their] mind as false [with the 
understanding that it is] the inalienable prerogative of every human being [to do so].’86 In 
fact, as clarified by these examples, although good and evil are intertwined in this world there 
remains a level of unreality that plagues falsehood in relation to goodness as essentially true 
so even if cruelty outwardly appears to have gained a fleeting victory it is only as a means of 
eventually establishing more substantial principles (i.e. freedom and love) whereas such 
concepts can never be said, in truth, to serve malicious ends as indicated by Shelley’s 
universal law of reform: ‘every great people either has been, or is, or will be free’.87  
Enthusiasm and Fanaticism from Alamut to Alhambra 
kkkOutside of the millenarian belief in a hidden Imam as an emblem of reunification not 
contingent on momentary oubursts of suffering, even the historical downfall of the Assassins 
and the gradual resurgence of Shi’i esoteric sects within positions of power came to serve as 
an image of enduring principles in the face of excessive aggression. The Order was 
massacred by the Mongul emperor Hulagu Khan who laid waste to their fortress in Alamut 
and wiped out this dissident group that had once been capable of defending itself from the 
advancements of Crusading and Sunni forces alike. Despite this widespread execution at the 
hands of a conquering Mongols (eventually reverberating even through Baghdad and 
Damascus) it would take the multiregional dominance of another military leader associated 
with the Khan lineage, Timur Lang (Tamerlane), to lay the groundwork for a Shi’i revival. 
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Timur’s vengeful expeditions resulted in invasions across Eurasia which, ultimately, enabled 
him to gain control over the the Ikhanate, the Golden Horde as well as the Chagatai Khanate 
and yet, given his ties to esoteric Shi’ism88 and his political efforts to win their support:89 ‘the 
seed of Shi'ism [was sowed by] Timur Lang [and] produced its fruit with the emergence of 
the Safavid movement’.90 The collapse of Timur Lang created mayhem from Persia to 
Central Asia necessitating the rise of a regime that could align the tribal conflicts which were 
re-emerging; at the start of the sixteenth century, the Safavid dynasty managed to integrate, 
‘the unruly Turkic-speaking tribal peoples with the sedentary Persian-speaking population of 
the urban areas’,91 under the banner of Shi’ism and through the accumulated efforts of 
subsequent Shahs (leaders) produced a civilisation where poetry, rational philosophy, 
artisanship, and textile work experienced a modest golden age. Throughout this history there 
is an intertwining of sublime beauty and nightmarish brutality whether it be the Assassin rule 
which was associated with pleasue gardens and political murders or the successive 
conquering emperors attached to the Khan lineage (Hulagu Khan, most notably related to 
Kublai Khan, and Timur Lang who married into descendent of Genghis Khan) that 
inadvertently reinvigorated Shi’i influence through the emergence of the Safavid dynasty 
which, in turn, produced a centre of literary learning, sumptuous textiles, and architectural 
delights.                                                                                                                                 
kkkAccordingly, Shelley’s fragment was not unique in its allusions to Shi’i history for other 
Romantics similarly drew inspiration from the complex tapestry outlined above in order to 
explore warfare as paradoxically honourable and humiliating; for instance, Timur Lang and 
Lord Byron were both associated with military lineages and thus, driven to engage in political 
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escapades despite their physical deficiencies inscribing potentially inner insecurities onto 
their body (the former having his right leg and right hand crippled due to an arrow and the 
latter being born with a clubfoot). It is not surprising, therefore, that Byron would positively 
cite this lame ruler in his poem, ‘Ode to Napoleon Buonaparte’, (1814) where he undercuts 
Napoleon’s presentation of himself as a world conqueror by hinting that, ‘he was more like 
his captive, the Ottoman sultan [Bayezit in Ankara]’,92 due to being exiled to the remote 
island of St Helena in the mid-Atlantic. Likewise, Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’ is an 
amalgamation of competing allusions including the immediate connotations to the titular 
Mongol emperor, references to practices enacted by the Assassin Order, and visual imagery 
sourced from The Arabian Nights fables, all of which are fused together in an opiate-induced 
dreamlike haze that, as Samar Attar suggests, produces a ‘creative and destructive energy’ 
where the promise of building an ‘earthly paradise’ (whether poetically, imperially or 
communally) risks seducing and deceiving even the most cunning, cruel or imaginative 
minds.
93
 There is material glory in the spectacular palaces accumulated through deposing 
kings and installing new orders, there is possible honour in upholding a dying lineage of 
shared values and there might be critical notoriety in producing an exceptional poem but the 
potential for wrong judgment is so great whenever establishing the foundation of a political 
order, rectifying a perceived injustice being perpetrated and crafting a piece of literature that 
the consequence of misapprehension cause all roles to be haunted by the spectre of guilt, 
whether due to unnecessary deaths or lost time. In the context of the failed French 
Revolution, both Shelley and Coleridge depict a space where an Assassin can be a poet and a 
poet can be a ruler
94
 for they witnessed the destructive nature of language as a tool for 
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ideologues and propagandists to strip away peoples freedom whilst also recognising the 
intense need for powerful individuals to be poetically and philosophically sensitive and thus, 
given that the Prophet became a symbol of both moral regeneration and deception during this 
period, they often framed their ambiguous poetic commentaries on reform in terms of Islamic 
history.
95
 The Gnostic Assassins, with their belief in the luminous leaders that arise 
throughout history to curtail corruption via their connection to Fate, resonated with the 
millennial politics of the French Revolution and Muhammad, merging Prophet and legislator, 
became associated with the enthusiastic rhetoric of Robespierre as a politico-religious 
character who could convert Divine Will into political activism and yet, with the progressivist 
narrative becoming harder to maintain and the eventual demise of Robespierre, the 
significance of their Islamic counterparts was inevitably impacted  as these radicals began to 
question whether it was possible to, ‘bring [a] disorienting message back to the hungry 
crowd’,96 without the potency of this enthusiasm, ‘threaten[ing] to overrun itself and drown 
in its own power.’97 Nervous about allowing disillusionment to dampen his impassioned 
rhetoric whilst also not enabling his youthful aspirations to fuel his naivities, The Assassins 
offers Shelley a space to work through his radical politics by exploring the lines between 
enthusiasm and fanaticism with the former signalling a defensive pride in the value of 
humanitarian ideals developed from a sense of duty to an all-pervading Spirit and a belief in 
man’s perfectibility whilst the latter connotes an apocalyptic compulsion to overturning order 
in a feverish attempt to marshal a new age of liberty and freelove at the cost of all else. By 
contemplating his own political identity in light of figures such as Hassan bin Sabbah, 
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Shelley is determining whether he can successfully mediate between being, a ‘prophet raging 
in the wilderness [and a lawgiver] preaching to the masses’,98 through adopting more tactful 
methods for relaying his reactive iconoclasm. On a public platform, the stakes are heightened 
and his calls for uprising in the name of universal fraternity risk devolving into empty 
promises of visionary fancy that are no more productive than the established regimes he feels 
compelled to abolish out of a disdain for custom.                                                                 
kkkReenvisioning Muslim history in a poetic fashion to explore the dynamic between public 
and private discourse (outward passion and inward zeal) was not only confined within a Shi’i 
narrative but Shelley’s use of the pleasure-garden motif as both a nurturing bower and a 
fortress from corruption echoes the generic conventions of Romantic alhambraism, a literary 
fashion which signifies the use of the Alhambra as a monumental and textual space for 
eighteenth-century writers to examine the ink between ‘a feminine world of intimate feelings 
and a masculine sphere of public action’.99 An icon of Moorish Spain, bridging East and 
West, Alhambra’s position as a complex located within Granada contributed to its split 
identity within the Romantic psyche as presenting both an inwardly luxurious and opulent 
abode of Oriental decadence and an outwardly austere fortress of Eastern militarism. Whether 
or not Shelley could be definitively be identified as channelling alhambraism, the dynamics 
Diego Saglia pinpoints as part of this alternative exoticising discourse (associated with 
questions of personal comfort versus outside conflict) are inextricably tied into the 
mountainous retreat that Shelley’s Assassins occupy as an amalgamation of the artificial 
opiate paradise attributed to Rashid al-Din As-Sinan and the Fortitied Alamut Castle seized 
by Hasan-i Sabbah fostering a space where, on a communal level, families are bonded in 
collective (if gradually despondent) tranquiilty whilst, on a national level, the backdrop is a 
world of crumbling empires and bloodshed. Additionally, the tragic trope that Saglia 
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attributes to this genre of the Moorish heroine who is simultaneously constrained to a 
domestic life whilst also being unable to attain full self-realisation within this sphere due to 
the fleeting nature of love is very pertinent to Shelley’s personal ordeals around the time of 
composing The Assassins as his split from Harriet Westbrook in favour of Mary Godwin 
situates the former in a similar position to Felicia Heman’s Zegri Maid who: ‘[d]eserted by 
her lover and scorned by her family because in love with an infidel [...] can only die away 
amidst the blooming natural beauties of her garden bower’.100 Although there was a time gap 
between the event and Harriet’s suicide and Shelley continued supporting her financially, the 
choice to dedicate one’s life to true love as opposed to wallowing in servile domestication 
due to a suppressive contract (social or marital) and the need to find a delicate middle ground 
when employing passions in an instructive rather than destructive manner are embedded 
within the subtext of other Oriental literature of the period and as such, inevitably finds 
expression in The Assassins. 
Summary 
kkkRegarding the question of acceptable conduct during times of political unrest and the 
validity of insurrection as a means of eliciting change, Shelley and the Nizari Assassins 
maintain several core principles including the belief in establishing transhistorical 
communities founded upon a shared knowingness, hope in the birth of luminary figures who 
will give shape to that collective expression on a world-historical level, and a distrust towards 
ruling powers that sought to discredit dissident movements through propaganda depicting 
them as outsiders. British xenophobia caused radical sympathisers to become associated with 
atheism, infidelity and, ultimately, position them as Other within the distinction between 
continental and English sensibilities whilst the Abbasids increased their polemical output 
against the Ismailis by propagating the ‘black legend’ which similarly imposed the stigmas of 
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unbelief and illegitimacy.
101
 Both disenfranchised parties were critiqued as imposters 
working from within the system to dilute its authenticity. Violence is acknowledged as 
having produced certain desirable ends in establishing or advancing humanity as a moral 
species (i.e. American Revolution) especially when a way of life is being threatened (i.e. 
Fatimid Dynasty under Seljuk rule) and yet, Shelley and the Assassins discouraged such 
behaviour as the lesser form of cosmic reckoning secondary to enacting change via artistic or 
intellectual forms of engagement, whether esoteric theological doctrines or self-reflexive 
poetic truths, since the former is only justifiable in extreme instances
102
 amongst a people 
who are yet to reach a level of emotional intelligence where dialogue is viable. The latter is 
preparatory in that it lays a foundation for those who come after to be enriched by their 
predecessors and build upon this legacy or, at least, not destroy their work. Whilst warfare 
can momentarily abolish oppression it is only in teaching people how to conceptualise of, as 
well as eloquently debate, the core principles underlying falsehood that freedom is gained. In 
particular, education is achieved through revising Qur’anic exegesis (for the Nizaris) or 
reframing high art (for Shelley) which exposes the unreality of institutional power by 
revealing the integral role that a slave fulfils in perpetuating the Master Narratives which 
control them and offering unconventional interpretations in the hopes society might break 
free from the defeatist mindset of a downtrodden worker: ‘[i]t is horrible that the poor must 
give in taxes what would save them and their families from hunger and cold; it is still more 
horrible that they should do this to furnish further means of their own abjectness’.103 Through 
this syncretic poetic text, Shelley can sporadically entertain the Wahabee and Hashshashin 
zeal as complementary, even constitutive, to worldly development as non-pacifist rebellions 
can help instantiate beneficial advancements in the struggle for equality as indicated by 
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Shelley’s praise of the American Revolution in spite of the casualities incurred (however 
miniscule) on the road to attaining independence.
104
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Chapter 2 
Interanimative poetics: Metempsychosis and Transconsciousness in the Imamate and 
Shelley’s The Assassins 
kkkThe theological doctrine underpinning the Assassins derives, in part, from Ismaili 
Gnosticism which is itself an interpretation of Neoplatonic thought through an Islamic lens 
and thus, at its core, propounds an emanationist worldview to explain the cosmological 
relationship between the One and the Many. Shelley poeticises a number of these principles 
through the necessitarian religion of his Assassins but, I argue, the intellectual affinity moves 
beyond a mere fragment and the recognition of a presiding Will compelling existence to act 
according to their essential goodness, a historical cycle where groups of spiritually or 
poetically gifted people are born in every age for the purpose of articulating the underlying 
truths of existence, the mirage-like nature of evil in relation to truth, and an underlying unity 
to existence that encourages reunification to equality regardless of transitory ruptures, were 
all core tenets of the actual group. Although Shelley depicts the relationship between good 
and evil as an eternal struggle he still associates freedom with the perpetual flickering of a 
flame; conversely, oppression is a counteractive force precisely due to its static, voyeuristic 
and unproductive quality: ‘the unextinguishable spirit of Liberty and the ever-watchful spirit 
of fraud and tyranny’. 1 Akin to the Ismailis, evil comes to possess a type of unreality due to 
being a distortion of the good or natural which is synonymous with a collective participation 
in re-creating our perception of reality.
2
 The universe that emerges is creatively constituted at 
every minute with atemporal ideals being granted form and meaning through human 
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interaction (i.e. composed of countless horizons of influence) as well as being deterministic 
in the sense of being continuously compelled, if not forward, at least into motion resulting in 
the inevitable cosmic interference of external forces beyond human control. It is within this 
balance between fatalism and imagination that falsehood can be defined as a contradiction to 
the ruling principles of enthusiasm and creativity which, for Shelley, equates to the centrality 
demanded by institutional power and results in the slavishness instilled by despotism as well 
as the destruction caused by warfare.                                                                                                       
kkkIn conceiving of the Imamate as a more pertinent structure to Shelley’s poetics than 
assumed given a purely dogmatic authoritarian understanding, it is useful to identify how the 
Ismaili theosophy of mythohistory posits a tripartite dynamic of preservation, restoration and 
transformation through intervening guides who encourage renewed recollection for the sake 
of overcoming the customary nature of time’s belatedness. Whilst Ismailis perceive all things 
to emanate from God’s Essence, leaders (Imams) are singled out as possessing a noticeably 
higher spiritual station than common believers which, at times, sees them acquiring an almost 
prophetic link to the supernatural realm in order to encourage new followers to flock to their 
side under the pretense that they shall find enlightenment in a world of illusion. Although the 
notion of inheritance, as it relates to intellectual lineage, differs with respect to Shelley and 
Shi’i understanding of discipleship, Bryan Shelley’s argument that the poetic ‘Assassins 
patronized individual reason’, whereas, ‘the Ismaili sect [obeyed] their Imam’,3 undermines 
the extent Shelley elevated illuminatory figures who awaken those predisposed to a poetic 
type of emotionality from the slavishness inherent in contemporary civilisation on the shared 
basis that, ‘artistic creativity [is] the key to spiritual-political transformation [for] art leads to 
divine knowledge’.4 Despite dismissing an Ismaili origin for Shelley’s Assassins on the basis 
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that the latter is committed to, ‘the liberty of individual reason’,5 whilst the former 
perpetuates an enclosed and elitist hierarchical structure dominated by a select few, the 
Christian Gnostics that Bryan Shelley chooses to align the titular group with are described as 
resembling an enlightenment intellectual elite which either shepherds the general populace or, 
if they resist tutoring, dismisses them in favour of generating a contemplative space removed 
from such corruption: ‘Shelley's Assassins share with the Gnostics a fundamental delight in 
the life of the spirit, which distinguishes them from the carnal masses’.6 In light of Bloom’s 
concept of misreading, the egalitarian element pervading either system is linked to a Gnostic 
willingness to reinterpret canonical texts as reflected in the Assassins natural theology shaped 
by individuals rather than institutionalised doctrine and coinciding with Shelley’s hope of 
establishing a freethinking society based upon, ‘divinization of the self, the merging of the 
spirit with the divine nature.’7 I do not seek to dismiss Bryan Shelley’s reading but offer a 
companion piece that highlights the Islamic side of the Assassin’s who are intentionally 
depicted as a Frankensteinian creation composed of varying historical and theological 
appendages precisely because, as Shelley acknowledges, the poem is driven by the rationale 
that, ‘no nation or religion can supersede another without borrowing heavily [from one 
another]’.8 My research seeks to unravel a larger picture out of the gaps and fissures 
generated by the fragments hybrid structure in order to reassess the claim that, ‘the similarity 
of Gnosticism to the religion of the Assassins was great, but not to that of the Assassins 
described by Shelley’,9 since such an approach indicates that Christian Gnosticism survives 
the transmutation intact whilst the Shi’i background is conveniently rendered into an empty 
husk unworthy of further examination. This attempt to confine the affinities of Shelley 
Assassins is disingenuous because, as part of the syncretic ethos structuring the piece, ‘Percy 
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Shelley’s “Gnostic” (antitrinitarian) Jewish Christianity [similarly integrates] an Islamic 
prophetic tradition that exalts creative gnosis’.10 Given this critical background, I shall offer 
ways of productively re-incorporating the Imamate of Ismaili Gnosticism back into 
discussions regarding Shelley’s appropriation of, and affinity with, the sect in order to 
highlight not only how the group can be used to characterise Shelley’s views on insurrection 
but also his conceptualisation of poetic lineage as well as the link between custom and 
apprehension.
11
  
The Successive Echoes of Inspiration 
kkkThe Assassin Order concerned itself with political and spiritual issues, not dissimilar to 
those plaguing Shelley; positioning themselves as recognising and preserving a legacy that 
had been either misidentified or abandoned by the current government which, in turn, 
necessitates the formation of a splinter group who occupy a mountainous fortress with a 
leader that exudes an occult aura and seemingly possesses a greater intuition or connection 
with the abandoned legacy of thought. This figure subsequently encourages the 
disenfranchised community to be more outward-facing in how and where they channel their 
devotion to these principles rather than succumbing to apathy beneath either the status quo or 
self-imposed exile. The vizier of Cairo, Badr al-Jamali, did not fulfil the wishes of Imam-
Caliph al-Mustansir to have his son Nizar succeed him upon his death and instead, upon al-
Mustansir’s more acquiescent half brother Qasim Ahmad, forced Nizar to escape to 
Alexandria from fear of death only to be eventually caught and executed after only a limited 
reign. Hassan-i Sabbah, the founder of the Assassin Order studying in Cairo at the time, was 
supposedly imprisoned by this regime but escaped to Persia with a newfound ardour to 
campaign for the recognition of the true spiritual succession of the Fatimid Imam. A 
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wandering da’i (preacher) throughout Persia during the 1080s harnessing nationalist 
sensibilities as part of his wider aim to gain recognition for the Nizari Imamate lineage by 
framing his efforts as a response to the tyranny of Seljuk rule against which the current 
illegitimate and deceitful Caliphs of Baghdad could provide no remedy and thus, highlighting 
the fact that ‘the Persian Ismailis could no longer count on receiving any effective support 
from the Fatimid state.’12 To curtail the expanse of this inauthentic spiritual heritage and 
supplant it with an awareness that a truer lineage was still available, Sabbah established 
himself in Alamut castle southeast of Daylam a mountainous region, ‘renowned as an area 
with strong independent tendencies’,13 where he encountered the Daylamites with whom he 
gradually cultivated and crafted an ideology based upon displacing rulers that sought to 
overturn or dismiss the rightful succession of Imams and who, instead, posited a new strain 
falsely associated with, ‘the lore of ancient wisdom’.14 It is important to emphasise that the 
Order was conceived, at least outwardly, from theological debates as a means of countering 
the suggestion that their political identity was devoid of any spiritual association since such a 
narrative fails to recognise the terms in which their desire for self-preservation and material 
conquest were framed. Sabbah chose to present himself as the Imam’s chief representative 
(Hujjah, or proof of the hidden Imam) by either suggesting that Nizar had gone into 
occultation
15
 or that his third son, al-Hadi ibn Nizar, had eloped to Alamut
16
 in order to 
remain hidden and had entrusted Sabbah with both his protection as well as providing a line 
of communication to others. Whether it is the leader who founded the Assassin Order of 
Shelley’s titular poem or the figurehead Rashid ad-Din Sinan who’s moniker, Shaykh al-
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Jabal, came to be attached (within the Western psyche) to the infamous pleasure garden
17
 
Shelley’s stranger reflects a number of Assassin leaders who escaped the gaze of empire by 
occupying a mountainous enclave where they either formed, or helped spread the influence 
of, a community of similarly disenfranchised Persians under the yoke of the Seljuk empire 
striving for political and spiritual recognition. Embroiled in maintaining the correct 
succession of the Nizari Imamate, these figures gained an occult status through which they 
made present a hidden lineage that, beyond re-establishing appreciation for the theophanic 
nature of existence implicit within Sunni prophetic cycles, also gestured to a more immediate 
chain perpetually renewing this lost apprehension. Likewise, Shelley’s Assassins are 
presented as channelling this intuitive emotionality by unconsciously retreading the steps of 
other, ‘Arabians and enthusiasts [who were also attracted to] the solemnity and grandeur of 
these desolate recesses’,18 all of whom placed themselves in situations that would allow for 
customs veil to be lifted as a consequence of nature’s reanimating touch: ‘new contemplation 
[arose as] mind is united with eternal things [and] a keener and more exquisite perception [is 
formed]’.19 A paradoxical scenario emerges where contemplation leads to fresh associations 
but also inevitably ushers another onset of perceptual fatigue over time for, ‘the apprehension 
lost in living on is both life’s apprehension and apprehension that realises its own life’,20 
necessitating the constant movement through reiteration implicit in the interanimative 
structure underlying the poem. There is a spiritual interchange between human observer, 
ruined monuments and organic scenery described as an, ‘epidemic transport’ and an 
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‘overwhelming transport’21 which foregrounds their transubstantive natures. As a group who 
abandoned civilisation for the sake of living in an enclosed mountainous area, their 
isolationist tendencies are both a blessing and a curse for it allows them mental freedom from 
the shackles of conventional thought but results in a rather self-serving form of knowledge 
that undercuts the spirit of connectivity associated with interanimation and is reflected in the 
temples dedicated to gods which populate Bethzatanai. Although the enthusiasm generated by 
inhabiting such exquisite landscapes eventually gives way to the general burden of everyday 
life which, ‘smothered, [without wholly] extinguish[ing], that divine and eternal fire’, there 
remains a flicker of hope that the introduction of a poetically versed stranger might excite 
their imagination once more.
22
 This figure would not only remind them how to enact 
compassion towards outsiders but also instil within them a drive to transcribe and transmit, 
‘the lore of ancient wisdom’, across communities so that they might further grasp and 
collectively employ, ‘the human spirit and [...] human hand [to] accomplish [the] profoundest 
[of] miracles’.23 Especially during his earlier poetry, Shelley’s belief in the goodness of 
human nature over and above any acceptance of original sin fostered his willingness to accept 
an innate capacity for poetic expression, sympathetic communion and imaginative reciprocity 
with a similarly intrinsic propensity to be forgetful or grow imperceptive and in turn, 
acquiesce to convention: ‘Southey [is] no believer in original sin: he thinks that which 
appears to be a taint of our nature is in effect the result of un-natural political institutions – 
there we agree’.24 In spite of his disdain for institutionalised thought as the root of all vice, 
‘all that is evil [can be traced] to the sophistications of society’,25 there remained an equally 
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potent conviction that some form of virtuous civilisation could inspire dignity and was not 
necessarily a roadblock to achieving civility for even if this road was fraught with many 
inevitable pitfalls Caesar’s assassins are notable for having uplifted an already, ‘virtuous and 
civilized community of mankind [from the] insolent dominion of one wicked man [doing so] 
in the names of Country, Liberty, and Virtue [rendering them] holy patriots’.26 Therefore, 
despite his pacifistic proclivities, Shelley entertains this image of the upstanding assassin who 
is willing to force change on a world-historical level in order to reinvigorate the public and 
awaken them from the monotony of accepted routine; for instance, upon recognising Albedir 
has only one spade and minimal space within his garden grounds, the stranger insists that, 
once better, he shall engage in working to help collectively cultivate the landscape and even 
highlights how his host would likely rather, ‘perform the additional labour which [his] 
nourishment would require [even deriving] a degree of pleasure in the fatigue arising from 
this employment’, but insists, ‘I shall contest with you such pleasures as these’.27 This 
positive rendition of the just assassin archetype is marked by an eagerness to contest over the 
delight of communal bonding but also an enthusiastic willingness to combat against forces 
which would destroy commendable ideals from Liberty to Virtue. The stranger is teaching 
Albedir to view reiteration as a central component of conservation rather than the end goal of 
preserving pleasure being contentment with habitude which would be the likely consequence 
if they were to remain enclosed within a cocoon of their own making without accepting the 
responsibility of sharing both the symbols and conveying the emotions generated by them. 
The answer is not to forfeit responsibility since such an approach uncritically accepts that the 
initial astonishment felt upon entering Bethzatanai will diminish over time along with any 
aspiration to inculcate these pleasures on a grander level in a manner that truly inculcates 
moral reform in others. In overturning their false assumption that hoarding delight preserves 
                                                          
26
 Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, p. 254. 
27
 Ibid, p. 137. 
73 
 
its efficacy, the stranger highlights how social perception can only be altered by realising: 
‘the interdependency of different lives on one another’.28                                                                               
kkkIt may seem that my appraisal of the ambiguous stranger as a combination of an Imam 
figure (with traces to Hassan-i Sabbah and Rashid al-Din Sinan) and a Shelleyan poetic 
legislator would oppose Peter Schock’s reading which foregrounds a more menacing occult 
aura exuding from this elusive figure and who depicts the group as Ophite Gnostics that 
worship the serpent, occupy the house of Satan (Bethzatanai) and are inclined as a result of 
their occultic beliefs to admire, ‘the demonic immortal who comes to [teach them to worship] 
the Luciferean God beyond the world.’29 Associating the Miltonic Satan to this stranger on 
the basis of charisma, oratory skills and a tendency to infiltrate and disturb paradise is not a 
counter to my own interpretation since certain characters Shelley infuses with an air of 
superstition (e.g. Ahasuerus) are not channelling conventional Satanic tropes at the level of 
dark magic or demonic heritage but rather the connotative force of a fallen being striving to 
rally against a patriarchal figurehead which commands love through fear and labels any who 
attempt to introduce freethought via a competing discourse as necessarily evil. The poet’s 
prophesying the downfall of Rome is not wholly dissimilar to the inspired hubris that fuels 
Satan’s vow to depose, ‘a Being who shall deliberately scheme to inflict on a large portion of 
the human race tortures indescribably intense’,30 but there is also a Christ-like sacrificial 
aspect to interanimation where past voices make way for new visions in the hope that 
fostering these rebirths allows, ‘the echo of the eternal music’,31 to be prolonged and enable 
further instantiations of the ‘beneficence and beauty by holy inspiration [to descend] on [...] 
searching spirits’.32  
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Interanimation grants a more productive focus to Shelley’s reimagining of the Order beyond 
their willingness to threaten or enact violence for the sake of preserving their communal 
values since the metaphysics characterising the Imamate incorporates notions which Shelley 
would later expand upon in the Defence of Poetry and ‘On Life’ such as the numbing effects 
of apprehension requiring the rejuvenative strain of forgotten poetic perspectives to 
recuperate lost vision. These beacons of enlightenment are presented as the, ‘great bards of 
elder time who [...]by their strain [made known a] living melody’,33 propagating a heritage of 
influence where precursor is retroactively influenced by  its successor, whilst the former 
nevertheless anticipates the actualisation of the latter, held together by poet philosophers such 
as, ‘Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Calderon, Lord Bacon, [and] Milton’, 
without whom human consciousness would lose its childlike attunement to life’s 
miraculousness: ‘[t]he human mind could never, except by the intervention of these 
excitements, have been awakened to the invention of the grosser sciences’.34 Circumventing 
the deadening effects of ageing is not achieved by rewinding time to an infantile state in 
which experience is simply fated to repeat the same numbing motions but rather, by being 
perceptually reborn, an individual may supersede the rectilinear course of chronological time 
(generating despondency through custom) in favour of bathing in the fountain of metaphor 
where, ‘old images that have frozen into statues or bric-a-brac [can be rebuild] from echoing 
clay of new living figures’.35 Temporal retardation is overcome through imaginative 
rejuvenation as, within the context of the poetic universe, poets and historians both possess 
the potential to foretell Rome’s eventual descent into slavery and degradation. The latter is 
prosodic in nature as it delineates transhistorical patterns for the purpose of bringing to 
attention relevant data for contemporary contemplation whilst the former versifies, in the 
sense of conjuring emotional resonance, by appealing to sensibility as Shelley indicates 
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through his comments on the French Revolution: ‘[t]he sympathies connected with that event 
extended to every bosom. The most generous and amiable natures were those which 
participated the most extensively in these sympathies’.36 In generating resonances rather than 
following patterns, poetry has the capacity to render history into verse which allows for a felt 
connection to the past through the present resulting in a medium that is less directly interested 
in being informative at the didactic level of imparting information but edifies through 
consumption which, when recited, invokes linguistic structures and tropes embodied in past 
sympathetic communities.  
Recollection and Reintegration  
kkkThe function of introspection (i.e. reflecting upon history as a means of progression) is 
the bridge by which to compare and contrast Ismaili attempts to synthesise a Neoplatonic 
emanationist rhetoric within the bounds of Islamic theology and the structural affinities noted 
between Shelley’s pattern of visionary poetics and the transmigratory system outlined in his 
translation of Plato’s Ion. Both perspectives explore how a living truth can be preserved 
through transhistorical connections which arise via tangible figures who accommodate within 
their being the collective reincarnations of prior guides united under the banner of the 
universal Imam or the great poem.
37
                                                                                             
kkkAs Creation seeks to know itself through knowledge of its Creator so too is the Creator 
able to reflect on His own Essence through the example of creation. This conception of God 
is largely impersonal with a Will that is shrouded in mystery not only due to the finite minds 
impoverished state relative to the Divine Intellect but also humanity’s inability to 
comprehend the logic inherent in a time before mundane reasoning. Accordingly, Ismailis 
conceived of salvation as only having been achieved once an individual fully appreciates that 
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the hierarchy of heavenly bodies is a macrocosm of humanity’s own spiritual development. 
The hierarchical chain becomes retroactively interpreted as a cosmological reenactment of 
the pre-eternal witnessing and attestation of God’s Oneness by mankind resulting in similar 
truths echoed in Sufistic symbols such as the reedpipe which configures the memory of a lost 
paradisal abode. The pre-mortal state ('alam-i dharr) in which the Imam’s and the Prophet 
were determined and at which point the covenant with God and his chosen representatives 
took place amongst the potentialities of mankind is understood as being an archetypal realm 
resulting in any true acts of free will being in accordance with the Primordial Will of Allah as 
a realisation rather than an obfuscation of this initial decree: a ‘cyclical theophanic advent 
[perpetually renews] this Primordial Covenant [...] whereby beings are existentiated and 
differentiated according to their response to the divine call’38 Hence, Shi’i cosmogony rests 
upon a mythohistoric framework that seeks to establish the rightful succession of authority 
both during and after prophecy by acknowledging the Divine guides who not only grant 
insights into the true nature of existence but, upon being recognised, enable individuals to 
reclaim a portion of their true Adamic self (al-Adami al-muhaqqaq) which symbolised their 
state during pre-existence.                                                                                                            
kkkShelley, exposed to Thomas Taylor’s translations of Platonic and Orphic literature and 
disinterested in following the contemporary academic trend of prioritising Aristotelian 
teachings,
39
 was willing to suspend his disbelief in terms of offsetting his scepticism with an 
appreciation for sublime notions particularly when it came to expressing his views on love, 
language and childhood which culminate in a moralistic account of history as shaped by an 
attachment to innocence gradually lost over time whilst poetically minded figures help 
rejuvenate this impoverished vision. Shelley was fascinated by the Socratic connection 
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between recollection and childhood as the latter signified a period of close proximity to a 
reality prior to creation resulting in him asking a mother walking across Magdalen bridge 
whether her infant could, ‘tell us anything about pre-existence [?]’.40 This potential to recall 
is obscured during adulthood – especially when entrenched within modern society – requiring 
those who are equipped with a poetic kind of madness
41
 and who are capable of channelling 
‘the spirit of the age’ to communicate, ‘intense and impassioned conceptions respecting man 
and nature’,42 as if reverting to an infantile state and becoming more intimately acquainted 
with that pre-existent spirit which subsequently persists in an atemporal manner. Shelley 
offsets poetic madness against criminal madness as, ‘the root from which all vice and misery 
have so long overshadowed the globe’, and which produces, ‘all bodily and mental 
derangements [as a byproduct of] our unnatural habits’,43 generating a distinction between 
moral agents based on the understanding that although man’s ability to, ‘communicate his 
sensations, raise[s] him above the level of his fellow animals’, this faculty also opens the 
possibility of arrogance and self-centredness since, the ‘advantages of intellect and 
civilisation’, inevitably clash with, the ‘liberty and pure pleasures of natural life’.44 This onto-
ethical distinction is not dissimilar to the fidais who distinguished between the initiated and 
the uninitiated, the group perceived their adversaries as subsisting outside of the natural order 
since, in choosing not to recognise the spiritual reality of the Imam, they suppressed their 
mystical body and only existed on a corporeal (i.e. conditional and delusory) level which, 
translated into Shelley’s vocabulary, pertains to harnessing a poetic consciousness that 
recognises and responds to the voices of past ages as a means of, ‘redeem[ing] from decay 
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the visitations of the divinity in man’.45                                                                                   
kkkSacredness and sainthood are at the heart of both conceptions of inspiration; the 
‘hierohistory’ of the Imamate ‘has at the centre of its axis the revelation [...] “am I not your 
Lord”’,46 perpetuated by cycles of walayat (i.e. companionship, guardianship) which foster 
interpretive communities contributing towards an eternal Religion (din baqi, qayyim) that, 
Shi’is believe, will eventually produce a newly established variant of the Adamic unity 
experienced during pre-existence as part of the ultimate reintegration on the Day of 
Judgement. The communion that the eternal Religion affords is understood as such,  
[W]e are the society of the Brethren of Purity, pure and sincere beings 
with generous hearts. We have slept in the cavern of Adam, our father, 
during the lapse of time which has brought back to us the vicissitudes of 
time and the calamities of events until finally, after our dispersion across 
various nations, there comes the moment of our encounter in the realm of 
the Master of the Eternal Religion, the moment when we see our Spiritual 
City elevated in the air
47
 
kkkTwo components shape this metahistoric soteriology: ontological tawhid which indicates 
the renewed remembrance of Allah’s Oneness as the central mode of revelation from Adam 
until the Seal of Muhammad and theosophical tawhid signalling humanity’s re-initiation into 
a primordial covenant via the Imamate and culminating in the final resurrector Imam 
(Qa’im). Pre-empting a kind of Keatsian negative capability,48 followers of the Shi’i esoteric 
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doctrine accept the mysterious and supranatural elements of life without striving to fully 
comprehend or demystify such phenomena which is itself often the result of an egotistical 
desire for power through epistemological control. Indeed, the Ismailis choose to suspend 
disbelief via a more kataphatic approach that focuses on delineating what God is not. 
Shelley’s own propensity for transvaluation indicates that his poetics does not intrinsically 
necessitate an absolute rejection of a sublime or supranatural realm but rather suggests he 
seeks to strip the institutionalised framework away from noumenal conceptions of Power in 
order to reaffirm the incomprehensible nature of the sublime back into a post-enlightenment 
society which risks falling into the opposite extreme of relativistic apathy. Angela Leighton 
and Paul Endo argue that the way in which Shelley forestalls either dogma or 
disinterestedness is by preventing the confusion and awe of an ecstatic encounter from 
developing into comprehension consolidated as doctrine and worship reduced to habit, both 
of which are driven by an unhealthy obsession. Accordingly, when Shelley refers to poets as 
‘hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration’ and lauds their position as simultaneously, 
‘herald, companion, and follower of the awakening of a great people’,49 these 
unacknowledged interpreters of life’s mysteries as well as those who internalise their words 
and live ethically (e.g. adopt a vegetarian lifestyle) would become constituted by, ‘continued 
pleasure, such as [felt during] favoured moments of youth’, and would appreciate, 
‘sensational delights [in an] infinitely more exquisite and perfect [manner]’.50 During this 
heightening of sensibility through communion with poetic priests, sanctity is granted not to 
supreme Beings but humanitarian principles, ‘[b]y all that is sacred in our hopes for the 
human race, I conjure those who love happiness and truth to give a fair trial to the vegetable 
system’,51 and the dynamic between human vessel and sublime inspiration is figured in 
similarly secularising terms  which, as reflected in Shelley’s usage of the Aeolian harp, is 
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likened to an artisan eliciting exquisite expression from their instruments. The 
interdependence between subject and object during these creative transactions is explored in, 
‘With a Guitar. To Jane’, which examines whether an interanimative exchange is possible 
amongst disparate entities and across temporal discrepancies as the focal object, a guitar, 
grants expression to both the organic and human realm. This vessel relays nature’s secrets in 
musical form due to its pre-existence as part of the natural scenery before being fashioned 
into an instrument and granted a new role within human consciousness. The guitar is capable 
of being student and instructor. As Ross Wilson has outlined, the concept of dead or hidden 
matter being brought to life and made perceptible through a melodic (i.e. poetic) strain is a 
common trope throughout Shelley’s work often in relation to questions concerning slavery 
due to the concern that such a transaction might replicate that of a slave and master dynamic 
with tunes being seemingly imposed upon the guitar rather than being teased out. However, 
interpreting the image in light of Platonic conceptions of the soul,
52
 memory becomes a 
reiterative force enabling musicians, responsive to the resonating hum of past sympathetic 
communities reverberating across time, to remain heard within contemporary life. 
Accordingly, the guitar retains records of its past life which synergise with the artistic 
prowess of the one playing: ‘reanimation is [thus] imagined not just as a perpetuation of 
suspended life but as restoration and transformation at once’.53 Although the archetypal state 
of pre-existence (when humanity existed in potentia) was an ontologically substantial reality 
for the Ismailis such myths are, for Shelley,  inextricably attached to metaphor and deeply 
aware of their own origin as narrative trope as indicated by his citation of John Frank 
Newton: ‘[m]aking allowance for such transposition of the events of the allegory, as time 
might produce after the important truths were forgotten [...] the drift of the fable seems to be 
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this: Man at his creation was endowed with the gift of perpetual youth’.54 If the sublime is to 
enter Shelley’s work it must remain open to being continuously reframed in order to naturally 
encourage his audience to infuse existential meaning with lived experience rather than relying 
on an all-encompassing type of devotion that robs the noumenal realm of transience, 
dynamism and boundlessness: ‘[i]f the emplotting of the sublime – of its movement out of the 
meaningless into meaning – is necessarily ideological, the Negative Sublime suspends the 
crystallization into hard, dogmatic meaning through an “awful doubt”’.55 Despite Shelley’s 
allegorical understanding of metaphysical concepts, neither he nor the Ismailis perceived the 
lapse into temporality or the decay of thoughtful apprehension into uncritical perception as 
salvageable in the sense of returning to a prior state since, given the palimpsestuous nature of 
metempsychosis, reclaiming originality and overcoming belatedness was a futile endeavour: 
‘[c]an a return to nature, then, instantaneously eradicate predispositions that have been slowly 
taking root in the silence of innumerable ages? – Indubitably not’.56                                                   
kkkIn positioning hierophatic figures at the helm of their mythohistorical cycles and in 
appreciating the therapeutic nature of remembrance as not necessarily mourning a bygone 
state but offering a means to move forward (in an informed and empathetic manner) various 
points of convergence between a Shelleyan and Ismaili conception of inspiration begin to 
emerge. Nevertheless, even though both rely on an interanimative framework founded upon 
continuation and reintegration, Shelley’s emphasis falls on intertextuality wherein humanity 
is encouraged to assemble new strands of thought by discovering, ‘the lore of ancient wisdom 
[...] sculptured in mystic characters on the rocks’,57 (i.e. harnessing the memories of previous 
writers) whilst the Ismailis foreground intracommunal harmony as all partake in the 
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‘symbolic reproduction of a lifeworld’58 and in doing so, are brought beneath a collective 
sodality. The former seeks to recognise others as authors of their own youth via renewed 
vision whereas the latter recognises others as Adamic souls attached from pre-conception to a 
transcendent order and endowed with the emotional capacity to recollect or disregard this 
link.                                                                                                                                             
kkkIn offsetting these worldviews, a clearer picture begins to formulate as to how the poetic 
rendition of the Assassins (historically linked to Ismaili theology and poetically connected to 
Shelley’s philosophy) could assume a position that is, ‘[a]ttached from principle to peace’, as 
well as evincing a willingness to, ‘wage unremitting hostility from principle’, since the 
potential use of violence, whether to maintain political stability or in the service of self-
defence, is not inherently destructive due to being waged in the name of defending ‘justice 
and benevolence’ from the ‘corrupt and slavish multitude’ who would forget their legacy.59   
Cyclical Belatedness and Mundane Time 
kkkIsmaili esoteric thought which reads the Qur’an in a more allegorical light posits the 
consecutive revelations and reiteration of universal truths through a spiritual ancestry 
composed of prophets and Imams who may adopt the garb of an occult cleric but 
metaphysically functions as a intermediary of emanation between God and creation. Given 
the Nizari belief that the Mahdi (an eschatological liberator) is not tied to a singular figure but 
is a role undertaken by each successive Imam, this focus on continuance and perseverance 
enables a constantly renewed link to lost wisdom in a manner less immediately present when 
prophetic missions have reached a definitive endpoint either through Moses, Christ or 
Muhammad. This pre-cosmic illumination that perpetually shines across generations and 
shapes the Imamate challenges conventional perception of the authoritarian Imam who 
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encourages others to submit to his divinely pre-ordained status and instead refigures him as 
an emissary of Gnostic secrets who prompts others to awaken their inner Imam and harness 
those eternal truths which he has already been made conscious of. This ecumenical approach, 
diffuses authority from any one manifestation by elucidating a retroactive approach which 
remains sensitive to the universality of the human predicament as bound within a stream of 
cyclical time that has its beginning in an existential delay. In other words, mankind has fallen 
outside of an emanatory scheme into a realm of mundane time and in doing so, is cut off from 
the eternal advent of being (the absolute godhead) whose existence constitutes the movement 
of all other angelic spheres. Assuming that it was self-actualised, the human sphere gains a 
consciousness separate from the other spheres and is accordingly superseded leading to, 
‘[t]ime [being] born, a time in which there is a remoteness, a past that is no longer eternal, a 
past that is no longer’,60  it is the prophets and Imams who liberate mankind from this stupor 
by encouraging them to recognise this regression and channel their radical belatedness in a 
manner conducive to progress. The cosmos tends towards perfection and goodness and 
humans are an element of this dynamic but given our capacity to forget, transgress and fall 
into stagnant routines it is only via the spiritually adept guides which materialise across 
history that imaginations can be enlivened through restored admiration for these abandoned 
apprehensions which, in turn, generates a lineage of resurrections built upon collective 
camaraderie where: ‘each adept must "resuscitate" (or "suscitate") an adept like himself [and] 
rising from degree to degree cause another at every step to rise to his own former rank’.61 
Light and dark imagery is often used to characterise the relationship between an Imam and 
his disciples as microcosms of the grander cosmological hierarchy of Intellects in the sense 
that it is only through a mentor that others draw closer to the Unmoved Mover and yet, it is 
thanks to their disciples imparting these traditions that new luminous bodies (enlightened 
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beings of subsequent generations) are formed: ‘the cosmic cycles revolve, the Imams and 
their attendant spirits move gradually upwards towards the Source’.62 This cyclical 
progressivism is echoed in Shelley’s early thought as he hoped that history, despite serving as 
a stage for mankind’s atrocities, could still narrate an endless chain of human ‘progression in 
improvement’ toward a ‘golden age,’63 that although rooted in a Manichaean worldview 
cultivated through discussions with Leigh Hunt
64
 led to a dualistic position that clung to a 
belief that evil was illusory relative to the substantiality of virtuous ideals, celebrating ‘the 
transient nature of ignorance and error, and the eternity of genius and virtue’.65  Admittedly, 
particularly during 1813 and 1817, Shelley posited a certain interconnectedness between 
good and evil personifying their alternation as an inevitable dynamic of existence at the level 
of a universal principle, ‘[history is] a continual struggle for liberty on the part of the people, 
and an uninterrupted attempt at tightening the reins of oppression and encouraging ignorance 
and imposture by the oligarchy’,66 seemingly granting vice an equally necessary and potent 
reality as an evil spirit which governs events in the mundane realm to the point where, 
‘gloom and misanthropy have become the characteristics of the age in which we live’.67 
Nevertheless, echoing Peacock’s belief in the eventual success of love as the predominate 
mode of communication, Shelley hoped that through an imaginative commingling of the 
human and universal spheres: ‘there will come a time when the human mind shall be visited 
exclusively by the influences of the benignant power’.68 Expanding upon William 
Drummond’s desire to ‘elevate the mind to the contemplation of divine perfection’ by 
connecting what consciousness reflects upon with what it loves, Shelley writes, 
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My purpose has hitherto been simply to familiarise the highly refined 
imagination of the more select classes of poetical readers with beautiful 
idealisms of moral excellence; aware that until the mind can love, and 
admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles of moral 
conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the unconscious 
passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of his 
happiness
69
  
kkkAlthough man made institutions rely on the disenfranchisement of freethinkers to sap 
creativity from a community and prevent imposition of new thought structures that might 
threaten the status quo, poetic language requires constant renewal to prevent it from 
becoming stagnant or uninspired: ‘if no new poets should arise to create afresh the 
associations which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to all the nobler 
purposes of human intercourse.’70 New thinkers reconfigure old ideas by synthesising 
contradictory elements, creating rifts that did not exist previously as well as generally reading 
cross-culturally or trans-temporally. Each generation will produce poets, thinkers and artists 
that create work which draws heavily from motifs and beliefs of the dominant ideology even 
as they subvert it in certain areas (e.g. Milton or Michelangelo) and as such, will 
simultaneously transform and propagate the status quo. Creative imagination reanimates life 
and is itself resurrected across traditions through bygone images, tropes and topos being 
cited, recontextualised and reimagined as part of a process of literary reincarnation that 
attempts to undercut the customary processes in experience which oppress enthusiasm and 
stultify perceptual insight. Freedom is gained through, rather than apart from, life because 
experiencing something once again does not require an infinite regress to a point preceding 
familiarity but rather an unfolding towards ever new cycles of expression instilled by poets 
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who obviate the historicity of habit and, most importantly, restore admiration which, ‘is not a 
mere additive to apprehension but rather essential to it, for, in Shelley’s view, impoverished 
perception of life is impoverished life’.71 Ismaili thought embeds this admiration within a 
cosmic process, the ‘eternal movement of adoration of the Principle, which eternally actuates 
it toward being’,72 reframing the baggage of accumulated experience not in a manner that 
weighs down the soul but positions humanity as echoing the transhistorical resurrections (i.e. 
physical re-manifestations) enacted by the prophets and Imams. Therefore, as Samar Attar 
highlights, what intrigued Shelley about the Assassins beyond their willingness to break away 
from conventional interpretations of scripture was the notion of a, ‘Hidden Imam, glowing in 
a world of light’, that is capable of, ‘liberat[ing] the soul from an evil, material world of 
darkness’.73                                                                                                                                     
kkkAkin to Shelley’s successive bards who restore admiration to apprehension, the Imamate 
is posited as a schema to overcome the numbing effects of secondariness where the repetitive 
nature of worldly temporality inculcate alienation from self due to a loss of vivacity in 
apprehending what was once constituted by a type of undiscovered witnessing (the indistinct 
reverie of childhood or the prelapsarian state) that is blunted by reiteration. For Shelley and 
Nizaris, the strain of melody or the individuations of the eternal Imam generate states in 
which, the ‘past is [...] metamorphosed into the future of Resurrection’,74 altering the notion 
of linear time as self-animated from a singular point in a chain which is destined to weaken in 
favour of interanimation governed by interconnected chains perpetuated through a 
reincarnatory system. The difference being that, for Shelley, this process resembles 
metempsychosis or, the ‘transformation and preservation of one substance into, and in, 
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another substance, to which it, as much as anything else, contributes’,75  this notion of 
contribution pinpoints the embodied agency inherent within any pattern of change as 
compelled by events outside individual control but is also distinctly anthropomorphic due to 
deriving its shape from the growing influence of communal efforts to reduce or advance 
social cohesion through a cultivation of empathy and equality highlighting how the 
revolutionary spirit is beholden to the transfigurative effects of human affectivity and mental 
shifts. Whether memory is a stagnant or reiterative force is key to poetry’s redemptive force 
as it recuperates mental shifts and lived emotions back into the present otherwise subjectivity 
would remain attached to an non-cathartic form of recollection since if, ‘[t]he curse of this 
life is that whatever is once known can never be unknown’, the choice falls upon harnessing 
these memories poetically or risk being inextricably attached to these lost objects in a manner 
that, ‘clings to you [and] revenges your desertion [by transfiguring] what has been [into a] 
seem[ing] yet to be, but [now] barren & stript of life’.76 Imagination offers some balance to 
the attrition of human existence by granting access to abstract thought through which 
historical decay can be filtered (infusing materialism with an ideal element) and, to reverse 
the agony of remembrance, grants poetry an honoured role in the revitalisation of mundane 
experience via a visionary future constituted by an equally visionary past. In maintaining 
humanity’s reflective capacity acquired throughout life whilst offsetting the corrupting 
aspects of perceptive decay and irrecoverable experience, poetry serves a moral function 
providing not only the best representation of the historical conscience but also contributing to 
the collective spirit of creative thought by producing, ‘episodes to that great poem, which all 
poet's, like the co-operating thoughts of one great mind, have built up since the beginning of 
the world.’77 Through this transhistorical connectedness, poets adopt a prophetic role as their 
writing contains a wealth of reference points, imagery and metaphor which serve to inspire 
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further renewal and progress, ‘mark[ing] the before unapprehended relations of things, and 
perpetuat[ing] their apprehension, until words, which represent them, become, through time, 
signs for portions or classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts’,78 enabling 
memory, or at least the language through which memory is conceived, to be both enduring 
and reinvigorating as ideas are available to be witnessed once again through new perspectives 
rather than hardened beneath the yoke of custom. Poetry remains consistently pertinent 
because it is able to draw upon human nature’s universal principles and synergise disparate 
mental categories: ‘[a] Poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one; as far as 
relates to his conceptions, time and place and number are not,’79 poetry can tap into an ideal 
realm and harness its positive qualities such as perpetuity and perfection but converts these 
unobtainable laws into available prospects for historical communities via poets who are either 
reacting to the spirit of the age or responding to a grander shared unconscious. Therefore, 
although the spirit of history functions as the overarching principle, poets remain the most 
accurate mirrors
80
 and astute commentators with regards to developing civilised society and 
forging transtemporal empathetic communities serving as beacons of liberty: ‘defeat[ing] the 
curse which binds us to be subjected to the accident of surrounding impressions’,81 and 
producing change by renewing perception as well as instilling within those willing to listen a 
way of communicating their impressions to others. Conversely, in Ismaili theosophy, the 
guiding principle is recapitulation or reintegration into the whole as, ‘eternal Time erupts in 
cycles of successive times whose rotation carries them back to their origin’,82 rendering the 
Deus absconditus that resurfaces at each level of theophany into a physical instantiation (an 
Imam or prophet) which are the mirrors repeatedly reflecting the luminescence (nur) of the 
Eternal Imam which has associations with the Word of God, Muḥammad's pre-existent soul 
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(nur Muḥammadi) or the Universal Intellect as the First Originated Being (al-‘aql al-kull) 
creating a transitive process not based upon poetic incantation but epiphanic manifestation.
83
 
More specifically, the Ismaili understanding is derived from a combination of Islamic 
theophany (mazhar) and emanationism causing the reincarnatory principle to be presented 
not as a metempsychosis (tanasukh) or divine incarnation manifest in human form (hulul) but 
an ‘intercyclical homology’ 84 working through a perpetual patterning of actuation, 
integration and recapitulation as part of an unfolding whole. Ismaili Imams and their 
luminary students are granted an archetypal dimensionality as the echoing resonance of their 
thought patterns migrate via a chain of spiritual adepts fitted for each period in a continuous 
strain. On all planes of existence, the result is an interlocking chain of influence that blurs the 
bounds between cause and effect until they become almost indistinguishable from one 
another when taken as a whole movement across time from conception to Armageddon with 
reflection being central to the overall process: ‘the Imam is said to shine divine light on the 
souls of his followers, and their souls reflect the light as when the sun shines on glass’.85 The 
divergence can be accounted for by assessing the overarching telos of either system whether 
it be the Grand Resurrection or the great poem. The former signals the consummation and 
completion of the Grand Cycle in which, ‘the soul achieves the highest wisdom [and] is 
assimilated by the Loftiest Wisdom of the Universe, an eternal substance of divine origin’.86 
It is through this journey towards an eventual cosmic homecoming on the Day of Judgement 
that all created things, including humans, gain purpose as every conception or cessation of 
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biological life alongside its respective spiritual awakening or closure is both driving and 
shaping the ultimate outcome which will not come to pass until everything has been brought 
back to the First Cause. The latter has no definitive point of closure as both its authorship and 
shape is characterised by indeterminate openness and yet, in either formulation, ‘the agency 
of reanimation, and its dependency on what it would reanimate, [remains] a critical 
question.’87 
Summary 
kkkMy focus lies not in arguing whether Shelley might have perceived the transferral chains 
constituting Ismaili Gnosticism as anything other than a, ‘Burkean celebration [...] of the 
stable self-reproduction of the patriarchal order [...] compelled and yet [...] motionless’,88  
since the force of my reading does not lie in delineating complete parity between the Imamate 
and Shelleyan interanimative poetics as if to argue that Shelley’s focus was to normalise Shi’i 
thought into the mainstream. Instead, through emphasising the hybridisation of disparate 
reformatory sects encompassed by the narrative, I have sought to distil one component of this 
alchemical mixture whose views regarding legacy or inspiration have been overlooked due to 
an assumed fundamental disagreement on behalf of Shelley and the Ismaili Assassins that 
undervalues the role of metempsychosis underpinning his transvaluative frame. I suggest that 
Ismaili thought is as revisionary within its own tradition as Christian Gnosticism and thus, 
equally pertinent to an exploration of Shelley’s synthetic imagination for it further reveals 
how he channels the revisionary potency of religious sects which, due to their fringe status, 
are capable of subverting orthodox associations in ways that dismiss the assumed 
interpretation (whether it be a positive rendition of the serpent motif or a shifting of assumed 
leadership dynamic through the figure of Imam Ali). Shelley’s own iconoclasm strives to 
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break down the power associated with monolithic sign systems but his reliance on poetry 
means that imagery must still persist in some form and thus, metaphoric displacement 
becomes an avenue for poetically minded philosophes to rebuild the world anew whilst 
maintaining a necessary level of reciprocity whenever art purports to speak on behalf of life: 
a ‘poem [may only live] in the reader’s reading, but [..] at the same time, the reader is brought 
more fully to life by the poem.’89 The diverse train of thinkers Shelley cites as part of this 
lineage from Dante to Milton is a testimony to the transhistorical breadth of Shelley’s 
approach to revisionism
90
 as well as the risks of repeating similar structures implicit in 
religious discourse regarding inspiration since this pseudo-clergy begins to reflect a new type 
of idolatry in the guise of self-divinisation. The Assassins, as an amalgamation of Gnostic 
revisionary outsiders, becomes a prime example of the anticipatory fear that Shelley felt 
towards his rational commitment to empiricism and  his ideational inclination to feeling as 
expressed in a letter to Elizabeth Hitchener in June 1811,  
To a belief in Deity I have no objection on the score of feeling, I would 
as gladly perhaps with greater pleasure admit than doubt his existence 
[...] Imagination delights in personification; were it not for this 
embodying quality of eccentric fancy we should be to this day without a 
God [...] this personification, beautiful in Poetry, inadmissible in 
reasoning [...] I recommend reason. – Why? Is it because since I have 
devoted myself unreservedly to its influencing
91
  
kkkThe poem imagines a society through which Shelley can explore whether faith and reason 
must always stain one another or whether they can reach a mutually constitutive middle 
ground offering a space in which to conceptualise a reform that does not exploit the 
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destruction of a prior status quo in the name of erecting a new one. Consequently, I have 
incorporated the cumulative efforts of Ross Wilson and William Dowden to delineate a 
Shelleyan theory of life, however abstruse such a feat may be, characterised by 
interanimation and metempsychosis where, ‘the systematic efforts of generations of men of 
intellect and virtue,’92 disseminate a poetic sensibility that awakens their audience to the 
habitual nature of existence and rebuilds new forms of apprehension upon visions previously 
buried beneath custom. It may seem as though I impose Shelley’s later views on poetic 
inspiration and genealogy from texts such as A Defence of Poetry upon a much earlier text 
but I argue that the imagery and connotative force associated with this sect remain pertinent 
even throughout his later writing. One notable allusion takes place in A Philosophical View of 
Reform (1819) where Shelley’s hopefulness regarding a spirit of enthusiasm that will arise 
from the East and awaken them from slavish subjectivity leads him to posit that it, ‘must go 
on “conquering and to conquer”’,93 which seems a likely reference to Coleridge’s play 
Remorse (1797 [1813]) where Alhadra, surrounded by a group of Moors in the mountains, 
proclaims: ‘[t]he strongholds of the cruel men should fall,/Their temples and their 
mountainous towers should fall, [...] And all that were and had the spirit of life,/Sang a new 
song to her who had gone forth,/Conquering and still to conquer!’.94 Despite no direct 
reference to the Assassins it still seems highly relevant given the general iconography of 
mountain dwelling revolutionaries who right injustices in the name of Allah and the Prophet
95
 
and the fact that the Shi’i sect is a component of Kubla Khan (1816) as those who ‘dr[i]nk the 
milk of Paradise’96 Additionally, Alhadra roughly translates to “presence” or to be present 
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which is rather fitting if she functions as the Imam figure in this scenario for they symbolise 
the transcendent link made manifest not through a type of indwelling of the divine within 
flesh but as a representative or reflection which shows forth goodness and instils ethics which 
would, in Shelley’s rendition, become a zeal that inculcates an honourable fortitude against 
tyranny given their intense, ‘[a]ttach[ment] from principle to peace, despising and hating the 
pleasures and the customs of the degenerate mass of mankind’.97 For Shelley, Imsaili 
Gnostics and Christian Gnostics, resurrection is the response to custom as images, previously 
believed to be deceased or static, are revised through a process of renewal until, at each stage, 
‘the past is abolished and metamorphosed into the future of Resurrection (Qiyamat)’.98 These 
spiritual or poetic strains serve as a countermeasure to rectilinear time that offers no 
redemptive retroactive movement or purely cyclical time which risks devolving into a 
retarding repetition as opposed to a reiterative renewal. All three schemas propose dormant 
apprehensions must be reintroduced afresh rather than forgotten as every age perpetuates a 
melodic strain retuning perception to wave lengths since unheard and even though Christian 
and Ismaili Gnosticism reframe this process within a metaphysical schema which Shelley 
would have shunned, he was still aware of the idealising assumptions and fictions that could 
potentially infiltrate his own thinking. Both the overlaps and discrepancies which arise when 
examining the relationship between consciousness and transconsciousness in each system are 
vital in gaining a fuller comprehension as to why these authorial decisions are thematically 
pertinent.  Even if, during the process of transvaluation, some subtleties are unperceived by 
the author himself, I argue that the spirit of this research still shares a similar metahistorical 
attunement to the transferral of ideas whereby past thoughts are not lost but remain essential 
to the shape of subsequent legacies, however reimagined.                                                                                                   
kkkBoth the Imamate and the poet legislators are shaped by the Spirit of Nature or the Will of 
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Allah that provide the only sustainable ideals to strive after and which, even at the heart of an 
outwardly unsuccessful revolution, shall continue to persist in varying forms. The central 
contention being that, for Shelley, interpretive authority is not singular and the Spirit of 
Nature becomes synonymous with Necessity on a temporal level whilst also being an 
atemporal creative and volitional force constituted by humankind’s collective One Mind. 
Whereas, for the Ismailis, the luminaries that serve to guide subsequent generations by 
revealing esoteric principle and correct conduct are understood to acquire their insight via an 
external supranatural force (Allah) with more unorthodox conceptions positing an indwelling 
within the Essence of God in contrast to the predominant scholarly consensus that chooses to 
affirm the separatedness of Creation and Creator.
99
 Nevertheless, the shared importance 
placed on self-knowledge bridges both worldviews on the understanding that it is only by 
plumbing the depths of selfhood that patterns will be revealed in order to uncover more about 
the nature of humanity as product or producer. In each schema, the atemporal prototype is 
either immortalised by God as possessing those Divine Attributes subsequently echoed in 
human form or the Spirit of Nature that paradoxically animates the universe whilst also being 
a consequence of human imagination. Time is measured according to the unfolding stress of 
ontological imperfection that must be worked through rather than against by retaining the 
memories of its downfalls (moments where it succumbs to temporal retardation) as a catalyst 
for a constantly reinvigorated appreciation of existence which inspires mankind to relinquish 
the perceptual baggage of reality as always already made and aim toward ever more renewed 
observations on life. Recognising humanity’s embeddedness within a grander pattern either 
known cosmologically or intuited symbolically, requires understanding that any implication 
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within the Will of Allah or the Spirit of Nature is equally expressed through intertwined, 
‘bondage[s] of [...] sympathy’,100 composed of individual, collective and transhistorical 
consciousnesses perpetually resuscitating life from the stultifying effects of its own 
belatedness.  
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Part Two: 1816 
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Chapter 3 
The aporetic veil: Attaining madness by submitting to paradox in Alastor and Sufistic poetry      
kkkWhen developing the Poet and the veiled maiden in Alastor it is likely Shelley was 
calling upon his knowledge of Sufistic literature for it follows a similar narrative structure 
regarding the melancholic lover who longs to be consumed by their idealised beloved until 
they are gradually detached from society as a consequence of this overwhelming desire. 
These narratives were popularised by the likes of Leila and Majnoun translated in 1785 by 
William Kirkpatrick entitled, Mujnoon; or, the Distracted Lover. A Tale. From the Persian, a 
partial translation of Abdullah Hatifi’s Laili Majnun by William Jones1 and another rendition 
entitled, The Loves of Mejnoun and Leila, by Isaac D’Israeli (1797) both of which explore the 
duality in Arabic and Persian languages of, ‘words [...] which express LOVE [but] imply also 
MELANCHOLY, MADNESS, and DEATH’, as the Oriental trope of ‘[d]ying for love’ goes 
beyond being ‘a mere poetic figure.’2 Additionally, Shelley might have been exposed to 
motifs of Persian love such as the image of the nightingale and the rose such as William 
Jones’s ‘The Flowers of Persian Literature’ (1805) in which he cites the intellectual John Nott 
who states: ‘[t]he Persians have several poetical fables, to which they often allude in their 
compositions, but to none so frequently as that which supposes the nightingale to be violently 
enamoured with the rose’,3 together both translators rendered the works of Sa’adi and Hafiz 
into English who employed this metaphor in their love poetry; in particular, conceptualising 
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the nightingale’s song as a reflection of the poet’s voice4 which Nilchian notes is a sentiment 
echoed in A Defence of Poetry when Shelley writes: ‘[a] Poet is a nightingale, who sits in 
darkness and sings to cheer its own solitude with sweet sounds.’5 In carrying out a 
transvaluation as opposed to a translation of these Arab and Persian texts, I argue that Shelley 
generates a poem attuned to the visionary experience espoused in Medieval mystic writing by 
prioritising paradox and bewilderment as the core dynamics characterising the subject and 
object relationship rather than certainty, consummation and articulation which Alireza 
Anushiravani  and Laleh Atashi accuse Jones of doing, ‘the unknown and the mysterious 
[are] explored [until] their Eastern opacity has given way to the Western transparency’.6 In 
seeking to obfuscate instead of elucidate, Shelley dismantles the progressive sense of a 
narrative that develops towards a finalised form by producing a text that resists imbuing signs 
with fixed meanings, perpetually gesturing outside of its boundaries, both mourning the 
inadequacy of language to convey the inexpressible whilst acknowledging the memorial 
immortality potentially available to Faustian artists. The contradictory nature of the maiden 
resists interpretive control as a help and a hindrance (a guide as well as a distraction) which is 
a conceit embedded within Alastor and mystical literature as her haunting memory both 
comforts the poet in the knowledge that she was real and not a figment of his imagination 
whilst the inconsistent nature of his recollections expose a falsity at the heart of their love: 
‘[s]he is my cure and sickness, and her memory my care;/but for the painful distance, passion 
dies./But she is far away, her tribe beyond/strong, evil winds that scar the stony plains,/And 
crows that croak of parting, like/bereaved, lamenting, high-born Nubian women.’7 Shelley’s 
                                                          
4
 ‘O Haufez! thy delightful lay,/ That on the wild wind floats,/ Resembles much, our poets say,/ The 
nightingale’s rich notes;/ What wonder then, thy music flows/ In the sweet season of the rose.’ (Ibid, p.176) 
5
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Selected Poetry and Prose of Shelley, ed. by Bruce Woodcock (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions, 2002), p. 641. 
6
 Alireza Anushiravani, ‘Cultural Translation: A Critical Analysis of William Jones’s Translation of Hafez’, 
Persian Literary Studies Journal 1 (2012) 41-58, at p. 55. 
7
 Geert Jan Van Gelder, Classical Arabic Literature: A Library of Arabic Literature Anthology (New York: New 
York University Press, 2013), p. 24. 
99 
 
protagonists seek to recreate themselves in the image of their beloved because, as the object 
of desire, the seeker’s main aim is to become desirable to the other in the hopes of being 
accepted. The drive towards annihilation in Alastor remains a tenuous position to hold as it 
signals a break from the Symbolic realm which inculcates a form of madness where, the 
‘Gothic Real boils and bubbles behind the fantasmic frame until it bursts [through the divide 
between Real and reality]’,8 subsequently challenging hierarchies and dismantling customary 
perception by turning substance into superstition. Conversely, maintaining difference fulfils a 
similar function to Mary Wollstonecraft’s presence in the Jane poems as a poetic rope from 
which to hoist the poet out of an indefinite Edenic slumber for the subject will never be able 
to enjoy the beatific vision without the moment of castration: ‘when the poet is brought back 
to "me," to desire, and to language […] he can experience the ecstasy only because he bleeds 
in his separation from it’.9 Akin to Sufistic devotional literature, Shelley’s object of devotion 
is personified as a female who both appears to be secondary in the relationship, as a ‘sister of 
my soul’ or ‘second self’,10 whilst also being lauded as the one in power and deified in 
comparison to the male seeker who is spiritually impoverished before their imagined 
immutability. The female self is the ground of masculine subjectivity due to its association 
with the pre-Oedipal Chora that nourishes the child in youth causing femininity to signify, for 
Shelley, the ‘ideal prototype of everything excellent or lovely’, which the masculine power 
must learn to embody until ‘like the chords of two exquisite lyres strung to the 
accompaniment of one delightful voice, vibrate with the vibrations of our own’.11 The 
similarities between Islamic and Shelleyan use of the spiritual maiden trope breaks down 
when metaphysics and metaphors collide; although Shelley’s spectral relationships stem from 
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a void, coupled with the desire for renewal, the emptiness does not necessarily signal a lost 
unity, as Ghislaine McDayter argues: ‘[h]is object of desire is not simply absent, it is absence 
itself.’12 There remains in Shelley’s work a constant self-awareness as to the fictionality of 
the object of desire as an idealised rendition of a real female (e.g. Jane Williams or Elizabeth 
Hitchener) which curtails the ecstasy of union since behind the veil lies hollow tautology. 
There is no fixed point of devotion just a consciously imagined artifice that cannot even save 
Shelley let alone the women he reifies: ‘such salvation is impossible because the 
imprisonment and confinement of these beings within the poet is essential [to] the poet's 
fantasy of stable subjectivity’.13 Shelley strives to replicate the interpersonal, non-penetrative 
relationship founded upon the dissolution of gendered boundaries that he envisions as only 
attainable by reinstating a feminine order but the problem regarding how to imaginatively 
inhabit that space as a male writer persisted, leading him to fear either his ideals overtaking 
his poetic voice or his voice draining those ideals of any real existence. Islamic renunciation 
of self requires an unwavering belief in the reality of their beloved as a higher ontological 
existent that they can reinstate within their own selves to acquire a reinvigorated, divinely 
inspired frame of mind and body that is ultimately provides a more truthful mode of 
experience. However, Shelley recognises all his literary attempts at self-renunciation are 
fictional since, regardless of how much he idealises the females in his writing, the poet stands 
as the ultimate creator within the universe of his own literary creation resulting in any efforts 
to commingle with an existence other than his own to be in vein. Shelley generates the fiction 
of a ‘glorious One’14 in Epipsychidion which either, in the worst case scenario, traps him 
within a hall of mirrors where everything merely reflects his own self-absorption or, in 
recognising this tautological perspectiveness, enables him to move beyond the solipsistic 
bounds of ego towards a deeper understanding of humanity as constituted by particular 
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instances within an evolving maze of accumulative experience. I shall examine Shelley’s 
transfiguration of Sufism in light of Lacan and Derrida to portray how the psychoanalytical 
and deconstructive tendencies within Alastor work in tandem to grant Shelley freedom from 
the religious connotations of these esoteric tropes whilst retaining their drive to subsist within 
the perplexity of the Real: ‘[i]f idealism becomes a perplexingly difficult position to 
maintain, skepticism also proves a blind alley’.15  
Lacanian neurosis 
kkkThe protagonist’s journey, like many mystical pilgrimages, is driven by a yearning to 
recover an ideal state of unity in the hope of encountering a Divine Other by erasing the 
individual ego amidst the universal whole and as such, this thirst for truth was instilled in the 
Poet from an early age upon being exposed to, ‘[e]very sight/ And sound from the vast earth’, 
which subsequently sprung forth from his heart, ‘[t]he fountains of divine philosophy’.16 In 
Ghazali’s Ascent to the Divine he presents a character study of the wandering Muslim pilgrim 
which is not dissimilar to Shelley’s aforementioned characterisation; they both possess an 
innate disposition towards a deep appreciation of existential realities and desire to solve 
intellectual problems through meditation and solitude. The protagonist’s disinterestedness 
towards worldly affairs is evident from the outset as his awe-inspiring beauty enamours the 
Arab maiden, who ‘gaze[s] upon his lips/ Parted in slumber’17 but the mute forms of his 
breath are as impenetrable as the ruined temples, and she is left ‘[w]ildered, and wan, and 
panting’.18 It is inevitable that such soul searching amongst lost civilizations will lead to a 
deeper questioning of one’s own place in history. Similarly, the singing-girls in Medieval 
Arabia were poetically idealised into the image of an alluring femme fatale that emblematises 
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the divine in much Sufistic literature and reflects the feminine spectral antitype in Alastor 
who is a deification of an Arab Maiden that seeps into the protagonist’s subconscious despite 
his outward disinterestedness and in turn, generates an image built upon nurture and 
affection: she ‘brought his food [...] Enamoured, yet not daring for deep awe/ To speak her 
love’.19 Eventually his dream reawakens her and these roles are reversed. It is clear that the 
veiled maiden who emerges from this interaction is generated from the imagination of both 
Shelley (who occupies the frame of his poetry) and the speaker (who conjures her in his 
dream) leading her to internalise aspects of a poetic identity, ‘[k]nowledge and truth and 
virtue were her theme,/ And lofty hopes of divine liberty’, whose, ‘voice was like the voice of 
his own soul’, until she slowly becomes a distinguished subject moving on her own and even 
initiating movement in the protagonist: ‘[s]udden she rose,/As if her heart impatiently 
endured/Its bursting burden: at the sound he turned’.20 The purpose of this apparition is to 
initiate the subject’s quest for unity as it is only when the subject encounters an idealised 
apparition derived from within that he is able to transcend his primary identity in favour of a 
vicarious existence in the light of a sublime alter ego, forming an ‘axis round which the 
epipsyche-idea revolves […] the paradox of separateness-in-oneness’.21 Consequently, the 
dream reflects the hero’s urge to create an ideal self as a means of having his, ‘lofty hopes of 
divine liberty’,22 realised in the sensible world because the soul is capable of projecting order 
upon seemingly unintelligible phenomena and thus, not only give shape to potential ideas but 
create essences. To better understand the identity of the spectral figure it serves to cite Evan 
Gibson’s repudiation of Harold L. Hoffman:   
He does not fall in love with himself as Hoffman believes, who makes the 
vision the poet's own inner self [but rather the] vision is a creation by his 
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soul of an ideal "soul-mate," one who will respond to every characteristic of 
his soul on all three planes [intellectual, imaginative, sensual]
23
  
kkkWhilst I agree that the protagonist’s soul is the creative receptacle from which the vision 
springs from, I believe Gibson undervalues the proximity that such a symbiotic relationship 
necessitates (one which Hoffman accentuates to the point of narcissism). Therefore, I seek to 
merge the two readings by suggesting that the female vision is an abstraction of the poet’s 
own soul – a projection of his essential being. Al-Ghazali draws the distinction between 
someone’s essential being (inniyah) which is a person’s real nature, and their intelligent being 
(‘aql) which is the thinking subject, as a way of explaining how a person remains aware of 
themselves during sleep through the median state of conscious (mahiyyah mujarradah). This 
schema helps explain how the vision can be both a projection of the poet’s own soul whilst 
remaining an entirely separate entity. For example, when a person sees a material substance 
(mahiyyah) and then closes their eyes, their intellect presents them with an abstract image 
that extracts the essence of the object but, because the essential being is already free from 
matter, the object of his intelligence becomes the substance of the observer. Although Gibson 
tries to separate the two existences, I would argue that the vision never subsists externally and 
thus, is always an approximation of the hero’s real nature as the observation made existent is 
simply an abstracted impression derived from within. This synergistic relationship is 
characterised most succinctly by M.H. Abrams as a ‘bilateral transaction […] between mind 
and external object‘24 which is embodied by the veiled maiden who exists on the bound of 
reverie and mundanity – whose beating heart filled, ‘[t]he pauses of her music’.25 The rhythm 
of her words reminds him that ‘[h]er voice was like the voice of his own soul’;26 the simile 
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should not be read as a means of distancing but embracing because even though duality 
assumes difference it also leaves open the possibility of correspondence. This distinction does 
not, as Gibson suggests, harm the authenticity of their shared nature but indicates an 
intelligible relationship between soul and body which is mediated through nature as their 
inner selves are in harmony like the strings of an Aeolian lyre: ‘her fair hands/ Were bare 
alone, sweeping from some strange harp/ Strange symphony […] in their branching veins’.27 
This external abstraction intensifies his indifference towards the physical maiden in favour of 
companionship with the sublime as his newly awakened imagination blinds the protagonist to 
the needs of the sensible world due to an overbearing need to reclaim a euphoric state of 
oneness. Consequently, he places the female apparition in the position of an idyllic alter ego 
not longing for possession, but dissolution, and, by folding ‘his frame in her dissolving 
arms’,28 hopes to achieve a higher level of selflessness (i.e. self-loss).                                           
kkkFor Lacan, the reflected subject perceived during the mirror stage grants a holistic but 
illusory sense of self, distinct from the onlooker, which engenders a totalising image that they 
associate themselves with and in turn, inculcates an existential misrecognition 
(méconnaissance) where  this rupture between observer and observed generates confusion as 
to what exactly constitutes true selfhood. The subject yearns to enact that alienating moment 
and experience wholeness once again despite it being a phantasmic reflection of a mistaken 
identity. Therefore, given that the estranged self is an internalised projection of the subject-
made-object their subsequent engagement with others becomes an extension of a greater 
drive towards self-reclamation. Similarly, Shelley notes a compulsive narcissistic tendency in 
his notion of love which denotes a wandering thirst for partnership (i.e. mirroring) on the part 
of a subject who, detached from a universe they sense could allow assimilation, strives for 
integration within any form that might potentially symbolise this ideal internalised image of 
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self, functioning ‘[n]ot only [as] the portrait of our external being, but an assemblage of the 
minutest particles of which our nature is composed [...] a soul within our soul’.29 Similitude 
establishes the necessary foundation for communion and even though such blending of, ‘two 
restless frames in one reposing soul’,30  requires a level of mutual transference – unattainable 
in life without collapsing the fiction of the ideal – there remains the possibility for art to 
sustain that euphoric moment where subject becomes wholly interchangeable with object 
resulting in a paradoxical instance of self-awareness in which fulfilment is attained through a 
vacuum, ‘the chasm of an insufficient void.’31 The idealised reflexivity inherent in Lacan and 
Shelley’s divided subject resembles a Sufistic lover who seeks to cleanse their nafs (ego) 
until it replicates the lustre of the ultimate Beloved from whom their own soul was initially 
realised and leading them to realise their vicegerency as beacons refracting Allah’s majesty 
through their conduct and perception. When describing infatuation, Sufis often delineate a 
change from besotted wanderer to vanquished worshipper as the earlier period of endearment 
(mawadda), which is etymologically derived from the term, peg (wadd), connotes the 
indelible impression that the beloved affixes onto the heart of their lover who is constantly 
haunted by their memory: ‘[i]f Layla should requite someone for fondness (mawadda) let her 
requite me, and should she requite for kinship, let it be me, her kinsman’.32 Both Shelley and 
the esoteric love poetry he echoes foreground travel as a prelude to awakening a euphoric 
vision, ‘there is no rest or respite to the heart over which [love] rules’,33 with Lacan similarly 
citing the courtly love of troubadours
34
 as, 'a paradigm of sublimation', for they base their 
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existence on recovering something unreachable but the voyage is less physical as it is 
spiritual or psychological. In each instance, the epipsychidion archetype conflates the act of 
finding to being found whereby revelation on the part of the ideal object or the reified subject 
becomes synonymous with self-revelation and thus, ekstasy (inward displacement) inevitably 
ensues.
35
  The propensity of sublimation to transcendentalise mundane objects is re-enacted 
by the Poet figure in Alastor who is responding to the Arab Maiden and the Sufistic lover in 
relation to the physical manifestation of beauty (female beloved) since both signify either a 
lack or an unobtainability relative to their ultimate goal which causes each protagonist to 
creatively transfigure the earthly feminine equivalent into an ideal poetic companion who 
speaks to their sensibilities and harnesses their creativity in a more intimate and penetrative 
manner. The latter remains, at best, a mundane emblem of a higher form hinting towards a 
greater potentiality or, at worse, an entity more mute and unperceptible than the abstract 
forms themselves with considerably less potential for inspiration.                                                
kkkThe world becomes somewhat theophanic in its revelatory potential as Lacan impregnates 
every object with self-signification as the analysand strives to salvage their originary lack and 
Sufistic poetry compulsively traces the approximate manifestations of Allah who, as the locus 
of universal beauty, is witnessed in the acquired splendour of creation with momentary 
unveilings realised aesthetically via the natural world or spiritually through expressions of 
faith. In particular, Rumi’s Divan uses sound (sama) to reflect the all-encompassing qualities 
of sublime love since, by piercing the  stillness of silence, it becomes a lively force propelling 
all creatures within his poetic universe to unify beneath a singular melody (naghma) with the 
potential to invigorate through instances of rousing symphony or annihilate during quiet 
moments when movement is forestalled: ‘[natures music] animates the Sufis of the skies into 
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their whirling dance./The spring breeze comes running, singing;/It makes the world laugh and 
the autumn leave’.36 The sensed melody is understood to be the breath of divine mercy 
animating creation at all levels of existence enabling it to persist after the creative command 
to be that first realised our entire universe, ‘[t]he entire world is only the sound of her 
music;/Who ever heard a melody so long drawn out?’,37 and true status is granted to those 
mistrels (manshid) who are capable of channelling these cosmic reverberations into a song 
(i.e. poem or treatise) that whether apophatically or kataphatically captures something of this 
ultimate Composer by transcribing His tones as a means of spiritually stimulating the 
consciousness of others: ‘[t]he minstrel’s strains I heard/softly struck in a sharp key,/inspired 
ecstasy in me’.38 The inclusive quality of nature’s sounds evokes Kristeva’s womb-like chora 
as God is often presented in maternal terms whilst the anxious wanderer occupies an infantile 
role aimlessly seeking sustenance (i.e. consistency) in a mortal world:  
I moved from place to place to soothe the baby of my heart;/Babies calm 
down when one rocks the cradle./Feed the baby of our heart, free us from 
the need to wander about,/O you who cure in each instant a hundred 
incurables like me
39
  
kkkThe sonoral patterns of the Divan’s poetic universe lead its protagonist to crave 
subsumption within the surrounding pageantry, ‘[y]ou go and tell the sea: ‘do not be agitated 
O sea!’/By those sweet lips with which you blow in me;/This bagpipe has no control over its 
singing’.40 By using ‘agitated’ and ‘no control’ Rumi presents this process of self-abnegation 
beneath a larger harmony as not comfortable but rather overpowering, stressful and 
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perplexing which resists attempts at overly idealising the visionary experience of love. Given 
that spiritual audition permeates the text from an organic to a metaphysical level, the notion 
of participation is less volitional than first assumed since the modes of expression available 
are drawn from a pre-established set of naturally or metaphorically generated imagery 
whether it be: ‘the roaring sea, the drum, the bagpipe, and thousands of other sounds that 
shake the blue dome’.41 Although it is blasphemous to refer to the Qur’an as music, part of 
this deep-seated cultural conscience surrounding the overpowering nature of sound can be 
attributed to the narrations detailing the spontaneous onset of prophetic revelation.
42
 The 
physical and mental strain attached to receiving revelation was due to a shift from the 
corporeal to the metaphysical realm entailing a brief relinquishing of the physical body. 
Likewise, harmony is an essential element within Shelley’s more platonic flights of fancy for 
he, like Lacan, posits imagination as a means of entering the symbolic realm with disciplines 
from poetry to music helping foster creativity: ‘the teachers who draw into a certain 
propinquity with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the 
invisible world which is called religion’.43 In imagining mankind as an ‘instrument [which 
produces] not melody alone, but harmony,’ 44 Shelley hopes that a greater appreciation of 
beauty as refined through an engagement with high art can account for the mysterium 
tremendum of revealed religion without being beholden to the uninspiring nature of scripture 
as dogma.
 Shelley’s spectral maiden reflects the Sufistic beloved whose femininity is 
expressed via musicality and sensuousness with both her frame and speech fascinating him 
into submission by maintaining a linguistic hold over the onlooker and appealing to an innate 
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desire to fulfil a lost wholeness through communion with a reflection greater than self 
culminating in an intimate moment devoid of climax: ‘[t]he beating of her heart was heard to 
fill/ The pauses of her music, and her breath/ Tumultuously accorded with those fits/ Of 
intermitted song [but] Sudden[ly] she rose’.45 Shelley similarly envisions the one who is 
visited by the phantasm of inspiration to be like a child who is sensuously awoken to the 
possibility of play through its mothers embrace and, after being stripped from this nurturing 
companion, ‘seeks, by prolonging in its voice and motions the duration of the effect, to 
prolong also a consciousness of the cause’.46 This maternal rupture is poetically narrated in 
the Alastor Poet’s despair upon re-awakening to a hollow world devoid of an ideal other in 
which even death becomes a potential avenue for reclaiming this rapturous state: ‘[t]hat 
beautiful shape! Does the dark gate of death/Conduct to thy mysterious paradise’.47    kkk                                                                                                    
kkkIn Alastor and Sufi literature, yearning for self-negation gradually increases the longer 
this attachment subsists since the fantasy of living vicariously through a truer form of 
selfhood overtakes any rationale driving self-preservation: ‘[l]ove leaves whoever loved 
crazed/and bewildered, or puts a speedy end to him./The lightest love is heavy and 
burdensome:/it weakens and fells the staunchest man.’48 Misassociation most staunchly 
colours the relationship during the period of eros (ishq) as all boundaries between external 
and private life blur until self-consciousness becomes wholly synonymous with the other 
inasmuch as the lover is distracted from their own identity and unable to conceive of 
themselves as a separate entity from Das Ding (ma’shuq) until the only solution is self-
effacement (ghalaba) reflected by Majnun’s intellectual intermingling with Layla: ‘[w]hen 
Layla is named I regain my reason, and the fears/of my heart return from a passion off on 
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distant trails./I kept distant from Layla, lest passion grip me fast./But in vain! I fell in love 
before I kept away’.49   
Selflessness as Suicide 
kkkDespite the primordial emptiness of religion signifying different levels of truth for both 
thinkers (allegorical or ontological) this process becomes a lesson in the limited nature of the 
subject’s free will. For Lacan, objet petit a possesses the power to forestall fulfilment whilst 
the self is required to perpetually sublimate objects to the level of things in an illusory 
attempt to attain momentary satisfaction: ‘the function of the pleasure principle is, in effect, 
to lead the subject from signifier to signifier [to maintain the] tension that regulates the whole 
functioning of the psychic apparatus’.50 Likewise, Rumi perceives God as the Ultimate 
signifier who possesses the ability to prolong or forestall the final communion in death 
irrespective of individual efforts (suicide is not an option since the ego must be effaced 
naturally and spiritually beforehand) with humanity being at a further disadvantage given 
their finite understanding through which to comprehend signs throughout their life journey. 
What emerges from both schemas is an identity torn between a removed ideal and an 
immediate subject who, after having been separated from the means by which selfhood is 
sustained, feels compelled to action through an insatiable desire to incorporate this missing 
object in order to discard their ego and ‘create from zero’51 and thus, Rumi, Shelley and 
Lacan’s works encourage humanity to recognise, ‘the [inner] child so immersed in the fun of 
play as to stubbornly pursue the goal heedless of perplexity or pain.’52 In doing so, a stage 
opens up beyond extinction to a point of retrospective clarity or gnosis wherein those 
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previous categories no longer engulf the seeker’s entire state of being but become rungs on 
the ladder to a higher consciousness which mediates between knower and known and, having 
peaked behind the veil to become self-aware of the machinations involved in sublimation, 
attain a level of satisfaction unavailable to those who neither accept their indebtedness to 
others nor realise how drunken idealisation can devolve into stasis disguised as contentment. 
The initial rupture from which a second self is conceived coincides with an awakening to 
subjectivity resulting in the Shelleyan, Sufistic and Lacanian dynamic of self versus other 
being conceived neither as a duality nor a conflict but rather as mutually constitutive 
indwelling where subjectivity is presented as both possessing an intrinsic attachment to the 
idealised other whilst acknowledging that the ego can only be truly elevated through 
disassociation with secondary illusory attributes. In other words, the seeker is no longer 
simply a self-less subject but embodies the annihilatory act of overcoming an imprisoned 
selfhood which, in choosing to awaken the other in self as opposed to finding the self in 
others, enacts a kind of resurrection via negation rather than succumbing to a, ‘suicidal 
neurosis or some sort of crude Freudian Thanatos’.53 The period after fana (annihilation) 
entails a state of baqa (permanency) in which the seeker returns to comprehend mundane 
existence accompanied with a renewed set of faculties gained from the Beloved whose 
attributes endure even after the egoistic effacement and, despite a loss of willpower which 
occurs at various stages of this process, some volition remains in the interpretive act of 
imagining what constitutes the ideal nature before it is tasted experientially. Therefore, 
inasmuch as these lovers are taken over by a spectre of their own imagination, a thread 
remains through which they re-establish a connection with the natural world and may 
subsequently return to consciousness whilst retaining any benefits of selflessness learned 
during the experience. This reawakening to creation with an ongoing consciousness that sees 
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its beloved in everything is experienced superficially by the Alastor Poet who senses, a 
‘Spirit [which] seemed/To stand beside him [who] Held commune with him, as if he and 
it/Were all that was [and whose] Two starry eyes, hung in the gloom of thought [...] To 
beckon him’,54 but the presence of this shrouded spectre instils a threat of being misled as 
opposed to eliciting reassurance. The difference being that Shelley’s foundational principle is 
not an eternal Transcendent Being, so any solace gained from this stage never really 
manifests for his Poet whose nonchalant behaviour might outwardly signify unwavering 
commitment to the will of an ideal Other but this steadfastness only furthers annihilation in a 
journey that continues to reflect his inability to transcend those compulsive habits associated 
with love’s various stage’s from endearment to abandonment.55 Shelley is closer to Lacan in 
believing individuals to be incapable of attaining satisfaction within worldly existence due to 
the unspeakable desire (the ever sought after ideal) being nothing more than a self-generated 
image generated from a reflection which inculcates an illusory loss that can never be 
reclaimed and resulting in existential anguish, ‘manifest[ed] as the subject's self-chastisement 
for not living up to the ideal’,56 alongside, ‘envying the other for his enjoyment of a 
privileged position [that is unavailable]’.57 After having witnessed his gradual deterioration 
during the main text, Shelley depicts the Poet’s final moments of dissolution which, due to 
his scepticism regarding the hereafter and the metapoetic aspects of this piece, does not signal 
a stage beyond permanency wherein the wanderer finally attains a beatific vision in death but 
the true beginning of permanency for Shelley’s protagonist in the memory of others. As he 
lies in his resting spot and, ‘[t]he breath of heaven did wander’,58 the fate of the protagonist's 
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soul is indicated in Shelley’s choosing of, ‘the great moon’,59 to be the closing image. Evan 
Gibson suggests that it symbolises ‘mankind's ideal aspirations’60 and as it sets below the 
horizon it is indicative of the belief that, ‘when man dies his ideals die with him’.61 Gibson, 
however, fails to recognise that the narrator’s initial desire to be harmonised with, the 
‘motions of the forests and the sea […] and the deep heart of man’,62 is realised in the poet’s 
death. The concluding scene, therefore, can be explained through Ghazali’s definition of the 
moon’s role as that which gives forms to material substance which would indicate the moon’s 
disappearance to be a relinquishing of figures, not of ideals. Whilst both seem rather 
destructive there is a stark difference; as the shadows are cast upon forms and their visual 
existence shrouded in darkness it empowers the hero’s ideal of self-loss because even when 
all, ‘the shows o' the world, are frail and vain’,63 his life devoted to the ideal has become 
memorialised. Conversely, if the setting of the moon depicts a world of silhouettes then its 
initial appearance enables the protagonist to internalise the beautiful forms before they are 
extinguished externally. For Ghazali, the purpose of celestial bodies is not only to give light 
to an existing reality but, through their awe-inspiring nature, gesture towards an ideal one. 
When the moon sinks behind the jagged hills to be transformed into, ‘a divided frame’,64 the 
protagonist’s body and soul simultaneously begin to disintegrate into the environment 
causing, ‘the Poet's blood [to mix with] nature's ebb and flow’.65 The Poet ends his journey 
having become an atemporal icon within the symbolic realm and having attained immanence 
within the natural world through his narrative memory. His existence becomes a sign of 
decay as perpetuity; spiritually being lost in, ‘Nature's vast frame’, whilst corporeally still 
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caught in ‘the web of human things’.66 By distilling baqa as a return to the world and 
remaining in conscious approximation with the ideal it becomes clear that although Shelley 
cannot promise eternality through subsistence in a noumenal dimension he can offer his 
protagonist a literary afterlife securing the perpetuity of the narrative as well as the Narrator 
who represents both Shelley as the one who relays stories and the audience who might 
receive, embellish and transmit Shelley’s poetry. Despite the fact that uncertainty also 
plagues a life dedicated to the poetic muse and the production of art there is, nevertheless, the 
potential for a legacy wherein identity (as a creative interpreter of life’s melancholic 
sublimity) is assimilated within the symbolic realm to become something of an abstraction 
itself whilst retaining the capacity to effect worldly change on an emotional as well as 
political level: ‘[p]oetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man’.67 
Although a Lacanian reading of the Sufistic underpinnings in Alastor helps preserve the value 
of imagination so as to avoid an overly nihilistic interpretation of its conclusion there is a risk 
of prioritising a positive portrayal of esoteric thought which glosses over the sinister 
underpinnings within the Islamic understanding of visionary experiences. From ‘To a 
skylark’ to ‘Ode to the West Wind’, there is a hope that by becoming an Aeolian harp and 
pursuing inspiration a poet might persist beyond material decay in the lines of his poetry just 
as the protagonist in Alastor memorially re-engages lived existence by reversing the Hegelian 
master-slave dynamic in favour of becoming the eye through which the beloved contemplates 
itself and yet, because sublimation derives from inaccessibility, Shelley’s scepticism can 
never fully commit to this dream. To better map out the ambiguities inherent in this dynamic 
between self and other it is useful to complement a Lacanian reading with a Derridean one by 
granting a voice to the deconstructionist concerns (e.g. the fictitiousness of symbolism and 
instability of meaning) in a manner that does not derail but deepens a comparative analysis 
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with Islam for these issues are echoed in the sufistic belief that madness (i.e. embracing 
paradox) is a key element in sublime love.  
Derridean bewilderment 
kkkA consequence of the oral culture in Arabo-Islamic societies was the rise of female (or at 
times effeminate male) courtesan who were sometimes trained in a variety of skills from 
reciting poetry to singing in order to impress the elite patrons whilst allowing them to climb 
the social ladder; an opportunity only available in a bourgeois society where upward mobility 
is made accessible to the middle classes. Singing-girls came to exist in the psyche of 
theologians as signifying seduction and offering a pleasurable distraction; they believed that 
eros induced a form of insanity, what the Greeks termed theia mania (‘madness from the 
gods’), directing both the men who take pleasure in the act, as well as the women who 
partake in it, away from worship. Ibn al-Jahiz, a ninth century Arab scholar, examines the 
ways singing-girls allured their prospective patrons and in some cases they became so 
enamoured to the point of deifying the female:  
They [singing-girls] provide a man with a combination of pleasures such 
as nothing else on the face of the earth does. Pleasures all come by means 
of the senses [...] But when one comes to consider singing-girls, three of 
the senses [sight, hearing, touch] are involved all together, and [the 
pleasure of] the heart makes a fourth. [...] All these senses are as it were 
scouts for the heart, and witnesses testifying before it. When the girl 
raises her voice in song, the gaze is rivetted on her, the hearing is directed 
attentively to her, and the heart surrenders itself to her sovereignty’68  
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kkkThe bewitching effect of music is latent in the etymology of the Arabic word as the same 
root mutrib for ‘singer’ relates to tariba, ‘to be/become affected with emotion, a lively 
emotion, excitement, agitation, or unsteadiness, moved with joy or grief, to be delighted, be 
over joyed, be transported with joy’, and tarraba, ‘to delight, to fill with delight, to enrapture, 
to please, to gratify’,69 highlighting how much power Arab society afforded music to elicit 
profound physiological and psychological effects that the listener could not control. The 
uncertainty and danger implicit in this understanding of the visionary experience is hinted at 
during various stages of Sufistic love since the term for fascination (sh’af) is etymologically 
linked to fitna which simultaneously denotes seduction and distress with the former 
pertaining to the loss of willpower and reason in the compulsive contemplation of a beloved 
whilst the latter describes periods of social strife where dictator’s overpower their civilians.70 
Both definitions expose the potential oppression in love when the master-slave dynamic is 
simply reversed rather than eradicated, these sinister undercurrents are further exemplified in 
the notion of eros (ishq) and abandon (istihar) which configure love as an illness whose 
symptoms include delirium, a lack of self-awareness and an internal fever that overtakes the 
entire body: ‘[eros] makes its nest [in] the heart, and drinks from the streams of the liver. It 
takes hold of the lead ropes of the ribs, and seizes the reins of the limbs. Then it becomes 
generalized and bursts into flame’.71 The possibility of following either a sublime or 
daemonic spectre of inspiration coupled with the inability, during the quest, to break away 
and objectively distinguish truth and illusion can lead to hayaman (bewilderment) denoting 
the madness of irresolution that results from enduring the visionary experience and which can 
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prematurely cause certain seekers to self-combust under the growing anticipation as indicated 
by Majnun’s plea: ‘I am sick with love, and the wandering disease has struck me./Stay away 
from me so you will not catch what I have’.72 Supranatural interactions are intrinsically 
bewildering and those who refuse to subsist within the gaps of paradox are prevented from 
attaining a relationship with Allah due to fear of the irrational for this station requires leaving 
oneself open during the period of irresolution where the experience is so overwhelming as to 
be hard to discern between a sublime, selfish, or satanic source. However, a true vision 
teaches that vulnerability in the face of the unknown must be an existential crossroads not 
overcome by transcending the confusion but by embracing impossibility and silence to 
achieve a freedom of consciousness that complements the clarity gained through self-
effacement and melody. The seemingly insoluble apprehension caused by undecidability, 
partly satiated by the internalisation of paradox, becomes another angle through which to 
analyse the relationship between Alastor and esoteric conceptions of visionary love by 
incorporating Derrida as a mediating rhetoric. Indeed, a Lacanian reading cannot quite 
account for Shelley’s disdain for didactic poetry within its more neatly contained conclusion 
of, ‘the light./ That shone within his soul’,73 being unproblematically positive despite its 
resemblance to Rousseau’s ‘light from Heaven whose half-extinguished beam [...]Glimmers, 
forever sought, forever lost [and whose] shape its obscure tenour keep[s]’,74 wherein another 
lost poet is depicted as being unwillingly propelled towards subsumption into a multitude (i.e. 
a greater whole) whose identity remains shrouded until the end with the notion that his life 
becomes a salvific lesson for others.
75
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kkkPsychosis or confusion is a way of nuancing these moralising tendencies that emerge 
when exploring any resemblance to theological concepts that Shelley’s poetic tropes might 
evince by tapping into the sublime awe underlying faith without judging his characters, as 
Hugh Roberts does of Rousseau, for having committed a, ‘mistake of [...] incorrect seeing, or 
choosing an inappropriate scale’.76 Chastising or commending Shelley’s protagonists for their 
accurate or erroneous vision simplifies the overlapping tension in Islam regarding the 
uncertainty felt upon encountering a visionary experience and Shelley’s refusal to privilege 
his own position to the extent that it could ever truly be said to grant closure. It also 
overlooks the anti-dialectical strain within both viewpoints (esotericism and scepticism) that 
prioritises paradox as the ultimate position to occupy during visionary infatuation: 
‘bewilderment [is] the only way of nonviolently receiving the Other’.77 Just as hayaman 
denotes a state between veiling and unveiling where realisation is stunted due to confusion, 
Derrida symbolises undecidability through the hymen which functions as a interstice between 
presence and non-presence maintaining a balance by mystifying the oppositional nature of 
duality whilst impeding both sides from interacting: ‘[n]either future nor present, but between 
the two [...] the hymen only takes place when it doesn't take place, when nothing really 
happens, when there is an all-consuming consummation without violence’.78 More than 
simply a relativistic space where meaning devolves into absurdity its operation is to expose 
how signifiers must first be granted signification through definition indicating that 
bewilderment enables self and other to exist in tandem without resolution or conflict for both 
are derived from the act of interpretation which is a movement from perplexity to 
significance: ‘reveal[ing] the structure of undecidability [makes] possible the generation of 
                                                          
76
 Hugh Roberts, ‘Spectators Turned Actors: The Triumph of Life’, in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, eds. Donald 
H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat (New York: Norton, 2002), p. 766. 
77
 Ian Almond, ‘The Honesty of the Perplexed: Derrida and Ibn 'Arabi on "Bewilderment"’, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 70 (2002), 515-537, at p. 523. 
78
 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Double Session’, in Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (New York: Continuum 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 187-237, at p. 223. 
119 
 
very particular, often opposing meanings’.79 Meaning can only exist in the absence of 
confusion but confusion must remain present for the possibility of meaning hence its mediary 
state between nothing and everything. Both context and text suffer from this aporia (internal 
contradiction) so exposing the instability behind religious or literary interpretations of God or 
Author as a cohesive and coherent entity is a means of gaining a more truthful glimpse into 
their nature since the centre of signification is characterised by dissemination rather than 
consolidation which Derrida calls, the ‘essential drifting of the text’,80 and which leads Ayn 
al-Qudat Hamdani
81
 to believe: ‘the world of meanings is something of a infinitely delicate, 
flexible and flowing nature [with] no such rigid stability as corresponds to the formal or 
material rigidity of words’.82 The dilemma of equivocation when determining a link between 
formal expression and hidden meaning is a pertinent element of Shelleyan, Derridean and 
Mystic thought as they each avoid affixing an all-encompassing image to the Other by not 
constraining it within a hermeneutical web which promises clarity but rather encourages 
tautology. In both Alastor and Sufistic poetry, the madness resulting from love requires 
internalising absurdity as a response to paradox because the Other is always already 
constituted by undecidability. In resisting the drive to interpret the unknown out of fear that 
something undefined can be neither devoted towards nor protected against, humanity has the 
potential to be free from ego and no longer indebted to mechanised or institutionalised forms 
of expression. The freedom gained from recognising, without becoming beholden to, the 
subjective straightjacket of perspectivism generates the largest discrepancy between these 
viewpoints since Shelley hopes that the polysemous and unstable quality of language may 
grant the possibility of diluting any individual ego into a universal I subsumed within the One 
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Mind. This subsumption is not a matter of usurpation under the pretense of synonymity (i.e. 
equality) because, ironically, such attempts at levelling result in tyranny due to it requiring 
self-projection at a universal level. Shelley’s liberating madness decentralises systems of 
meaning-making that enslave signifiers to monolithic Signs in favour of highlighting how 
many angles of vision have existed throughout history each with their own measure of value 
by which they interpret reality and, in deprivileging the influence of ideals in relation to 
forms, dismiss that ‘single monotheistic voice such as Moses heard on Sinai [for] the relative 
and provisional "voice" of Mont Blanc.’83 The goal of recognising the expansiveness of self 
is not to conflate individual identity with creation for that mindset remains grounded within a 
dualistic perspective which prioritises the original subject and generates a false sense of 
control. Not venturing beyond, but before, intellect allows individuals to disassociate from 
humanity and appreciate that, ‘[the] tribute [...] an individual consciousness can bring to what 
ceaselessly and unconsciously flows through the mind’,84 is so meagre as to become 
depersonalised relative to all other movements in existence that constitute the, ‘everlasting 
universe of things [...] flow[ing] through the mind’,85 and of which the subject’s psyche is 
merely a receptacle, ‘passively / Now render[ing] and receiv[ing]’.86 Hence, internalising 
paradox is understood as acquiescing ego to an endless expanse of mundane forms compelled 
to motion biologically (i.e. entropically) and mentally as perception becomes an equally 
unavoidable form of stimulation.  
The Haunting Silence of Self-Expression   
kkkParadoxical feelings of alienation and familiarity characterise the interactions between 
Alastor and his idealised Other; for Muslim mystics, that same dynamic is developed from a 
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different metaphysical assumption (souls recollecting their sublime nature) pervading the 
universe in which that dialogue takes place. Self-effacement is deconstructive in theory but 
strips down to something more substantial as the individual reflect’s creation’s theophanic 
fabric where signs gesture towards infinite perplexity:  
reaching [the Beloved] through the Beloved and beholding his signs in 
the beloved Manifestation, as though he were the true essence of every 
thing, [whilst also being neither] for any thing, nor out of any thing, nor 
from any thing, nor in any thing
87
  
kkkThis process of submission of will to the Whole for the sake of gaining autonomy over 
ego is what leads to the more intimate Thou-Thou dynamic not as an indication of the deified 
status of the mystic to a level akin to God but in reference to the perspectival shift that takes 
place during the contemplative union of any worshipper who accepts the arduous voyage 
towards visionary knowledge: ‘a constant awareness of God's absolute sovereignty [that a 
person] counters the human instinct to claim power.’88 Shelley and Derrida posit an endless 
play of differences in which a central Signifier cannot be said to exist outside of this relative 
system, a ‘diacritical relationality unregulated by the presence of a transcendental 
signified’,89 whilst Sufistic thought conceives the fluctuation constituting the Other to be 
representative of its status as an essentially divine entity upon which interpretive diversity is 
ontologically contingent and from which it derives its potential for actualisation. Ian Almond 
characterises the respective deconstructionist tendencies as such:  
For Derrida, the bewilderingly infinite possibilities of the text lead to one 
conclusion: that the text is semantically vacuous, a sheet of symbols 
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bereft of depth. Ibn 'Arabi, however, viewing the perplexing variety of 
people's beliefs, does not come to the conclusion that there is no God but, 
rather, that there is "Something that cannot be known" that both 
embodies and is embodied by all of these infinite manifestations
90
  
kkkGiven that the concept of essence has no transcendental ontological grounding in 
Shelley’s anthropocentric system, his passage to self-knowledge requires an awareness of the 
communicative play of signifiers that constitute an identity because those accidental 
properties determine, and often generate, the divine in nature by examining the manifestation 
of ideals throughout history such as love, power, and equality. For mankind to understand 
themselves as part of a generative, unstable One Mind requires recognising this concept as a 
distinctly psychological, rather than theological, phenomenon whereas, for Sufis, it is the 
Signified (the essence) that is the subject of knowledge not the signifiers. Subsequently, 
Shelley differs from the esoteric understanding inasmuch as he does not examine ideals in 
order to shed light on the particularities of existence but examines particulars to learn about 
how and why humanity creates ideals. For Shelley, mankind’s shared capacities reified into 
ideals are illusory so he demands a shift in perspective which prioritises the developmental 
nature of humanity rather than a static ontologically distant Essence whilst Rumi contends the 
accidental and ideal are signs both gesturing towards and veiling a Divine reality (an Ultimate 
Signifier) that is neither ontologically nor epistemologically synonymous with the ideal 
building blocks of life through which we mentally construct reality (power, beauty, love, 
time) since It conditions existence as a shadow of Itself. Both thinkers agree that self-
knowledge is a never-ending process yet the journeys they take to reach this conclusion are 
contradictory; Shelley conceives of identity as historically constituted arguing that to 
acknowledge a Supreme Existent as the foundation of all life is to feign certainty which 
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curtails creativity or flexibility when constructing identity; Rumi conceives of identity as 
grounded and sustained by an infinite Deity who is by nature all-encompassing and that to 
know yourself by coming to know your Lord is possible yet unexhaustive. In Sufism, 
exceeding the bounds of your immediate ego through a knowledge of essence entails self-
annihilation of those outward attributes which are not necessarily un-Islamic or unimportant 
for the sake of engaging on the public stage but they remain inessential and, if mistaken as 
being indispensable, they become veils shrouding the divine origins of the believer who 
becomes absorbed in the importance of their own ego.                                                                  
kkkBeing overly precious of the mundane form is foolish because they are signifiers of 
locatedness stressing the limitations of subjectivity when restrained to an embodied discourse 
as opposed to acknowledging them as signs of much deeper metaphysical attributes of Allah: 
‘[i]f a man is defined [only] by beard and testicles/then every goat has beard and hair 
aplenty’, indicating, ‘[true] masculinity does not result from every penis’.91 Therefore, for 
Rumi, the path to self-knowledge is a return to a moment where inner and outer life was 
undifferentiated and which can be recaptured during ecstatic contemplation of the Divine 
Names. In embodying these Attributes for the sake of drawing closer to God, humanity can 
better anticipate the beatific vision of the afterlife. If a person takes the socially determined 
facade of self as their entire being, what Rumi calls ‘[t]he confusion of “we” and “I”’,92 they 
will feel anxiety of temporality leading to a self-conflicting existential crisis where the 
subject is caught between who they are on a supramundane level and the myriad of 
inessential identities they associate with as a social actor and as such, he ‘who knows his 
[true] essence [...] has built [for himself] a palace in the security of eternity’.93 Ironically, 
Sufistic self-annihilation is a means of growth where the mystic relinquishes the material 
veils covering the real grounding of self which originates from the Ultimate Signifier 
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allowing them to be transfigured into a locus of Divine creativity opening up a higher realm 
of possibilities for identity formation in contrast to the limited amount of variations made 
within an individual lifetime until their heart becomes a double-sided mirror reflecting the, 
‘signifying power of the true signifier, i.e., the Divine, [whilst] the Divine reflects back the 
true self (the "essence") of the mystic’.94 Universal laws acquire their nature from Allah 
indicating that, at the centre, everything breaks down not into a relativistic void but rather a 
relativism born from approximation to a more essential dimension of reality. The central 
contention regarding where the locus of meaning resides can be traced, Islamically, within 
the notion that each individual essence denotes an eternal and unchanging subject whose 
innate knowledge, will and existence is acquired from an immutable entity, whereas Shelley 
prioritises the historical development of mankind whose language is disordered and 
multivalent during the gestation period not due to the transcendent expansiveness from which 
it derives but more so a result of undecidedness. For Shelley, words are more authentically 
poetic due to not having been restrained by the formal rules of syntax since, ‘[e]very original 
language near to its source is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem’, until subsequent 
generations acquiesce to the needs of society by curtailing this spontaneous process through, 
‘the copiousness of lexicography and the distinctions of grammar’, creating artificial rifts 
between previously interwoven relationships in the name of taxonomy.
95
 It is clear that 
rhetoric guided by imagination is, ‘the principle of synthesis’, forging connections that are 
internally coherent to the poet, a ‘mind acting upon its thoughts’, as opposed to a 
grammatical register that employs reason to conceive of relationships not as discursive ‘in 
their integral unity, but [simply] the algebraical representations which conduct to certain 
general results.’96 Any sense of the Transcendent that emerges from these interactions is 
intuited not at the centre of revelation, bestowing and sustaining the essential relationships 
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underlying creation, but rather occupying the borders of the poet’s personal interpretation of 
the world as a symbol of the unspeakable that is both only conceptually knowable yet 
essentially unknown due to the finite nature of human comprehension. A visionary model of 
poetry redistributes power back into the hands of individuals as artists who infuse the sublime 
qualities of life with unique, discursive and ever-evolving meaning whilst democratising the 
act of meaning-making across all minds until, ‘Poetry, and the principle of Self, of which 
money is the visible incarnation, [become] the God and the Mammon of the world’.97 The 
responsibility of authoring one’s own world is a plight fraught with uncertainty just as a poet 
wonders whether the voice that returns during the metaphorical transaction is, indeed, their 
own or the infiltration of yet another reification that threatens to reduce aesthetic appreciation 
to devotional worship. Tilottama Rajan perceives the effacement enacted by various 
Shelleyan protagonists to be an extension of the disintegration that poetry itself undergoes as 
part of, the ‘great poem, which all poets, like the co-operating thoughts of one great mind [are 
implicated in] build[ing] up,’98 since the individual poem is but one instance in this wider 
creative consciousness. This act of distortion leads to a continuous deferral of form wherein 
the poem cannot be said to have successfully established itself as a totality akin to the whole 
from which it was derived causing it to become ensnared within a state of perpetual 
derangement derived from an insatiable compulsion to realise itself as a holistic text but also 
recognising itself as always already constituted by this ideal: ‘going out of oneself [...] toward 
an other who is never attainable [except by inhabiting] the radical instability of a purely 
metaphorical world in which the meaning of a metaphor is another metaphor’.99                                                                                                                    
kkkJust as the questing Poet in Alastor yearns after an ineffable object to feel whole, the text 
itself can never encompass the great poem even though it privileges that Ultimate form as the 
only avenue to become complete and thus, Shelley exposes both the form and idea to be 
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equally inadequate and undeveloped
100
 as their transaction is founded upon suspension, 
erasure and contradiction. These three principles characterise Sufistic discourse regarding the 
relation between self and Other but adopt markedly different connotations due to the Islamic 
belief in mankind’s potential perfectibility and fittedness both to the natural world (divorced 
from the negative connotations of a postlapsarian status) as well as an intrinsic connection to 
the Divine as the mirror by which Allah perceives His Names and Attributes. For instance, 
Rumi essentialises this paradoxical communion of singularity in duality by positioning the 
beloved as an endless labyrinth which both repels and allures its lovers into a frenzy of 
distress and elation, ‘[h]as anyone witnessed one life in two bodies?/My life is union with 
you, my death separation from you;/You have given me unique skills! in two [different] 
arts’,101 indicating that patient resignation in the face of perpetual oscillation is an innate 
response tied to an individual’s mortal connection to the finite and spiritual association to the 
celestial. Consequently, the central discrepancy that arises when examining Islamic and 
Shelleyan deconstructive tendencies is this distinction between perversion and perfectibility 
characterising the source of inspiration since the former promotes the theophanic purity of 
creation whereas the latter engages a negative sublime which, in being essentially embryonic 
and distorted, is unable to achieve complete formal realisation due to its own 
incompleteness.
102
 Ahmad Achrati, scholar of Islamic philosophy, offers a distilled example 
of these divergences: 
There stands the stark difference between Ibn Ginni's idea and ideal of 
hospitality, the perfection that is yet, to come, and [Shelley and] Derrida's 
contradictory claim that nothing is yet, that which is not is always already 
perverted, that there is no hospitality, but hospitality is already corrupt, 
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which amounts to an assertion of the ontological priority of sin and 
defect; very un-Islamic
103
 
kkkBoth Shelley and Sufis perceive presence in negation to expose the inherent vitality of 
paradox and, in either case, this encroaching expansiveness causes the onlooker to reflexively 
contemplate their current limitations and be inspired to generate new communicative 
strategies (sonorous or silent) which increase rather than bypass perplexity. Shelleyan and 
Sufistic verse trace the impossible task of translating the infinite to a comprehensible 
definition through the spectrum of language whilst avoiding a reduction in complexity 
whether it be the existential chasm that opens up for Shelley at the prospect of such an 
undertaking, ‘[w]e are on that verge where words abandon us [...] look[ing] down the dark 
abyss of—how little we know’,104 or the esoteric maxim that, ‘[t]hough interpretation of 
speech makes things clear/Love free of words is clearer’,105 there is a shared appreciation of 
such facile reductions being a figurative dead end for it is only when words are replaced in 
favour of gestation, sound or silence that the labyrinth can exist endlessly. However, the 
status of the negative differs for each schema because, for Muslims, Allah is no-thing 
whereas, for Shelley and Derrida, such a Supranatural entity enters into the discourse as 
nothing. The perspectival discrepancy between the transcendental Thou-ness of Islam and the 
depersonalised I-ness of Shelley can be summarised by reconsidering the divergent 
understandings of the relation between World and Text since Islamically al-Lawh al-Mahfuz 
(The Preserved Tablet) predates creation with all scripture and events written within. 
Conversely, Shelley’s notion of the One Mind as constituted by the feelings, thoughts and 
writings of humankind across time leads to a retroactive and creative form of necessity in 
keeping with Mallarmé’s statement that, ‘[e]verything in the world exists in order to end up 
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as a book’,106 in contrast to the Islamic understanding that everything in the tablet exists in 
order to end up in the world. In spite of these differences, Sufis and Shelley equally chastise 
those who, due to emotional or intellectual insecurity, are so mystified when confronted with 
a sense of something greater (an ideal Other) that they cannot contend with the hysteria 
inherent in relinquishing ego and as such, seek to explain away phenomena rather than 
recognising how, ‘regularly go[ing] through a kind of insanity (a controlled psychosis) [can 
lead to] something resembling sanity (something more than normal neurotic repression and 
acquiescence)’.107                                                                                                                        
kkkRumi, Hafiz and Shelley acknowledged that the type of visitation (inspiring or dogmatic) 
alters according to the perceiving heart as if reality possessed an inner mechanism allowing 
those who have gone astray to perpetuate their delusions of grandeur whilst incurring 
spiritual malaise. Those poet-legislators who perpetuate values Shelley perceives necessary 
for maintaining life’s harmony are also able to continue generating art with the prospect of a 
meaningful legacy (at least relative to the works promoting idolatry). A tentative split is 
formed between Idealisation as an inhibiting process founded on a distorted and negative 
sublime and a staunch commitment to the empirical as an equally uninspired and insular 
perspective. I argue these components are necessary elements for paradox to exist since it 
requires an openness to something greater than self but restrained by a willingness to 
constantly question one’s own presuppositions. In a sense, the other no longer serves as an 
internalised mirror but a devious refraction of a person’s inner demons which only 
perpetuates the type of idolisation of images detested by Shelley. However, during this 
bewildering confrontation, figures such as the Alastor Poet can elicit admiration not due to 
any correctness of perception but because of an unwillingness to accept the totality of forms 
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as all that constitutes existence as well as his desire to surpass dictated boundaries and thus, 
despite the emphasis on effacement as opposed to aggrandisement, the Poet’s commitment to 
perishing by penetrating a supranatural realm resembles the Sufistic desire for annihilation 
reimagined in a Faustian form.
108
 
Private Fancy versus Public Life 
kkkThe discussion surrounding bewilderment does not simply pertain to the dismissal of 
overly facile reductions of the dynamic between self and Other but, more specifically, the 
possibility of disappointment or disenchantment in the visionary experience born from the 
difficulty of truly submitting subject to object. Even self-effacement for the sake of 
empathetic expansion feeds off a desire to author reality according to one’s own inclinations 
so a balance must be struck between being open to a choric harmony whilst not succumbing 
to subjective fantasies: ‘idealization [...] is an inability to integrate the good object into the 
ego [...] because there is something missing in this object that prevents it from being posited 
except as fantasy’.109 I shall examine the Arabian Nights and, ‘The Keen Stars Were 
Twinkling’, under this notion that freedom of mind can exist in madness but, failing to 
recognise how far gone you are, can also lead to blindness. It is in potentia that the One Mind 
expands, free from the dark idolatry of self that comes from asserting with certainty that 
one’s own preconceptions encompass reality in its entirety and saved from the despair of 
materialistic nihilism where an unwillingness to admit ignorance in the face of life’s 
miraculous yet mysterious nature bars people from experiencing the joy of metaphor.  
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Adopting a more psychological approach to narrating the transaction between self and other, 
the Arabian Nights
110
 provides a social as well as spiritual commentary as it revolves around 
the antagonism between, ‘personal desire and a world preventing that desire from its full 
realization’.111 These visions, however, are not granted primacy over mundane existence 
since their function as glimpses into a more truthful dimension is placed into question with its 
subjective origins scrutinised as potentially altering these sublime openings into self-centred 
projections wherein society either becomes the voice of reason or an active participant. ‘The 
Sleeper and the Waker’ questions the assumption that it is possible to break entirely from 
societal influence without it shaping one’s waking and sleeping life for humanity remains a 
socially constituted being; the main protagonist, Abu l- asan, becomes so enamoured by his 
erotic dream that he becomes unable to discern reality from unreality and remains oblivious 
to the ruler’s role in determining his dream experience. When Hasan unknowingly invites the 
Caliph, Harun al-Rashid, to his house he reveals that his deepest desire is to become Caliph 
for a day to achieve revenge against both the Imam and a group of sheikhs prompting Rashid 
to drug his drink in order to fulfil this wish and revel in the ensuing chaos. After realising his 
desires within the court (both politically by enacting his revenge as well as erotically by 
playfully interacting the courtesans) Hasan is drugged once more and left outside his 
mother’s house who discovers him asleep muttering a courtesan’s name leading her to 
assume that his sleep-walking is the result of a sexual dream causing her to denounce his tall 
tale as nothing more than a satanic mirage. These illusions of grandeur continue when he is 
released from prison for attacking his mother and is once more sent to the palace in a drugged 
state at which point he becomes completely unable to distinguish dream from reality 
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believing himself both free from consequences as if sleeping but drunk on the power that he 
fancifully possesses resulting in an ecstatic loss of self-awareness as he removes his clothes 
and dances with courtesans.  What emerges from this narrative is a protagonist who seeks to 
reimagine existence according to his own whims by denouncing his original self in favour of 
an idealised image of his life as Caliph which he believes so fervently to be real as to chase 
this dream until he devolves into a mad frenzy and becomes nothing more than a figure of 
mockery.                                                                                                                                   
kkkLikewise, ‘The Keen Stars Were Twinkling’, reveals a narrative that explores an 
individual intellect  coming to terms with the external world through a form of inspiration 
which emerges from repressed desires and social interference even as it initially holds out 
hope that these erotic impulses are sublime in nature. Akin to Alastor, Shelley employs the 
trope of a singing woman who raises the poet into the feminine circle of motherhood through 
an ecstatic performance awakening them to the interconnectedness of the natural world: ‘[a]s 
the moon's soft splendour/O'er the faint cold starlight of Heaven/ Is thrown -/ So your voice 
most tender/ To the strings without souls had then given/ Its own’.112 The speaker adopts the 
poetic identity of a submissive infant requiring a maternal voice to enliven the otherwise 
lifeless strings of the guitar; her voice enlightens the poets faculties to engage in an 
imaginative commingling with a world whose beauty he could only observe from afar but 
now she serves as an intermediary at once granting meaning and translating it to the speaker. 
As the poem progresses, however, the perceived harmony crumbles as the disparate elements 
begin to drift apart once more, ‘[t]he stars will awaken, / Though the moon sleep a full hour 
later, / Tonight’,113 until it is revealed that the undifferentiated unity the speaker hoped he had 
found in the actual world, like the Moon which casts light upon the shadows of dark scene, 
comes closer to an analogy of Plato’s cave where the ideal realm of coherence exists 
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elsewhere with the external order of this world merely acting as a simulacrum of another 
order: ‘[t]hough the sound overpowers/ Sing again, with your dear voice revealing/ A tone/ 
Of some world far from ours,/ Where music and moonlight and feeling/ Are one’.114 Far from 
the receptive child who internalises its mother’s musical plenitude, what emerges is a poetic 
voice more akin to the controlling and overpowering cries of an infant who decides when and 
how their mother soothes them, ‘[s]ing again, with your dear voice’, until the mothers love 
becomes unnatural and curated so it can no longer be said to originate out of a selfless love 
between subjects but from a self-centred artistry between fictional selves. Even if Shelley 
does not intend his work to have such deleterious effects on the relationship he is fully aware 
of the artifice supporting his fantasy when he refers to his vision as having been undone due 
to a lack of mutual feeling in the real world where Edward Williams, Mary Shelley and 
matrimonial laws, still exist. Equal communion with the beloved is foreclosed in poetry both 
due to their real life attachment to other people as well as a strong desire to develop his own 
literary abilities. It becomes difficult to take pleasure in the ecstasy of pre-linguistic sounds 
whilst putting forward his identity as a poet like a child coming into  a sense of its individual 
subjectivity free from the mother, Shelley ‘does not want to give up the material presence, 
but he […] does want to move independently with increasing skill and agility’.115 Shelley 
must either destroy the female voice at the expense of his own or accept that such self-
disassociation is only possible in death and, at least, promote ideals of love and equality in 
the hopes they can unsettle some of the power possessed by institutional hierarchies. Abu l-
Hasan, the Alastor Poet and the Speaker in ‘The Keen Star’s’ present the visionary 
experience as ambiguous since the vanity implicit in the epipsychidion archetype can either 
lead to a uncritical self-absorption wherein the extinctive tendencies of self-destruction 
override the positive aspects of selflessness or a greater awareness of self as an extension of 
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the organic world whereby narcissism actually generates a sense of pride through preserving 
the interests of creation in line with Nature’s Spirit rather than individual ego. 
Summary  
kkkShelley’s transvaluation of Sufistic tropes through the spectrum of Lacanian and 
Derridean thought reveals a productive dynamic between meaning-making (i.e. 
interpretation) and deconstruction via paradox which provides, ‘a gap between hermeneutics 
and its dismantling, [forcing us to scrutinize] the specific myths that reading enables us to 
construct’.116 Paradox is a result of alienation felt during this interaction between subject and 
object, it serves as a means towards greater self-understanding despite the seemingly negative 
process since the enticing illusions contain aspects of the onlooker’s identity whether it be a 
projection of phenomena already encountered in the world or through the interpretive 
filtering that takes place upon witnessing the ideal Other. Regardless of the perspectival or 
ontological grounding, neither viewpoint wholly devolves into solipsism as discovery of self 
entails perpetual deferral towards a bewildering expanse that curtails insularity by opening 
the individual to the stream of life composed of all created thought and feeling constituting 
Being at an atemporal level. In Sufism, to penetrate the essence of Allah only leads to a 
paradoxical open-endedness discouraging definitive comprehension in the same way 
Shelley’s last major work, The Triumph of Life, ‘places interpretive responsibility with the 
reader while withholding reassurance that certain meanings can be found’.117 Recognising 
human existence as an aporetic state caught on the cusp of unchanging constancy and 
destabilising entropy should not lead to uncertainty or indifference since embracing the 
paradoxical nature of this predicament inculcates a resistance against intellectual closure and 
keeps the subject open towards potentiality and flux. Even with mystic writers such as Rumi 
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the experiential process is mimicked through writing techniques that simulate bewilderment 
which, in turn, places the interpretive onus on the reader as they are left at the poem’s end to 
continue the spiritual dance on their own:  
I beseech you by the one whose heart/is a sweet and fermenting ocean -
/The ocean that has given the jewels/their precious nature;/That you 
compose the rest of this ghazal;/And hence cast the magician Samiri to 
the depths of envy!
118
  
kkkThis productive indecisiveness of paradox causes the audience to adopt their position as 
autonomous interpreters unable to simply rely on an authorial hand to guide their image of 
the Other and, rather than fall prey to the passivity of reading, these seekers participate in the 
narrative by enacting the interpretive journey for themselves.                        kkk                     
kkkDespite not being a didactic poem, this outward facing awareness of a space beyond the 
text pervades Alastor as reflected in the Preface which states, the ‘picture is not barren of 
instruction to actual men’,119 as well as the gesture towards a subsequent generation that 
might come across the Poet’s life journey  and internalise some aspect of his fate: ‘the infant 
would conceal / His troubled visage in his mother's robe / In terror at the glare of those wild 
eyes, / To remember their strange light in many a dream / Of after-times’.120 The lesson is not 
simply a warning against the inherent pitfalls of dreaming as Susan Fischman suggests
121
 nor 
is it an unwavering commitment to dream as enlightenment but, as with Derrida, 
undecidability becomes the central ethical framework governing the piece since it provides a 
state containing both the freedom to transfigure intuited senses into imagined images as well 
as the freedom from believing in their objective reality: ‘[t]he ghost of the undecidable is a 
conscience, reminding us that our laws and ethical codes are not natural but the result of 
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human decisions that might as well have gone the other way’.122 The infatuated psychosis of 
Sufism shapes the mental landscape of Alastor through Shelley’s reimagining of such tropes 
enabling him to generate a narrative which places paradox at its hermeneutical centre in a 
manner that productively harnesses misreading whereby not only our creative output but our 
life becomes a text available for examination and yet, this memorial immortality is bound by 
the same uncertainty that allows endless interpretation: ‘Alastor is committed to vision, to 
creating and questioning its own fictions as it opens up interpretive possibilities’.123 This 
perpetual suspension (motionless wave) is the closest corollary to Sufistic baqa for it 
replicates life-in-death by subsisting in the Real where neither ‘lack’ nor ‘fullness’ enact the 
role of ‘transcendental signified’ but give way to, ‘a fundamental splitting akin to 
diffirance’,124 which protects the One Mind (i.e. the emotions and content constituting it) 
from becoming reified, deified and institutionalised whilst also encouraging individuals not to 
suppress the inspirational visions derived from this source. In the context of the 
epipsychidion, Shelley’s transvaluation of the Islamic veil emblematises how humanity must 
not allow their finitude to deter them from their expanse nor allow their expanded nature to 
cause them to forget their limits because, by existing within this crossroads, the onlooker is 
no longer required to possess absolute knowledge regarding an enigmatic Other and the 
Beloved is released from the elucidation of revelation allowing it to be forever undeveloped.  
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Chapter 4 
Wanderer’s without guides: Logical deductivism and intuitionistic inductivism in Ibn 
Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and Shelley’s Alastor  
kkkAlastor exemplifies how Shelley’s earlier interest in the sublime fluctuated between 
monistic materialism and sceptical idealism offering a case study through which to gauge the 
complex shifts and fraught allegiances implicit in his journey from a prior belief in a mind-
independent material reality which would eventually be disregarded as a seductive system for 
naive minds. The Romantic poet reached a crossroads in which he recognised existence could 
not be reduced solely to cognition whilst equally acknowledging the psyche’s primary role in 
perceptually shaping reality. A prominent figure in Shelley’s acceptance of material idealism 
is William Drummond whose Academical Questions he read whilst composing Alastor and 
Mont Blanc drawing from a mixture of Hellenistic and Humean sceptical stances that confine 
comprehension to perception whereby existence becomes a sequence of events which the 
mind intuits as conjoined through a false sense of cause and effect. Nevertheless, despite 
refuting any possibility of material objects subsisting independently from the mind, he 
preserves the importance of experience in acquiring knowledge: ‘Drummond’s syncretic 
methods [mediates] two important traditions as no writer had done before him: classical 
scepticism and modern British empiricism’.1 Academical Questions adopts an empiricist 
approach to knowledge inasmuch as it is founded on experiential data derived from sensation 
but with the added acknowledgement that we can only ever be immediately acquainted with 
our own impressions bereft of any reason to believe in the objectivity of an extramental 
reality given that phenomenal existence is always mediated by the observer: ‘[a]ll things exist 
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as they are perceived; at least in relation to the percipient’.2 Although a material world 
existing independently from mind is illogical, this worldview does not necessarily negate the 
possibility of a reality beyond sensation cut off from experience as a consequence of the 
human mind’s finite nature for even our universal laws: ‘are the unknown causes of the 
known effects perceivable in the universe. Their effects are the boundaries of our knowledge, 
their names the expressions of our ignorance’.3 Despite differing levels of emphasis, Shelley, 
Drummond and Hume accepted the futility of considering an objective world subsisting 
outside human perception leading them to dispel the sophistry that humanity could construct 
a detached assessment of physical space in a manner that circumvented their own received 
sensations. For Shelley, the inscrutable nature of reality had to be upheld on some level in 
order to preserve intuition as central to poetry’s capacity for instilling empathy and 
reinvigorating a childlike reverie in those impressions stultified through habit.                                 
kkkIf Shelley shared Hume’s belief that sympathising with other minds can be a  means of 
self-knowledge in a perceptually bound universe, his politics were also shaped by a Lockean 
approach to individualism which promoted autonomy, freethinking, and stated that, should a 
person learn to be accountable for themselves by reflecting upon their conduct,  they 
invariably safeguard the interests of their peers. Just as ‘[s]elf is the great problem for 
Shelleyan ethics, and love [...] is the great answer’,4 an appreciation of humanity as 
constituted by freestanding agents is equally important since society would be irrevocably 
weakened if each discrete portion was faulty within itself. Displacing individual autonomy is 
not the solution to establishing a loving community because it risks establishing a monolithic 
group consciousness where people at the bottom feel they must conform to tradition or their 
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reputation will be ruined. Working to counteract the suppression of authority despite potential 
repercussions to social standing is the keys to engendering a society of strong-willed 
individuals who uphold their human rights in a rational manner whilst allowing others to 
forward their unique experiences and ideas: ‘[t]his individualist ethos is basic to Shelley's 
visionary humanism’.5                                                                                                                  
kkkGoing beyond the stability implicit in Locke’s  understanding of self where people can 
persist through time despite their material existence (i.e. their atomistic composition) being 
altered, Shelley adopts Hume’s scepticism regarding the consistency of personal identity and 
the reliability of perception but chooses to downplay man as simply a disordered 
amalgamation of impressions. In mediating between these positions, Shelley seeks to 
maintain the subjective quality of experience with the understanding that certainty in 
causation both as a subject persisting through time and the assumption of cause and effect 
occurring extramentally is an untenable position whilst also upholding the individual as a 
political subject held together not by immutable laws but through human passions which 
psychologically mediate experiences. Shelley’s propensity to uphold self-sovereignty whilst 
emphasising joint co-operation is born out of a desire not to lose sight of the individual as 
merely a cog within a communal wheel but in a manner which forestalls the potential 
narcissism in self-love by expanding the empathetic frame to include mankind on a collective 
level. What eventually, in A Philosophical View of Reform (1819) and Prometheus Unbound 
(1820), becomes a reciprocal dynamic between intersubjectivity and introspection is, in 
Alastor, a vital tension propelling the work as Shelley grapples with how to recuperate love in 
a world that is temporally finite yet sublimely beautiful. Uncovering the source of inspiration 
is implicated within questions of misidentification, ‘distinguish[ing the forces and constraints 
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of necessity] from forces and constraints subject to human agency’,6 and can often lead a 
person to fall into a radical materialism or a superstitious idealism both of which are bereft of 
indeterminacy. Alastor is caught between a Lucretian universe composed of atoms, voids, 
and a view of necessity infused with contingency, and a Schellingian or Platonic universe 
guided by spirit, abundance and polarity. Shelley envisions a world which, if there is a 
coeternal spirit, remains stripped of any verifiable Transcendent to the point where he is 
forced to err on the side of reason and science not out of belief in the veracity of its methods 
but disbelief in its religiously revealed alternative. Nonetheless, humanity itself could be 
described as Platonic in the sense that individuals are able to either enliven matter through 
creative freethinking or petrify nature through superstition until, over time, the animating 
spirit becomes synonymous with humanity. Tim Milnes foregrounds the function of creative 
sympathy in scepticism and the limits of human knowledge
7
 as both Hume and Plato set aside 
the quest for certainty in an ideal correspondence of mind and world by grounding the 
remedy for such existential doubt in our relationships with others where truth does not 
revolve around objectivity but rather the continued resituating of error for:  
the Platonic notion of love[...] emerges in Shelley not as a means of 
attaining truth, but as a model for the kind of dialogue that sustains truth. 
[...] Shelley’s interest in the logocentrifugal potential of the teachings of 
Lucretius, Bentham, and Plato repeatedly clashes with his foundationalist 
instinct that truth lies in an epistemological relation of correspondence 
[...] rather than in the everyday praxis of human discourse
8
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kkkThese empiricist, materialist and idealist strains running through Shelley’s commentary 
on individualism and collectivism are well accounted for, even acknowledging how classical 
Greek and Roman thought (e.g. Aristotelian scholasticism and Lucretian atomism) were 
recontextualised within seventeenth and eighteenth century debates regarding sensationalism 
and intuitionalism but critical assessment of Shelley’s philosophical affiliations rarely 
considers the influence of translated Islamic texts on Enlightenment discourse. Samar Attar 
provides a number of inroads to explain how Shelley may have been inspired by Ibn Tufayl 
(1100-85) both directly as well as inadvertently by citing the various scholars that Shelley 
drew from regarding the nature of God, the link between apprehension and comprehension, 
or the prospect of an egalitarian future once the elite have been deposed: ‘Locke, Hume, 
Godwin, d’Holbach, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the rest of the eighteenth-century philosophes 
[had been exposed to the work of the twelfth-century Spanish-Arab philosopher]’.9 For 
instance, John Locke who, having studied Arabic at Oxford, became acquainted with Arabist 
Edward Pococke whose son translated Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan [Philosophus 
Autodidactus] in 1671 which likely contributed to Locke’s conceptualisation of tabula rasa as 
the original narrative is known for incorporating, synthesising and reimagining Muslim 
philosophical and theological thought spanning across al-Farabi (870-950), Ibn Bajja (1095-
1138) al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Ibn Sina (ca. 970-1037). The latter of which is accredited 
with a set of tales that enlist images and personages Ibn Tufayl would later employ in his own 
allegorical biography and whose empiricist epistemology regarded the infant babe as a blank 
slate gradually acquiring mental associations through experience and thus, despite 
discrepancies in their cosmological frameworks, ‘it is obvious that Avicenna had a systematic 
epistemology [revolving around] empiricism [which would] later [...] appear in the work of 
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John Locke’.10                                                                                                                                   
kkkIbn Sina charts the acquisition of knowledge from childhood to old age, a trajectory Ibn 
Tufayl would similarly infuse into Hayy’s own development, on the basis that the mind is 
utter potentiality actualised through learning and experience (mushahada) with the capacity 
to abstract (tajrid) universal concepts from sensible objects with the aid of reflection (i'tibar) 
as the individual transfers this awareness of intelligibles to a higher thought process which 
subjectively determines their relevance. The result is an initially passive state giving way to a 
recognition of their dominant position as the nexus through which reality is conceived, 
structured and passionately responded to. By extension, every act of perception reveals as 
much about the self as it does about the sublunar world and yet, empiricism is not trapped 
within the confines of selfhood, unable to comment on the external world since our 
comprehension of reality expands in conjunction with our knowledge of self. In an effort to 
inject rationalism with mysticism, Ibn Tufayl sought to mediate the Aristotelian proclivities 
of Ibn Sina and Ibn Bajjah with the spiritual intuition of al-Ghazali for whom sense 
perception became a fallible and untrustworthy source of knowledge after he underwent a 
sceptical crisis reflective of Hume’s own arguments against epistemological certainty – a 
connection which might be traced through Nicolas Malebranche and Nicholas of Autrecourt 
who were exposed to Ghazali’s critique of causal necessity. Hume’s scepticism rejects 
empiricist ways of knowing in order to forestall blind conformity to an assumed 
correspondence between mind and nature and as a means of discounting the validity of 
miracles whereas the Ghazalian approach employs doubt as a means of removing any 
intellectual prejudices preventing a person from accepting the possibility of miracles. 
Although al-Ghazali does believe in metaphysical truths, confirmed by true revelation, he 
also echoes Hume in believing reality as only knowable through an individual’s insufficient 
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senses causing the totality of man’s knowledge to be rooted in knowledge of self. Alexander 
Bevilacqua argues Hume’s engagement with Islam as an intellectual system was 
disingenuous: ‘primarily invested in making generalisations and determining patterns across 
human societies, rather than [examining its] history, religion, and culture’.11 Nevertheless, for 
the sake of comparative analysis between Alastor and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, it is sufficient to note 
that both thinkers were relevant in influencing the outlook of either text or author and that 
there exists intellectual affinity, if not a base level of familiarity, upon which they might be 
said to converge such as their sceptical critique of causality understood to be psychologically 
imposed through habitual exposure.
 12
 Indeed, a more immediate point of influence can be 
found in the writings of Simon Ockley who authored both a translation of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan 
as well as History of the Saracens; the latter of which Shelley is known to have read
13
 whilst 
the former, published in 1708, provided a pertinent message that would have likely resonated 
with the Romantic poet: ‘glorify[ing] reason, experiment[ation] and science, but at the same 
time [acknowledging] the limits of reason and the great benefits of imagination’.14  
The Romantic Scientist and the Child at Play 
kkkContextualising Shelley’s work within philosophical debates alongside eighteenth-
century Orientalist scholarship, it becomes more feasible to ascertain how Ibn Tufayl could 
provide a voice through which to read Alastor (a text which already draws inspiration from 
Persian poetry) attracting those who gravitated towards the narrative premise of an isolated 
autodidact who discerns the principles of nature through both logical deductivism and 
intuitionistic inductivism without the need for religious institutions or civil doctrine. Hayy 
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represents self-sovereignty during the process of learning and the importance of reminding 
others of these capacities in the hopes that some may listen and cultivate them (as with 
Absal). The balance between acquiring ideas through inspirational and observational avenues 
is a consequence of Ghazali’s own expansion of Ibn Sina’s rational theory of intuition (hads) 
into a more mystical form of cognition. The latter believed prophecy to be attainable by those 
possessing superior intellect through an emanational chain that initially engages reason until 
awakening imagination at which point theological truths become perceptible in as clear and 
as logical a manner as when the mind receives sensory information. Ghazali acknowledged 
the soul’s natural capacities are partly formative in prophecy but attempted to emphasise 
God’s guidance within this process as his occasionalist tendencies necessitate that Allah 
determine the scope and condition of prophetic inspiration in line with divine causation. Hayy 
emblematises naturalistic accounts of insight given that empiricism forms an integral aspect 
of his psychological development; inadvertently conducting experiments as a byproduct of 
surviving alone, Hayy acquires higher levels of discernment through greater exposure to 
natural phenomena and longer periods of reflection.                                                                    
kkkDuring his self-education, Hayy uncovers the dynamic interplay between union and 
multiplicity underlying causation and becomes increasingly aware that all perceptible effects 
require a single, necessary and immaterial cause to be both compelled into existence as well 
as continuously sustained since an infinite number of causes would be illogical. Echoing Ibn 
Sina’s philosophy that humanity can obtain sound metaphysical knowledge without direction 
from others, Hayy can be read as an exemplar of those who Ibn Sina believes possess a 
particularly potent intuition (hads) due to the astuteness with which he employs his 
observational and reflective faculties to attain spiritual proximity to Allah (tawr al-wilaya) 
whilst avoiding incorrect inferential judgements that can arise from faulty deductivism. 
Breaking down this naturalistic approach to knowledge, foundational principles arise in the 
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mind after having been unconsciously established via sense perception and, when a child 
grows old enough to ruminate on the meaning of these impressions, they begin searching 
more intently to uncover the active intellect at which point proof techniques such as induction 
(istiqra) and experimentation (tajriba) are employed. After focusing predominantly on flora 
and fauna, Hayy turns his gaze towards the cosmos noting how stars and planets are driven 
by set motions and arranged into particular patterns which fuels his intellectual aspirations to 
search for the light which illuminates (i.e. actualises) life and from which these celestial 
bodies derive their luminescence in order to reveal the pre-made world below. In classifying 
entities as prone to enact a particular state when exposed to particular circumstances rather 
than assuming causation is the necessary impact of one object upon another, Hayy becomes 
less concerned with scientifically dismantling how this world functions and adopts practices 
designed around increasing his spiritual maturation with the aim of uncovering a direct vision 
of Allah (the unknown first cause). Acknowledging the multifaceted quality of apprehension 
as both sensation and feeling, he engages matter as a means of uncovering the immaterial at 
which point the scientific emphasis on observation is exposed as insufficient and he must 
instead appeal to a more Ghazzalian conception of witnessing (mushahada). The latter 
consists of an intuitive knowingness whereas the former relies on qiyas (deductive analogy) 
which is analogical, logical, and syllogistic. His search for the Ultimate Cause of the 
Universe connects him to a Neoplatonic chain of intelligibles muted by a recognition of 
necessary connection as always presumed at a distance and never known objectively which 
(whereas Humean scepticism refuses to single out an external power accountable for 
preserving continuity) causes Ibn Tufayl to expand his discursive epistemology into a non-
discursive one. Allah’s mysterious nature is left intact even though the theophanic nature of 
reality is exposed and thus, he gleams transcendence through immanence.                                               
kkkI offset Ibn Tufayl’s natural mysticism with the interpretation of Alastor as an exploration 
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of the Romantic scientist, bridging the divide between natural philosophy as a creative mode 
and science as a narrative mode, for both pieces depict a desire to appreciate the mystery of 
that which is sensed beyond form and grapple with a need to conceptualise such seemingly 
inexplicable phenomena to the extent that the Sufistic self-abnegation as a form of 
epistemology echoes the nineteenth-century scientists determination: ‘to find things out, even 
at the risk of life. While obviously we would much prefer not to die; knowledge has been 
taken to be worth the price’.15 This complex drama is played out within Shelley’s own prose 
where he champions the prospect of, ‘catalogu[ing] all the thoughts of the mind, and [...] all 
their possible modifications [to generate] a cyclopedic history of the Universe’,16 whilst his 
creative propensity preserves the enchanting nature of existence from the petrifying lens of 
objectivity: ‘Nature is [...] marked with the most impressive character of loveliness and 
grandeur, once I was tremulously alive to tones and scenes [but the] habit of analysing 
feelings I fear does not agree with this’.17 Kaitlin Gowan Southerly and Nahoko Miyamoto 
Alvey have explored how the Poet figure and Narrator of Alastor  pursue the unknown in a 
manner which reflects  Enlightenment scientific discourse as they enact a dangerous 
commitment to unveiling mystery and thus, akin to Ibn Tufayl, Shelley’s narrative harbours a 
split affiliation at once critiquing as well as drawing inspiration from Romantic rhetoric on 
the natural sublime and Alexander von Humboldt’s scientific travelogues,  a relationship 
‘based, not on the domination of imagination over empirical experience and rational analysis, 
but on a partnership among them more compatible with scientific method’.18 Despite not 
charting the Alastor Poet’s development from birth to eventual self-loss as Ibn Tufayl does, 
the preface distinguishes him similarly as a, ‘youth of uncorrupted feelings and adventurous 
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genius led forth by an imagination inflamed’, reflective of Hayy’s default position as pure 
potentiality who employs imaginative and deductive faculties to satiate his inquisitive nature 
spurned by a longing for spiritual unveiling after sensing something more real than the 
sublunary forms which assume objective status, seeking ‘familiarity with all that is excellent 
and majestic to the contemplation of the universe’.19 In following Nature’s footsteps so 
intently and internalising an awareness of its mechanics, both Hayy and the Poet figure reach 
a point of intellectual exhaustion as they fall back on their imaginative and intuitive faculties 
to discern an unembodied presence resonating with their soul at a deeper frequency than 
anything encountered previously (i.e. an abstracted assimilation of all the material 
information acquired up to that point) and resulting in their perception being forever filtered 
through this added dimensionality. As if now truly awake to a world previously thought 
either bereft of fresh insights or confined to sense impressions, Hayy’s revelation reinforces 
creation as an enchanted space through which a noumenal realm may be metaphorically 
intuited whereas, for the Alastor Poet, disillusionment sets in as the existential void from 
which his search stems pervades existence and renders it vacant by comparison to his newly 
discovered antitype: ‘[h]is wan eyes/ Gaze on the empty scene as vacantly/As ocean's moon 
looks on the moon in heaven’.20                                                                                                                           
kkkDespite Lockean neutrality and absolute potentiality being the default state that Ibn 
Tufayl, Ibn Sina and al-Ghazzali ascribe to mankind upon birth, neither sullied by original sin 
nor tarnished by experience, there is a natural disposition (fitrah) which connotes a 
preconscious recognition of Allah’s existence  resulting in any perception that affirms God’s 
presence being a form of recollection. Hence, Ibn Tufayl believes childhood to be a period of 
visionary openness as the mind is passively predisposed to the existence of multiple 
dimensions with less attachment to standardised forms of epistemology and thus, intellectual 
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development into scholastic or deductivist thought should merely complement the ongoing 
cultivation of infantile fancy whilst also preventing such idealising tendencies from mentally 
disassociating an individual to the extent that they perceive Nature as a distracting phantasm 
rather than a resplendent theatre of divine unveilings. Similarly, Shelley cherishes childhood 
as an age when love and harmony is inseparable from perception as, ‘we less habitually 
distinguished all that we saw and felt from ourselves’, eventually becoming obscured by the 
‘mist of familiarity’ that veils us from ‘the wonder of our being’ and signals the beginning of 
a perceptual decline that will persist throughout adulthood unless forestalled by a return to, 
‘reverie’, where, ‘dissolv[ing] into the surrounding universe’,21 infuses this world with 
creative potential without overflowing, and becoming lost, in a universe behind the veil. As 
with The Assassins, Alastor relates to issues concerning poetic sympathy through communal 
contemplation with an added emphasis on the pitfalls and power of love to potentially blind 
or redeem concepts which would emblematise Prometheus and Asia’s sympathetic 
relationship. At its core, poetry (inspired by nature’s beauty) expands the circumference of 
both writer and reader with regards to self-expression and in turn, renders the medium into an 
ethical instrument of change for a species which is promethean in spirit but haunted by furies. 
The Poet’s fate is, thus, a warning for those who might become mesmerised into retrospective 
myopia due to an inability to resolve the loss felt upon awakening from an ecstatic vision 
with their antitype and a desire for direct union leading to a Satanic overstepping of 
boundaries. If the imaginative faculty is able to balance existence and expression without 
allowing one to wholly submit to the other, it is possible to once again become a ‘child at 
play’22 by reinstituting this unifying reflectivity and reclaiming a portion of that maternal 
delight lost in youth: ‘[c]onsciousness develops not along a circle, from unity through 
                                                          
21
 Ibid, p. 635. 
22
 The Selected Poetry and Prose of Shelley, p. 635.  
148 
 
division back to the old unity, but along a spiral, from unity to division to a higher unity’.23 
Intellectual maturation and the acquisition of experience should not ossify vision rather they 
should all contribute to an increasing awareness of humanity’s majesty (at once noble and 
dangerous) as well as the ongoing development of the creative imagination, living poetically: 
I have been familiar from boyhood with mountains and lakes and the sea, 
and the solitude of forests: Danger, which sports upon the brink of 
precipices, has been my playmate. I have trodden the glaciers of the Alps, 
and lived under the eye of Mont Blanc [...]I have conversed with living 
men of genius. The poetry of ancient Greece and Rome, and modern 
Italy, and our own country, has been to me, like external nature, a passion 
and an enjoyment. Such are the sources from which the materials for the 
imagery of my Poem have been drawn
24
  
kkkNeither the child who generates subjectivity through play nor the poet who moulds their 
identity through poetry can be disregarded as illogical (i.e. the visionary experience is so 
open-ended as to have no internal coherence) but rather, it is the innate desire prompting 
humanity to creatively engage with the world which serves as the unifying force granting 
structure to imagination: ‘feeling generates form because the self has become committed not 
to arbitrarily producing just anything, but to accurately recalling that which it loves’.25 At 
certain points, reason contradicted what Shelley would characterise as points of belief such as 
his hope in an afterlife, ‘[c]ertainly reason can never account for, or prove, the truth of 
feeling. I have considered it in every possible light; and reason tells me that death is the 
boundary of the life of man, yet I feel, I belief the direct contrary’, whist, in other instances, 
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reason became synonymous with belief as a necessary substitute to faith which Shelley did 
not necessarily discredit due to its relation to feeling: ‘it does not prove the non-existence of a 
thing that it is not discoverable by reason [...] but until I feel it I must be content with the 
substitute, reason.’26 The Enlightenment streams Shelley draws from inevitably shape the aim 
of his visionary pursuits, the idealism inherent in his view of the world as mentally 
constituted provides a more democratising subjectivism in line with common sense,  ‘[by] 
considering all knowledge as bounded by perception […] we arrive at a conception of Nature 
inexpressibly more magnificent, simple and true’,27 whilst detranscendentalising nature for 
the sake of re-enchanting it under a secular lens and infusing the phenomenal world with 
godly qualities. In shifting the locus of the sublime from the divine to the organic, mankind is 
divorced from their prior attachment to a celestial order compelled by a Supreme Godhead.                                                                                              
kkkFor both Ibn Tufayl and Shelley, ageing is depicted as a move not only towards a deeper 
comprehension of the empirical or rational sciences but, if it can retain childlike reverie 
without childish imitation, there remains the possibility of altering an individual’s previously 
passive and helpless cognition of that, ‘shadow [which] fell on me [in youth]’,28 into a 
morally active life focused on uncovering the divinity within by awakening themselves to the 
revolutionary potential of love. However, their focus on individual development as a means 
of heightened awareness of universal connectivity rests on rather different metaphysical 
assumptions. Ibn Tufayl’s conception of self-understanding still revolves around Allah with 
each animal, plant and celestial body Hayy examines gesturing towards a higher order just as 
worshippers circumambulate the Kaaba to reflect the angelic motions around the Divine 
Throne and thus, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan does not have to present as fervent an emanative schema 
as Ibn Sina to be implicated within this mystical symbol of the heart encircling its Beloved.  
Shelley, on the other hand, presents Life itself as the ‘centre and circumference’ of existence, 
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a universal principle through which all things collectively subsist, and the central object of 
contemplation that apprehension must learn to value despite the seeming impossibility of 
such a feat: ‘Life, the great miracle, we admire not, because it is so miraculous’.29 Any 
attempts at confining life to a single system would be disingenuous since it denotes both the 
conditionality maintaining everything as well as the particular objects constituting our inner 
and outer reality so, rather than wasting time searching for a monolithic solution for the sake 
of facile resolution, imagination must be willing to maintain multiple, divergent fictions at 
once in a more engaged and sympathetically charged position than materialism. 
Narrating the self: Confessional autobiography and emotional allegory 
kkkThe shared core of Alastor and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, ‘lies in the drama of “the lost soul 
struggling in the wilderness”’,30 as each author employs the allegorical framework of a 
bildungsroman to explore mankind’s yearning to uncover nature’s sensed mystery whilst 
foregrounding the autodidactic element in perceptual development when striving after a 
transcendent union. Although both wanderers are unable to penetrate through every veil 
obscuring the ideal Other, Hayy is the only one to attain satisfaction within mundane 
existence on the basis that spiritual cultivation is a necessary precursor to more sensitive 
insights in the next life. Past experiences within nature imprint themselves on both characters 
in a manner which directly shapes their conceptualisation of an existence beyond form 
(isolated either by necessity or choice) from the input of other humans. In terms of reception, 
Hayy is largely shunned or ignored by society because his revelatory encounter was based on 
intuition and experience resulting in a feeling of estrangement when engaging others who 
cannot comprehend that relation to Transcendence without scripture: ‘[w]hen his thinking 
had risen to this level and the sensory world had been left behind to some extent, just as he 
                                                          
29
 The Major Works, p. 633. 
30
 Madeleine Callaghan, Shelley's Living Artistry: Letters, Poems, Plays (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2017), p. 57.   
151 
 
was mounting to a height from which he could gaze out toward the approaches of the world 
of mind, Hayy felt alien and alone’.31 Conversely, Shelley foregrounds an indulgent aspect to 
this journey of anticipatory ecstatic unveilings by having the Alastor Poet carry out a self-
imposed exile depicted as the alternate, but equally likely, fate of a love-struck wanderer in 
search for idealisms. The seeker of non-discursive experiences witnesses the presence of 
sublimity in mundane creation whether it be the Unmoved Mover, a Demiurge, or an 
abstracted principle of femininity which results in them either turning away, or being turned 
away, from society as a consequence of becoming overly absorbed in the remembrance of 
this idealised Other. Shelley and Ibn Tufayl merge empirical and intuitionistic streams of 
thought to fit their narrative purpose; Ibn Tufayl adopts a literary avenue to assimilate aspects 
of Avicenna’s syllogistic metaphysics whilst following certain critical amendments al-
Ghazali levelled at his scholasticism based on more esoteric foundations; Shelley, moving 
from his attachment to monistic materialism, championed imagination as a faculty of intuitive 
reason and offered a hopeful escape from the uncertainties of phenomenal illusion without 
allowing any noumenal reality (inaccessible to the senses) to delude his sceptically empirical 
eye so, just as ‘Hayy violated the mystic code when he decided to go alone without a guide 
[...] Shelley’s Poet in Alastor imitated Hayy, the supreme individual who believes that the 
divine light shines within each one of us’.32                                                                           
kkkEmbarking without a guide on this existential journey of converting sense-perception and 
reason to intuition and ecstasy inevitably leads to moments of uncertainty which impacts both 
protagonists in different ways for different reasons and with different outcomes but each has 
a precursors whose own phases of doubt resonates with their own experiences.  Hayy Ibn 
Yaqzan reflects al-Ghazali’s own autobiography, al munqidh min al dalal (Deliverance from 
Error), which narrates the midlife crisis he underwent upon recognising his learning had not 
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been directed solely to Allah and, after perceiving the loss of his voice to be a sign, was 
driven to abandon teaching at Nizamiyya madrasa in Baghdad to rectify this quest for fame 
that had sullied all his prior learning. In al-Munqidh, al-Ghazali highlights three groups 
(scholastic theologians, Ta’limites, and philosophers) and through the course of his journey 
across Arabia examines them individually to discern how each reduces theology to mere 
dogma, superstition, or reason with their desire for such transfiguration of Transcendent 
mystery to epistemological certainty being a result of their disengaged spirituality, each 
‘paying lip service to the law!’.33 Comprehension of God via a sacred path is replaced in 
favour of one’s own desires for superiority as society inevitably shifts from a communal 
experiential knowing to hierarchical centres of learning with the latter model being 
particularly egregious with regard to religious discourse which should engender a sharing of 
wisdom as opposed to instilling arrogance: ‘the knowledge they acquire only makes them 
bolder in disobeying God Most High’.34 Ibn Tufayl and al-Ghazali employ the figure of an 
inquisitive wanderer detached from society and formal education as a means of exposing the 
privileging of reason as simply another form of dogma and choose, instead, to foreground 
certain levels of theological knowledge being attainable when reason as well as observation 
realise their own cognitive or perceptual limitations resulting in self being the centre of all 
knowledge: ‘[t]he heart is that which, if a man knows it, he knows himself, and if he knows 
himself, he knows his Lord’.35 A pilgrim must come to know the world through their own 
selves but, bound by the flawed intermediary of sense, are required to taste the numinous 
through an ecstatic dissolution of ego in a manner which returns to the world with the 
sceptical recognition that objectivity is a grammatical construct attached to forms partaking in 
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(as well as gesturing towards) many more dimensional planes than ratiocination will account 
for. These interior motions of the soul are intrinsically linked to a deeper prophetic reality as 
the, ‘quiescence’s, exterior and interior, are learned from the light of the niche of prophecy’,36 
which is a level that Hayy reflects inasmuch as he is an emblem of Ibn Sina’s rational 
prophetology. A person can only rely on outward forms during the early stages of their 
learning because, should they needlessly extend this process, their observations will cease to 
guide them and merely serve to confound their search as the physical world monopolises their 
comprehension and draws them away from recognising this world as a sign gesturing towards 
a suprarational realm. In this schema, it is vital that individuals harness their intellectual 
faculties whilst offsetting the categorical certainty provided by such methods through the 
tutelage of experiential intuition which instils doubt in the believer as to the concreteness of 
mundane life.                                                                                                                                          
kkkI offset Ibn Tufayl’s incorporation of Ghazali’s sceptical crisis with an analysis of Hume 
and Shelley’s views on narrating a biographical self as Hume discerns how narrativity can 
provide coherence to an existence fraught with instability and Shelley similarly grapples with 
retroactively imposing order on an anterior self by questioning whether introspection can 
grant relevant information about the world or risks transforming existence into an extension 
of a presumed subject. For Hume, identity is an imaginative and linguistic illusion which 
enables individuals to make sense of their life by infusing experiences with structure, 
coherence and progression as new perceptions can alter past conceptions through recollection 
and in turn, recontextualising those emotions within the relational matrix of contemporary 
viewpoints. If memory remains open to re-narration then subjects are both perpetually in flux 
whilst also possessing a sense of continuity (from the perspective of self and others) through 
the mental habit of first person pronouns and proper nouns resulting in identity becoming a 
                                                          
36
 Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 94.  
154 
 
grammatical construct constituted by the social practice of storytelling. Temporal 
development as narratologically understood within the perceiving subject’s mind (and 
validated within the collective consciousness) grants continuity to life rather than the causal 
succession of impressions between mind and world as indicated by his autobiography, My 
Own Life, which offers a therapeutic lens to chart and re-evaluate his progress as a thinker by 
identifying prior flaws and enacting a type of atonement through revision, ‘replac[ing] his 
memories with a written narrative, and his body with a book’.37                                               
kkkShelley, whose allegorical biographies range from Alastor to The Revolt of Islam, often 
charts  the progression of a young mind awakening to sense impression by gradually 
discerning its position in the universe and employs the bildungsroman structure as a means of 
renarrating his personal awakening during childhood to a sublime yet mysterious spirit 
underlying phenomenal existence as outlined in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’: ‘[w]hile yet a 
boy I sought for ghosts [...] I called on poisonous names with which our youth is fed [...] 
Sudden, thy shadow fell on me;/ I shrieked, and clasped my hands in ecstasy!’.38 Shelley’s 
recollection of his childhood in which, during times of youthful innocence, he had ‘[h]opes of 
high talk with the departed dead’, would lose their lustre with age as he refused to allow life’s 
mysteries to be appropriated by the ‘poisonous names’39 of ‘God and ghosts and Heaven’40 
until the inexpressible becomes codified and instead, forfeiting such naïve beliefs, chose to 
scrutinise the material world with a discerning eye and a perceptive ear, ‘I was not heard; I 
saw them not’.41 Nevertheless, having experienced a similar encounter with the shadow of an 
unknown spirit, Shelley cannot wholeheartedly condemn the wandering Poet’s aspiration to 
uncover life’s secrets as this curiosity is a response to his discontentment towards habitual 
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apprehension. In both the child and the Poet exists Shelley’s tendency to personify the 
inspiring qualities of nature as if it were an separate entity, ‘Nature was the poet whose 
harmony held our spirits more breathless than that of the divinest’,42 channelling its artistry 
and beauty into those who can both passively receive impressions as well as actively imprint 
their own readings back upon the world. A reciprocal transferral of authority where Nature 
provides the original stimulation for its human observers to produce derivative visions which 
are reframed in new ways, reimagined afresh and shared in a manner that encourages the 
proliferation of subsequent revisions born from individual engagements with this felt organic 
harmony. Noting this alteration between passive and active participation in perception, the 
Wandering Poet initially internalises the sense impressions he gleams from the natural world, 
investigating ‘Nature's most secret steps / [...] like her shadow,’43 until eventually these 
accumulated observations actualise an imagined projection that takes on a life of its own 
which is in line with Hume’s understanding of imagination as synthesising and ordering 
experience in a creative manner: ‘Man [as an] inventor [denotes] the use he makes of the 
principle of the association of ideas [by employing imagination for the sake of] separat[ing], 
and join[ing], and compos[ing them] into all the varieties of fiction’.44 The entire process is 
not directed towards the imposition of monolithic interpretations upon the world in the name 
of objectivity but recognises that phenomenal existence is filtered through subjectivity and 
that the inherent perspectivism in all empirical observation should not lead to relativistic 
nihilism but rather mobilised to deprivilege institutional discourse. Through the world of 
Alastor, Shelley ruminates on the potential for visionary experience as well as the possibility 
for building social and organic connections despite the Poet being trapped within a passive 
mode unable to progress towards an innovative, as opposed to imitative, stage. The Poet 
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recasts the events that occur into an ideal form causing his reflections to ossify into a 
lingering presence that overwhelms the world until any sense of change is transfigured into 
an obsessive death drive and he is rendered incapable of appreciating life’s 
interconnectedness at a social and organic level: ‘[l]ike Lockean man he is a mirror that 
accurately reflects the flow of his phenomenal experience, but has no power to construe it’.45 
From his youthful longing to unveil nature’s secrets to his sceptical crisis regarding 
materialism, Shelley often re-presents his deep-seated metaphysical concerns and 
mythologises them through his works which collectively serve to enact this mental schism 
between natural science and poetic thinking indicating that, although there is a significant 
relation between Shelley and his fictional personas, any identification is dispersed and 
filtered through numerous voices as a way of attesting to, ‘the amorphous [and] often 
contradictory fragments of the self of the poet’.46 Shelley’s visionary experience is figured as 
‘a radical spilt in the subject’s spiritual history and postulates the possibility of a new birth’47 
so that revelatory moments represent a discontinuity between the old and new self where the 
subject is constantly being born again to  new readings of their place in the world. A lifetime 
composed of numerous contradictory selves coming into awareness. The lifelong process of 
severance and reinterpretation (illumination of new possibilities and obscurity of past 
identities) is shown to be at the mercy of readers who choose whether to disseminate the 
remains of your old works amongst those who will recreate the artistic persona in response to 
their own experiences: ‘Shelley figures the effect of poetry as a kind of haunting power and 
proceeds to ghost-write his own life, to ghost himself, in poems like Alastor, Adonais and The 
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Triumph of Life’.48                                                                                                                           
kkkIbn Tufayl does not present Hayy’s visions within the secular terminology of artistry but 
as working within an intellectual tradition investigating the phenomenon of prophecy by 
echoing Ghazali’s point of view (reliant on Ibn Sina’s theory of imaginative prophecy) that 
realising prophethood through mystical experience, spiritual enlightenment and constant 
remembrance is possible to a degree in regular individuals but only fully attained by the 
prophets themselves. The difference between a directly inspired messenger and someone who 
struggles (with Allah’s help) to rise in spiritual ranks is that, although the prophets are also 
humans, the latter can never be said to reach infallibility as to their insights or interpretations 
since there remains the possibility for their dreams (related to the term for perception) to be 
clouded by limitation. The Qur’an sets up a distinction between ru’ya to denote divinely-
sourced inspiration and hulm to denote a fictitious imagining derived from either internal 
desires or satanic whisperings
49
 which postulates a rift between those pure enough to receive 
a celestial message with minimal distortion and those blinded by corrupt passions (shahwa). 
The allegorical biography grants Shelley and Ibn Tufayl the ability to trace a character who is 
at once open to intuition as well as predisposed to sensation, the secondary artistry of the 
Alastor Poet and the pseudo-prophecy of Hayy possess both commendable and potentially 
duplicitous qualities capable of re-infusing the world with a splendour lost to conventional 
apprehension whilst potentially reflecting or conforming simply to what has already been 
instilled either through institutional learning or material forms                                                         
kkkComparing these various renditions of spiritual biographies, it is unsurprising the 
theological and philosophical tenets characterising their crises would share the closest 
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resemblance with their respective traditions yet the choice of form and voice creates links 
across both pairings. Hume and Ghazali adopt a confessional and autobiographical approach 
to relaying life events with the hopes of attaining mastery over past doubts. Conversely, 
Shelley and Ibn Tufayl relay their tale allegorically within a visionary mode based not on 
confessing personal details or indulging in internal monologues but displacing meaning, as 
metaphor does, outside the frame and towards an implied audience:  
convert[ing] the reader's secondhand "idea" of that dream [or divine 
witnessing] into a direct "impression" [so that] ownership of the dream 
passes to the reader, who leaves the poem ready to commence his own 
equally intense search [for a community of feeling]
50
  
Both seek to reinstate revelation (creative imagination) back within the human realm but do 
so in different ways; Shelley seeks to balance the consecutive force and permanency of sense 
impressions whilst retaining the hopeful openness offered by reflection resulting in his 
conception of the mind as a, ‘chronicle, register, book of account, and other such forms of 
immutable record’,51 through which mankind can either reflect on what it has been in order to 
rewrite new paths forward or continue being a receptacle but never an author. In mediating 
between Locke’s tabula rasa and Hume’s narrative memory, Shelley develops an 
introspective mode that seeks to transmit passions from one person to another via a corporeal 
textuality that privileges individual as well as collective authorship through the displacing 
effect of metaphor and within the mutually constitutive realm of the social body.  Even 
during Queen Mab Shelley considered consciousness as impressionable with each sensation 
imprinting itself on the mind gradually informing behaviour through the acquisition of new 
ideas:  
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O Spirit! through the sense/By which thy inner nature was apprised/ Of 
outward shows, vague dreams have rolled,/And varied reminiscences 
have waked/ Tablets that never fade;/All things have been imprinted 
there,/ The stars, the sea, the earth, the sky,/Even the unshapeliest 
lineaments/ Of wild and fleeting visions/ Have left a record there/To 
testify of earth
52
   
kkkHowever, especially as Shelley more strongly emphasises the productive role of 
imagination in perception, he expands the Lockean analogy of mind to account not only for 
sense and self-reflection but highlights mankind’s visionary capacity with the caveat that 
sensory experience provides material which is transfigured into mental content. The 
transitory nature of spontaneous insight may generate an inexpressible delight but can also 
lead a person to chase delusions. For Ibn Tufayl, working within an Islamic framework, the 
mind preserves impressions and is granted the logical tools of deduction as well as creative 
insight to convert these sensations into momentary unveilings which heighten the level of 
accountability with regards to how these insights are put into practice. All of these individual 
chronicles are intimately related to the ultimate record attributed to Allah’s Knowledge, the 
Preserved Tablet (Al‑Lawh Al‑Mahfooz), which, although a created entity, is also protected 
from additions, deletions or alterations
53
 and contains a transcription of every motion, deed, 
statement, and thought as part of the Unseen (al-ghayb): ‘[when] the heart thus becomes 
[like] a polished, shiny mirror, the veil is removed momentarily between the Preserved Tablet 
in the heaven and the heart, and the record of the Tablet is reflected on the heart’.54 From a 
metaphysical perspective, if life can be re-narrated and the mind is a record then the world 
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becomes a text which is interpreted through rational and creative inquiry to uncover the real 
nature of existence then Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Tufayl and Ibn al-Nafis
55
 write 
allegorical novels to compensate for their longing to uncover ‘a grand Author’ behind 
creation whereas Shelley desires to uncover the ‘authors of feeling’,56 as they possess the 
power to grant signs meaning. 
World as Text 
kkkTo expand the investigative scope with regards to textuality and intellect, it is useful to 
offset Ibn Tufayl’s commitment to Islamic revelation against Shelley’s conception of poetry 
as an acorn. Ibn Tufayl’s naturalistic mysticism is influenced by a Ghazalian metaphysics 
which posits humanity is capable of intuiting aspects of the noumenal through movements 
perceived in the phenomenal realm and yet, the former chooses not to present his poetic 
world in such distinct terms as the latter who delineates this dynamic as true knowledge being 
attained from the malakat (the unseen world) that sound hearts gleam from the mulk (the 
apparent world) in a symbolic (mithal) and metaphoric (mathal) form after being filtered 
through the imagination (khayal). Just as nature is the primary artist for Shelley due to its 
inspiring qualities, the empirical method remains vital  for Ibn Tufayl regardless of the need 
for mystical assent precisely because man is only capable of gaining insight into life’s 
mysteries by distilling images into their essential qualities as a consequence of mankind 
being tied to the world of metaphors (al-‘alam al-majazi) requiring them to creatively 
participate in rebuilding their perception of existence for the sake of unveiling Reality (al-
Haqq). The connection (muwazanah, munasabah) between our world and an alternative 
higher realm is figured in terms of a mirror-like reflectivity with all the implications of 
distortion associated with that comparison and thus, even if an individual attempts to intuit 
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the true nature of existence through their creative faculties, there is a chance their deductions 
are entirely fanciful and specious. Those confined to forms are either wholly unaware, or 
emotionally unable to account for, the sensed transcendence within immanence whereas those 
who appreciate the shadowy aspects of existence as metaphor must balance between 
recognising our apprehension is not the extent of life’s dimensionality: ‘[t]he image in the 
mirror comes second and stands for the effect of a cause on the level of being, but it comes 
first when you want to know yourself’.57 The importance of maintaining equilibrium so as to 
neither be blindly misled by the totality of created existence nor acquiesce wholly to self-
intuited fantasies as equally all-encompassing is indicated by the highest exemplars in Islam, 
the prophets, who are intermediaries between the sublime and created world and for whom 
the epiphanic and the everyday are integral to self. Given that creation is acknowledged as the 
expression of a divine blueprint, images have a tendency to imprint themselves onto the 
hearts of observers to the extent that a transitory visual representation remains in the mind’s 
eye even after its physical counterpart has disappeared producing a ghosting effect via 
recollection that enables the imagination to enlist any symbols or images accumulated 
through sense-perception to develop their abstractive faculties and in turn, more intuitively 
ascertain their essence. If Allah is the Supreme Architect then the prophets, and those closest 
to them in spiritual rank, are most adept at witnessing the unveiling of those plans (surah) 
engraved on the Preserved Tablet.                                                                                                           
kkkThe problem of mimesis (i.e. whether art can be representative of reality) is a key 
question that Shelley is also working through as he poeticises his movement from monistic 
materialism to empirical scepticism and which leads him to see the perfected form of 
humanity as, ‘hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration’.58 By grounding humanity within 
the metaphorical, poetic language is capable of reinvigorating the mind through fresh 
                                                          
57
 Imam Ghazali’s Cosmology Reconsidered, p. 33.   
58
 The Selected Poetry and Prose of Shelley, p. 660.  
162 
 
associative reference points as a counter measure against dogmatic language which erects 
laws, parrots scripture and deifies abstractions. Imagination hangs tentatively between 
inspired intuition and self-aware fictionality so as to neither exist in a, ‘dim vast vale of 
tears,’ nor assume linguistic representations corresponds to ontological realities, ‘[t]he poet 
[...] is both image-maker and image-breaker’.59 The recreative force that Shelley attributes to 
poetry is described not in terms of unveiling but renovation coupled with obfuscation, ‘high 
poetry [...] is as the first acorn, which contained all oaks potentially [so even if] Veil after veil 
may be undrawn […] the inmost naked beauty of the meaning [is] never exposed,’60 as the 
anthropomorphic One Mind (an empty sign constituted by every individual interpretation) 
replacing the Grand Author (a Sign that incorporates all other signifiers) momentarily reveals 
a portion of itself whilst constantly evolving and eluding any complete comprehension. The 
world as a text is not a mirrored entity but a locus for competing points of view all 
contributing to dethrone the antiquated Symbolic order and develop new modes of discourse. 
Queen Mab provides a pertinent reminder of the revolutionary capacity of interpretation as 
the Fairy bemoans the loss of freethinking to the strictures of scripture, ‘Earth groans beneath 
religion’s iron age,/ And priests dare dabble of a God of peace,/ Even whilst their hands are 
red with guiltless blood’,61 but there remains a glimmer of hope in society’s eventual 
advancement as subsequent generations learn to be accepting of difference. The extent to 
which the Spirit of Beauty fuels individual minds in a productively enlightening or 
reductively obfuscating manner is explored further in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ where 
Shelley examines the human tendency (including his own) to project insecurities onto 
idealised concepts in order to satiate another innate desire for immortality both of which he 
perceives as flaws preventing mankind from reaching their full potential. In this schema, the 
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attainment of human perfection is only available in a transcendental realm instead of being 
directed towards contemporary reform. Throughout the poem Shelley repeatedly prevents 
himself from elevating his written creations to the level of autonomous existence even when 
acknowledging the importance of mythmaking in his own poetics as he questions the truth of 
vacant signs artificially granted metaphysical signification: ‘[n]o voice from some sublimer 
world hath ever/To sage or poet these responses given –/Therefore the names of God, and 
ghost, and Heaven,/[…]Frail spells’.62 However, Shelley subsequently affirms the poem’s 
own belief (if not hope) in the sublime reality of Beauty, ‘[t]hy light alone – like mist o'er 
mountains driven,/ Or music by the night wind sent[...] Or moonlight on a midnight stream,/ 
Gives grace and truth to life's unquiet dream’,63 he is caught between the need to reconfigure 
old mythologies in order to prevent poetic language from becoming habitual and cliché 
without allowing this visionary freedom to overtake the organicist vitality of nature itself. 
Enlightenment and illusion are mutually constituted yet contradictory forces enacted during 
the relationship between Intellectual Beauty and human thought; on the one hand, luminosity 
can signify the blinding awe elicited by Intellectual Beauty which, in the hands of 
soothsayers and sophists, is inundated with transcendental meaning despite connoting nothing 
more than a vacant space; on the other hand, Intellectual Beauty might be figured as a 
shadowy reflection of the mysterious phenomena in nature with the flame of individual 
human thought subjectively bringing to light its meaning. In the Alastor volume, creative 
imagination is a potentially estranging force within the realm of human discourse (harnessing 
a quasi-religious idealisation of immateriality that is problematic when abstraction is viewed 
as superstition) whilst also infusing existence with a reconstructive potency to form 
connections previously forgotten which in turn, generates a balanced outlook where: ‘the poet 
himself must be the battleground for the perpetual war between the visionary imagination and 
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its opposite [since] one who would profess how the earth can be made paradise risks 
becoming his own hell’.64                                                            kkk                                               
kkkThe pursuit of knowledge is where Shelley and Ibn Tufayl convene and diverge; both 
accepting its synonymous nature with the quest for perfection but differing as to whether the 
ability to conceive of perfection is man’s greatest tragedy, or accepting that, ‘in seeking 
knowledge we seek perfection, and in perfection beauty resides’.65 The pilgrimage to attain 
such knowledge, however, is born out of an existential need for rejuvenation whether through 
creating renewed associations or developing a reinvigorated spiritual life as a counter to the 
stultifying habits inculcated by institutionalised learning and thus, they perceive the world as 
providing the tools (creatively and logically) to unlock mankind’s potentiality as much as 
their enslavement. As Hayy attains mystical insight without having to outwardly proclaim a 
faith, Shelley’s Queen Mab highlights the dangerous effects of passivity if the natural 
goodness of humankind is not cultivated but allowed to waste away under the atrophic effects 
of slavish civility which stifles those youthful sensations by curtailing contemplation: ‘[l]et 
priest-led slaves cease to proclaim that man/Inherits vice and misery, when force/And 
falsehood hang even o’er the cradled babe,/Stifling with rudest grasp all natural good’.66 In 
their commentary on civil society it is clear neither believes it ideal to force others to drink 
from the spiritual well, alongside religious institutions that Shelley saw as legitimising a 
social contract built on servitude and which, Ibn Tufayl reasoned, only served to maintain a 
neutral status quo resulting in a stark contrast between those contented masses who continue 
to occupy these societies and those wandering observers of nature who, ‘tear every leaf from 
                                                          
64
 Neil Fraistat ‘Poetic Quests and Questioning in Shelley's "Alastor" Collection’, Keats-Shelley Journal 33 
(1984), 161-81, at pp.174-75, p. 178. 
65
 Mashhad Al-‘Allaf, The Essence of Islamic Philosophy (Washington: IIC Classic Series, 2003), p. 153. 
66
 The Major Works, canto 4, lines 117-20, p. 34. 
165 
 
the accursed book of God, [and instead] read the inscription on his heart.’67                                   
kkkIronically, Shelley employs a Humean scepticism regarding the existence of supernatural 
beings so that his empiricist philosophy does not need to account for anything which might 
be explained as miraculous in a divinely ordained sense whereas Ibn Tufayl employs 
Ghazali’s method of doubting worldly causality to make way for Allah as the single 
prenatural cause which has the added effect of introducing miracles as an extension of God’s 
Will subverting His own habitual established processes. Nevertheless, each thinker accepts 
that our finitude generates the impenetrable veils which obfuscate the totality of life’s 
mysteries and as such, critique groups which stultify metaphysical ideas by transposing them 
into a setting of instutionalised learning. Indeed, both perspectives recognise that the 
Transcendent can never fully enter into human sign systems as this world is grounded in the 
metaphoric which bars perception from penetrating the realm of presence. Shelley relegates 
the question of a remote Power to a blank space (not necessarily empty but blindingly 
unknowable) refracted by life’s colours, ‘[l]ife, like a dome of many-colour'd glass,/Stains the 
white radiance of Eternity’,68 the mysterium tremendum is transfigured into the beautiful 
embellishments that invigorate the mundane with a sense of sublimity and which supply the 
necessary creative materials for ecstatic experiences within the symbolic realm, otherwise 
‘[i]f one has become stuck in a certain narrow or predictable way of seeing [and] no fresh 
light can come into the mind, the colour and beauty fade from life’.69 Rather than focusing 
solely on a colourless Divine Light in the hopes of directly accessing its spiritual reality, 
Shelley calls for humanity to displace their infatuation with this ideal Beyond and invest it 
into the human palette of diverse expressions generated through imaginative encounters with 
natural beauty so as to expose the heart to constantly evolving forms of delightful splendour. 
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For Ibn Tufayl and Ghazali, whilst a spiritual union with the Transcendent was momentarily 
attainable by cleansing the heart until it becomes a vessel for Divine inspiration they never 
claimed that individuals became Allah or that their impoverished status was overwritten. 
They argued that this state was merely a witnessing or tasting because only the Creator is 
intimately conscious of Himself and, given that any lordly traits attributed to human beings 
are solely metaphoric in nature, humanity can find contentment within an apophatic 
epistemology. Intuition is not divorced from cognition since these are stages in the process to 
acquiring metaphysical insight (the latter relying on reason and the former being visionary in 
nature) producing different outcomes between theoretical philosophy and experiential tasting 
relative to the level of human perfection attainable at either rank.    
Ecstasy, Eudaimonia and Education 
kkkWhen seeking intellectual and perceptual union with an Ideal Beloved, the pleasure 
principle is not merely directed towards higher forms of cognition but introduces a sensual 
aspect as an added goal that differs from the worldly equivalent in that it subsists past death. 
In this case, enjoyment functions as the effect as well as the end goal of mysticism since it is 
both the byproduct of living a life of active contemplation and used by Ibn Tufayl to describe 
the eternal state attained by those who occupy the Ultimate stations of paradise. Despite the 
overlaps with Aristotelian Eudaimonia, Aristotle foregrounds theoretical knowledge in the 
field of science, philosophy and logic where a contemplative life, directed to the highest 
idealisms, is enriching due to a deeper intellectual appreciation of those principles and any 
sense of happiness is derived from the act itself. Ibn Tufayl, on the other hand, presents a 
protagonist whose intuitive cognition grants the seeker enjoyment to the extent that they 
come to not simply know but envision and experience the source of all knowledge. To shed 
further light on the type of reflective enjoyment expounded in Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, it serves to 
examine a precursor to Ibn Tufayl and an influential figure in al-Ghazali’s ethics, Ibn 
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Miskawayh (936-1030), for whom sa’adah (happiness) was attained when an entity 
(inanimate or otherwise) perfectly realises the property that makes them unique.
70
 For Ibn 
Tufayl and Ibn Miskawayh, anyone who seeks happiness in material gain or contemplation of 
high ideals for their own sake without directing inquiry towards their source will never be 
satiated because those pleasures are neither self-desirable nor self-sufficient. Hayy and Absal, 
upon entering into a mystical union with the Divine, become illuminated by His Majesty as 
their cognition of mundane forms become immediate perceptions of ultimate truths, 
becoming satisfied (not only by their undignified thoughts being curtailed) but because they 
no longer live for the approval of others as they understand that virtue is an end unto itself. A 
key difference between the visionary or experiential and the scientific or speculative forms of 
knowledge when it comes to comprehending the Creator is that although theoretical 
contemplation can grant the philosopher knowledge of the highest principles, the only way of 
tasting these truths is to internalise them as they are being revealed. Hayy is on a path where 
higher stations of insight confer a type of tangible happiness that, given the text’s reliance on 
al-Ghazali, will likely persist through to the afterlife.                                                             
kkkRegardless of Shelley’s potential qualms regarding Ibn Tufayl’s delineation of existence 
as a theophanic self-expression of Allah, there is pleasure to be attained through his own 
intellectualising of nature since he both sympathised with, and criticised, the Alastor Poet’s 
aspiration to directly know his own idealised miniature as moments of ecstatic insight can 
revive dead apprehensions: ‘the idea of love [which takes] from life and refine[s] into art’.71 
These newfound aspirations cannot be satisfied by simply elevating the natural world to the 
level of transcendence since, as Shelley discovered during his exploration of this internalised 
feminine antitype in Epipsychidion, the main pitfall in love rests in, ‘seeking in a mortal 
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image the likeness of what is perhaps eternal’.72 Nevertheless, this acceptance was the result 
of his own complex (and at times failing) relationships with women, whether it be Emilia 
Viviani, Jane Williams, Harriet Westbrook or Mary Godwin, he came to know first-hand how 
the desire to follow one’s passions could lead to a type of self-destruction in much the same 
way he was wary of taking mere shadows for enlightenment after having experienced such 
ecstatic revelations in his youth. This fine line between pleasure and pain in poetic insight 
rests on making sure that love, ‘a going out of our own nature, and an identification of 
ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own’,73 does 
not result in such self-loss and complete enrapture with an intuited Other that submissive 
devotion becomes an intrinsic part of the relationship for, as with the Alastor Poet, it risks 
fostering an enclosing rather than enlarging viewpoint – the expansiveness associated with 
imaginative sympathy is reduced to a myopic introspectiveness. The Poet privileges the 
visionary content and not the interstitial mental connections which allow for its existence 
whereas, for Shelley, satisfaction comes from the journey as opposed to the destination (ie. 
the moment of unveiling) because when one vacuum is displaced another will inevitably arise 
indicating Alastor is not an attempt to demonise those searching after the shadows of 
Intellectual Beauty but a cautionary tale for any who might misattribute substantiality to the 
image of their devotion rather than the, ‘sympathy of corresponding powers in other human 
beings’.74 This focus on the minds associative capacities rather than Divine Providence is 
similar to Hume’s conception of the missing shade of blue which posits the imagination is 
capable of generating simple ideas not merely through direct apprehension or sensation but 
also through a blending process where ideas, acquired experientially, can lead to other 
abstract images as a result of closely resembling simple perceptions being metaphorically 
arranged into new formulations and as such, ‘we think God by augmentation of experience, 
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and think this particular blue by elision of experience’.75 Filling absence through elision 
generates a new image which is a psychological intermediate of impressions gleamed from 
nature but which also takes on a life of its own as Hume and Shelley recognise how humanity 
interpolates the gaps in life’s mysteries and their works expose the ease with which a person 
can blindly argue for the ontological existence of substances and powers that they do not 
know directly. A subject can only claim to know the simple impressions accumulated through 
perception and arranged by the mind in such a manner as to give rise to this now seemingly 
self-subsisting image. A sense of emptiness propped up by life’s illusions is the key 
component in spurring humanity’s search for an externalisation of our inner soul but the 
ephemeral quality of those spiritual visitations presented as the truth made manifest are also 
the catalyst for widening this existential lacunae. The unbounded feeling conjured during the 
ecstasy of imaginative sympathy, a going out of oneself, is both a dangerous and freeing 
sensation for it can liberate the mind to new avenues of thought and away from the 
calculating view of reason but it also risks inculcating within the observer a false sense of 
boundlessness where they perceive themselves as a reflection of that sublime sensation 
precisely due to their own incapacity to adequately respond (i.e. their limitedness); for, ‘a 
rational subject has the tendency in relation to the mathematical and dynamic sublime to 
become a sublime, transgressive thinking-speaking-acting subject’.76 Given that reason is 
unable to substantiate an individual’s imagined object of adoration, they are forced to 
transfigure this pain of an unconsummated relationship into a non-cognitive harmonious joy.   
A key point of contention regarding Ibn Tufayl and Shelley’s views on eudaimonia as a form 
of cognition results from their differing beliefs on Beauty as an ideal good; the Shelleyan 
female principle, manifested through the actions of wives and mothers, is as integral to the 
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creation of Beauty (as an atemporal concept) as the notion itself is in spurring those acts and 
physical traits deemed beautiful. This experiential synergy generates a more mutually 
constitutive relationship than the Platonic split between ideal forms and their terrestrial 
counterparts with the immutable concepts representing true reality as opposed to the 
Demiurge inspired, divine faculties possessed by mankind which are secondary. Being 
immersed in the material idealist tradition, Shelley is inevitably responding to, and in turn 
working within, the framework of Locke’s tabula rasa which, in the hands of sceptical 
thinkers such as Hume (who expanded the ancient scepticism regarding essence to include 
existence) exploits its experientially blank nature as well as its limited attachment to a priori 
knowledge as a means of hiding matter behind the veil of psyche and unsettling conviction in 
an immaterial essence as the ground of being: ‘the soul is now unknowable or even 
hypothetical; Locke had emptied it out [it] is a vacancy, whose extent is discovered as it is 
filled [and is] more or less unconscious emptiness.’77 Unable to find others who are 
empathetic or willing to search for their antitype in a life beyond our own, a person may 
examine the organic world to uncover this likeness they feel so bereft without. In turning to 
nature, the subject may become conscious of a nonverbal harmony which resonates with their 
soul as disparate natural phenomena collectively gesture towards the existence of an 
underlying spirit. As Shelley writes: 
the motion of the very leaves of spring, in the blue air, there is then found 
a secret correspondence with our heart. There is eloquence in the 
tongueless wind, and a melody in the flowing brooks and the rustling of 
the reeds beside them, which by their inconceivable relation to something 
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within the soul awaken the spirits to a dance of breathless rapture, and 
bring tears of mysterious tenderness to the eyes
78
  
kkkThis synchronicity of forms highlights mankind’s inherent attachment to the universe as a 
constituent element of its perceptual unfolding which is marred by a tendency to 
anthropomorphise and in turn, makes union difficult to discern from projection – the spiritual 
and the psychoerotic become intertwined. The sensuousness by which Nature exposes itself 
to the enraptured seeker causes utter disassociation from corporeality as a means of allowing 
such a non-discursive experience to take place and urges the individual to recognise 
transcendence is achieved by exceeding cognitive norms and generating fresh insights from 
dead apprehensions.                                                                                                                       
kkkThe inevitable distortions which take place as a consequence of man’s narrow 
comprehension and restricted perspective become the means by which they creatively expand 
beyond their locality through the contributions of other minds existing both as 
contemporaries and transhistorically. This sense of boundless finitude can be either a blessing 
or a curse depending on whether it nurtures sympathetic openness where humanity recognises 
their role as secondary artists in relation to the Spirit of Beauty whilst appreciating how they 
collectively contribute to upholding, shaping and engaging with emotionality; otherwise, it 
fosters a type of self-aggrandisement where an individual perceives themselves to be above 
the natural order (in a hierarchical mindset that often seeps into social beliefs) and, as Hume 
would argue, their notion of a Supreme Being is simply an extension of their own ego 
contemplating the mechanics of their own mind but abstracted to an unlimited degree. 
Consequently, Mother Earth, Intellectual Beauty and love are contingent upon human 
behaviour infusing those concepts with power, whilst Muslims would consider human actions 
as acquired from Allah, with the notion of individual behaviour adding or diminishing from 
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His Majesty being blasphemous. Ibn Tufayl creates a theophanic universe where the material 
veil gestures towards a Transcendent Power which is an immaterial Agent. Generating a 
conception of history that assumes all humans are naturally predisposed to seek perfection 
but only those who take the time to refine their emotional intellect and critically engage with 
the world as an interconnected whole can justify their God-given vicegerency and avoid 
being swept up with any who allow these faculties to go unnoticed under the oppressive 
influence of civilisation. The embodied nature of pleasure, gained through achieving a 
constant state of awareness of the Divine, is highlighted in the importance Ibn Tufayl places 
on developing a body that is as equally cultivated in a morally upright manner as the intellect 
due to its role in providing a healthy vessel for the inquisitive mind to work within. 
Otherwise, Ibn Tufayl fears, a corrupt foundation will produce unhealthy results which spurns 
Hayy to develop his own dietary plan that omits the killing and eating of animals since he 
feels it would be an abuse of his natural superiority over the animal world and runs counter to 
his intrinsic desire to use that power for protection rather than destruction for personal gain.  
The ecstatic moments which arise during a Sufistic contemplative encounter with the Divine 
results in a luminous flash of inspiration, attained not through theory but an experiential 
tasting. Hayy’s formative period in which he carried out forms of scientific inquiry through 
biology and astronomy as well as asking philosophical questions regarding the ethics of 
killing animals for survival were vital in enabling him to carry out his metaphysical 
investigations but, at some point, a perspectival shift must occur where the thinker must 
examine the cause itself rather than solely inspecting Its effects lest they remain forever in the 
first, non-essential (i.e. non-pleasurable) stage of sublime observation. Ultimately, Locke and 
Drummond were more willing to accept a deity within the confines of their philosophies on 
cognition; the Muslim thinkers cited previously believed man’s neutrality at birth never 
denied God’s sovereignty over man nor a deeply felt resonance regarding His existence; and, 
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for Shelley and Hume, such apodictic certainty was not something they could believe in as 
even when such abstract conceptualisations of a noumenal realm were entertained it would be 
conducted towards moral and social change rather than a spiritual afterlife.                                 
kkkConsequently, Shelley is caught between an appreciative respect for those who desire to 
seek ideals within an unregulated state of nature and a cautionary censure of the gullibility 
and superstitious blindness that can result from such a visionary existence. This duality is 
reflected in two other eighteenth-century philosophes, Voltaire and Rousseau, who were also 
both enchanted and dissatisfied by Ibn Tufayl’s allegorical novel. Rousseau recognised 
human nature as naturally endowed with the capacity to develop morally and intellectually 
due to their essential being deriving from God’s will and in turn, he scorned the stifling 
effects of habit and compulsion that governmental policies levy against the free spirit. 
Nevertheless, Rousseau is unwilling to leave man completely unaided within nature as Ibn 
Tufayl had narrated with Hayy since his trust also falls partly upon the guiding influence of 
thinkers, such as himself, who can shade individuals from the deadening impact of society 
and help extract their intrinsic talents. The isolation that comes from pursuing and reclaiming 
a natural morality requires the refocusing touch of other human beings who can prompt one 
another to harness and realise these lessons but without the dehumanising dynamics of 
industrial society which is grounded upon dependency and unfulfilled desires: ‘the price paid 
for experiencing anything is the experience of ourselves as alienated’.79 However, in his 
novel Emile, or On Education (1763), it becomes clearer why love is not substantial enough 
to rectify his qualms regarding a moral education sought to rid people of a bourgeois mindset 
driven by self-importance and dissatisfaction; just as the Alastor Poet’s journey exposes the 
illusory nature of pleasure through beauty, Rousseau shows the idea of positing a beloved 
either within nature or within another likeminded spirit will always be a subjective projection 
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of beauty and, attached to this sentimental image, transfigures any contentment into a 
contingent object of desire. Likewise, Voltaire was actively engaged in the plight of thinkers 
and groups who were influenced by Ibn Tufayl’s thought (from Locke to the Quakers) and 
who worked to promote the importance of religious freedom which resonated with the French 
writer due to his own disdain for clerical monopoly in matters of epistemology that should be 
fuelled by induction and scientific experimentation. However, this optimism, inquisitive 
exploration and rational accumulation of talents through self-education is satirised in his 
novel, Zadig ou la Destinée (1747), where the titular character, Zadig,
80
 exemplifies the 
problems that arise when attempting to live in society as a good-hearted but disillusioned 
philosophe for all his powers of deduction or optimistic youth are unable to help him avoid 
being taken advantage of. Eventually, Zadig comes across an angel disguised as a hermit who 
teaches him to justify acts of wickedness as beneficial since every movement in creation is a 
necessary balancing of order and thus, his final submission to fate serves as a mockery of 
Leibniz’s attempt to reconcile human suffering with Original Sin and the argument that God 
chose the best of all possible worlds.
81
                                                                                              
kkkTo some extent, these authors would appreciate Hayy’s split from dogmatic centres of 
religious or social education as a sign for others to take control of the curriculum and embark 
upon a journey for self-knowledge, or spiritual enlightenment in a manner that foregrounds 
autonomy and tolerance. Nevertheless, there remains a naivety underlying his hopefulness 
and a futility underlying his alienation which prevents them from wholeheartedly trusting this 
natural religion as a miracle cure for the modern malaise resulting in them feeling 
disenchanted or inconsequential upon realising: ‘the problem of moral education for our 
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species remains unsolved’.82 For example, the journey that Shelley’s protagonist embarks 
upon in Alastor evinces similar themes to those found in Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker (1782) since both explore the workings of a mind that has recently become aware of 
the decay, transience and mundanity of nature the secrets of which no longer elicit excitement 
or joy just despondency at life’s ephemerality so they direct their passions inward. Each show 
an interest in the visionary gleam of youth that fades over time as the Alastor Poet’s age starts 
to accelerate from the point he awakens from his erotic dream he slowly loses the very 
perceptive and creative faculties that gave birth to his beloved in the first place even as he 
draws nearer to final stage of annihilation. The simultaneous death drive and pleasure drive 
spurning the protagonist to that cherished Shelleyan instance of self-castration manifests 
physiologically as the fresh spark of innocent youth that caused the ‘virgins’ to ‘pine’ and 
‘waste’ due to a ‘fond love of his wild eyes’83 eventually cause him to lose his only 
attachment to the phenomenal realm when his eyes fade into perpetual darkness: ‘[t]he fire of 
those soft orbs ceased to burn’.84 For both Rousseau and Shelley, this extinguished aspiration 
is a result of intellectual degeneration experienced by those who direct their entire being in 
service of ideals whilst dismissing, and being dismissed by, society. Alternately, Zadig’s 
injured eye that he acquires after being attacked by bandits  does not symbolise his pariah 
status amongst humanity but within Fate itself as the countless misfortunes resulting from his 
attempts at doing good serve as a mockery against those whose optimism would blind them 
from visible injustices within the world and who, in turn, rationalise these events as wise 
decisions from a monarchical king or an Abrahamic God rather than the arbitrary rule of a 
self-serving clergy and a Deistic clockmaker. Ultimately, Shelley, Rousseau and Voltaire’s 
refusal to fully replicate the autodidactic, self-contented wanderer represented by Hayy – 
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despite appreciating him as an image of freethought and man’s perfectibility – results from 
Ibn Tufayl’s own readiness to trust in the guiding and all-encompassing nature of Allah as the 
Qur’anic understanding, ‘[t]he East and West belong to God: wherever you turn, there is His 
Face’,85 becomes central to the educational narrative in a way that the other texts cannot fully 
endorse. 
Summary 
 kkkI have investigated how Muslim thought inadvertently feeds its way into the genealogy 
of Alastor’s commentary on the relation between mind and matter through the Enlightenment 
interest in Hayy Ibn Yaqzan with a more focused comparative analysis of how Ibn Tufayl 
employs al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina to form his naturalistic mysticism alongside Shelley’s 
engagement with Locke and Hume to formulate a fledgling sceptical idealism as he begins, 
developing ‘an aesthetic of inspiration from the unlikely ground of his early empiricism [but] 
beset by uncertainty and scepticism’.86 I have also sought to foreground the dynamic 
interplay between these philosophical affinities and transvaluative differences as a means of 
complementing the earlier chapter by offering further reasoning behind why Shelley embeds 
aspects of his narrative around the East, whether geographically or symbolically. Both 
thinkers attempted to accommodate the intuitionalist and the empiricist views on the origin of 
ideas by admitting the agency of two contributory sources of knowledge — intuitive impulse 
and sensory stimulation — each playing defining roles (however unequal) in the genesis of 
ideas. Throughout this journey, the Alastor Poet’s fixation on the abstract elements 
constituting his mental antitype result in his dissolution as a warning that our creative 
faculties can easily lapse into the compulsive infatuation for a Supreme Being characteristic 
of religious consciousness unless productively channelled towards establishing sympathetic 
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communities in this world. This yearning for ideational companionship is due to a feeling of 
existential seclusion endured by all who occupy a world where mind and matter are not fitted 
together in a Wordsworthian sense and, given this insufficient correspondence between 
phenomenal existence and the terra incognita, are forced into misrepresentation whenever the 
former is conceptualised through the latter’s anthropocentric lens. In refraining from viewing 
connectivity in terms of epistemology, passions (such as love) can be cherished for their role 
in instantiating the very drives which prompt these quests to search beyond and it is through 
expanding the experiential breadth of our finite mind that life becomes valuable:    
 
the life of a man of virtue and talent, who should die in his thirtieth year, 
is, with regards to his own feelings, longer than that of a miserable priest-
ridden slave, who dreams out a century of dullness [...] Perhaps the 
perishing ephemeron enjoys a longer life than the tortoise
87
 
kkkHayy Ibn Yaqzan and Alastor emphasise mankind’s responsibility in how they choose to 
perceive reality, Hayy’s own spiritual trajectory is generated as a response to Islamic 
theology and philosophy which eventually became, in the eighteenth century, an emblem of 
anthropocentrism where the human mind was rendered self-sufficient with no need for formal 
training and freed from the deadening grip of cultural norms. Given this fusion, it becomes 
clear how an examination of Ibn Tufayl’s tale would reveal an Islamic counterpart to this 
lineage of human-sized erotic striving which Shelley himself fashioned out of a response to 
Humean scepticism and Lockean empiricism alongside Romantic strains of influence from 
Wordsworthian naturalism to William Jones’s translations of Vedantic and Sufistic literature. 
Matter is not existentially tainted due to a Fall, humanity can both strive for sublimity whilst 
acknowledging how their own finitude limits them from assuming complete epistemological 
                                                          
87
  The Major Works, p. 83. 
178 
 
dominance over creation since employing concepts and relying on observation reduces 
knowledge to vague assertions and general principles, none of which can claim to possess 
ontological validity.                                                                                                                           
kkkThere is a shared feeling of compulsive emptiness driving Hayy, the protagonists of 
Islamic love poetry, and the Alastor Poet, since their quests for an idealised other adapt 
similar symbols of homesickness from the reedpipe to the Aeolian Harp but, from an Islamic 
perspective, these are born out of an underlying yearning to reclaim a Paradise lost whereas, 
for Shelley, recognising life’s eroding sway renders any attempt to grasp and formulate an 
account of it always tenuous, there remains a lingering hope for an earthly Paradise yet to be 
fully discovered. Shelley sought to retain the purity of nature’s voicelessness whilst Muslim 
thinkers sought to remove all distractions to allow God’s voice to shine through as external 
signs clarify Qur’anic expression. The former generates an insular inversion of the Buberian 
I-Thou configuration of Christianity
88
 into an I-I relationship whereby ideal concepts, such as 
justice or beauty, provide mankind with seemingly immutable ethical or aesthetic principles 
through which to live by whilst also being largely constituted, and shaped, by the collective 
emotional responses to the human condition that civilisations have elicited over the ages. On 
the other hand, Islamic thought is centered around the notion of remembrance on a 
cosmological, scriptural, and hagiographical level; whether it be recalling the primordial 
covenant where all souls were gathered to testify to the Oneness of God or the Qur’anic 
emphasis on the rejuvenative, cyclical nature of prophecy creating a system in which every 
sign not only leads back to Allah but also signals further development towards eventual 
reunion.  
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Chapter 5 
The mental Book of Fate: Ash’arite occasionalism and Lucretian atomism in Shelley’s The 
Revolt of Islam  
kkkAlongside the geographically focused interpretations of The Revolt that argue, ‘[a]part 
from its title, The Revolt of Islam’s most direct engagement with the Orient comes in the 
Preface’,1 it is important to assess how Shelley’s universalising project is tied to transvaluing 
tropes or concepts in a manner that attempts to harness imagery affiliated with past traditions 
in order to mould an adequate response to contemporary issues. Shelley’s sceptical idealism 
is a combination of Enlightenment cynicism with a Romantic deconstructive self-awareness; 
the former influences the secular framework underlying his conceptualisation of the One 
Mind through which he determines inspiration as interrelated and history as cyclical; 
whereas, the latter fuels his attachment to personification as a method of invoking religious 
symbolism free from the constraints of orthodoxy. These two components inevitably feed 
into and shape his transvaluation of Islamic concepts from the Book of Fate
2
 to holy war.
3
 I 
intend to examine what the Book of Fate signifies within the context of Shelley’s exploration 
of oriental determinism as shaped by Thomas Peacock’s interest in Manichean thought, 
particularly as it relates to Oromazes and Ahrimanes (i.e. good and evil) which, when vying 
for power, personify the ethical battle taking place within every individual. Moreover, 
Shelley’s mythographic interest in Eastern Fatalism, prompted by John Frank Newton and 
Peacock, merges with his intellectual interest in sceptical philosophy, informed by the likes 
of Godwin and Hume, both of which drove him to poeticise the tenuous position of humanity 
as caught between hopeful improvement and uncertain afterlives. The Romantic poet sought 
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to cultivate a heightened awareness of how reform may seem futile in the moment, especially 
driven by the despondency felt upon witnessing a failed revolution, but these individual 
setbacks must be appreciated within a larger context of radical campaigns against tyranny just 
as the Preserved Tablet is a pre-existent counterpart to the actual Qur’anic text which is 
revealed, and unfolds, within time. Shelley’s mentalised version of this theological concept is 
employed when referring both to an individual state of mind as well as the collective mind 
that freethinkers contribute towards and derive inspiration from. In other words, when read as 
part of Shelley’s mythographic schema, The Revolt of Islam is understood not only as an 
Oriental allegory for the French Revolution but also as The Revolt[ion] of Islam, a 
transvaluation of perceived Islamic values not dissimilar to how Spencer Hall reads ‘Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty’ as offering, ‘an alternative to conventional Christian theology [with] its 
mythmaking confer[ring] a religious valuation on the secular state of consciousness’, in the 
hopes of reinforcing, ‘man's faith in the active, humanistic virtues of "Love, Hope, and Self-
esteem"’.4 Akin to the commentary on causality mediated by Hume and Ghazali through the 
spiritual biographies of Alastor and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, a dialogue is taking place in The Revolt 
between Lucretian and Ash’arite atomism through the Book of Fate as trope and its Islamic 
formulation as the Preserved Tablet (Lawh al-Mahfuz). Even though it would be easy to 
dismiss any genealogy between the two on the basis that Shelley’s conceptualisation is a 
response to other Romantic writers such as Southey’s Book of Fate in Thalaba the Destroyer 
(1801) both poeticisations unavoidably incite comparison with their Qur’anic counterpart. 
Citing any tradition within a new context will inevitably produce far-reaching intellectual 
implications and if it can be appreciated that, ‘Shelley looked to Lucretius’ entropic, 
Epicurean vision of the universe for a philosophical articulation of the relationship between 
                                                          
4
 Spencer Hall, ‘Power and the Poet: Religious Mythmaking in Shelley’s ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’’, Keats-
Shelley Journal 32 (1983), 123-49, at p. 133. 
182 
 
atomic ‘anarchy’ and a non-despotic unity’,5 then a deeper understanding as to how the 
Islamic imagery is being subverted remains vital to characterising the metaphysical 
revolution driving the poem. The purpose of bringing these disparate worldviews into 
dialogue, Lucretian materialism and Ash’arite occasionalism, is to complicate the surface-
level portrayal of Oriental fatalism that the poem supplants onto Othman and focus on how 
Cythna, under his rule, refigures the terms of her oppression as the means of her liberation.  
kkkShelley is not only employing Lucretian atomism to outline his views on determinism but, 
in grounding these notions within an Oriental setting
6
 and in proximity to concepts such as 
the Book of Fate, he is recontextualising prior Muslim interpretations of God’s will in light of 
similar phenomena from desert landscapes to tyrannical governments. Dismissing these 
comparisons purely on the pretence that they are potentially inadvertent or fraught with 
negative preconceptions is to recognise Shelley’s adaptation of a tradition without assessing 
the process by which he generates this reimagining. The mutability of outward forms (i.e. the 
notion that states are continually in flux and that death compels the renewal necessary for 
perpetuating life) is a component of Islamic atomism which similarly posits Allah as 
recreating existence in every instance due to mankind’s inability to subsist autonomously 
coupled with an appreciation of humanity’s relative level of control within the grander 
spectrum of reality. The central difference is that, for Islamic atomists, God remains the 
grounding ontological principle whilst in The Revolt and ‘On Life’ our materiality is 
beholden to biological processes creating determining principles separate from individual will 
but largely anthropomorphised and thus, indicating humans are as central in moulding their 
trajectory as they are in influencing the shape of the One Mind. This equilibrium Shelley 
strives for when determining the mind’s relation to nature is achieved by, ‘steer[ing] a course 
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that would avoid the twin shoals of transcendentalism and atomistic empiricism’,7 not 
necessarily signifying an ontological split between a noumenal and phenomenal realm but 
rather continuously warning against believing too intently any mental world generated from 
either the creative or rational faculties. 
Islamic and Lucretian Atomism  
kkkThe Revolt entails a transvaluation of Islamic determinism for the spirit of beauty or spirit 
of revolution (as in Prometheus Unbound) that compels harmony in the face of dissonance is 
not an omnipresent or omniscient entity guiding outcomes whilst granting humanity the 
intellectual freedom to shape their reactions and intentions accordingly but rather a mixture 
of blind necessity charged with a level of human emotionality. The core sense of directedness 
derives from the organic world’s ability to return towards growth even in the face of 
destruction which is a movement guided not by a progressivist impulse but as a consequence 
of cycles of birth and decay implicit within Lucretian materialism. There remain external 
powers free from our control just as there are minds beyond our control which, when reified 
to the level of a singular principle in the universe, have the potential to be either life-
affirming or soul-crushing but, in either case, reveal something about the human predicament. 
To name an abstracted entity is to enact a cosmological injustice against mankind and the 
underlying principles themselves precisely due to the impossibility of defining the essentially 
indefinable. Hence, there is a clear aversion to the type of fatalism conventionality attributed 
to the Orient which strips away human volition in favour of submission to a monolithic 
power source that is undoubtedly conceptualised in a way that echoes Islamic imagery as 
Cythna warns the mariners of, ‘the dark fiend [with an] iron pen,/Dipped in scorn’s fiery 
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poison’,8 urging them instead to, ‘[l]ook on your mind – it is the book of fate’,9 echoing her 
own decision to impess her name upon the sand and take the authorial power into her own 
hands. This solipsistic reading of the One Power is invariably associated with a despotic 
mindset characterised as, ‘solitary, self-sufficient and self-consuming [standing] as a false 
unity’,10 it reflects itself in everything else until it becomes instantiated into a position of 
power purely on the basis of repetition and when, on a cosmological level, ‘all are mirrors of 
the same’,11 it becomes easier for that authoritarian Will to be replicated on a worldly stage 
where allegiance to a ruler becomes simply an extension of the values embedded in 
submission to an Omnipotent Deity. The fear of becoming beholden to a singular ideology or 
idea reified into an ontologically tangible force fuels Cythna’s remarks regarding self-
sovereignity and prompts her to question: ‘[w]hat then is God? Some moon-struck sophist 
stood/Watching the shade from his own soul upthrown/ Fill Heaven and darken Earth, and in 
such mood/ The Form he saw and worshipped was his own’.12 In this instance, Cythna warns 
against misusing our creativity or propensity to draw connections between events and imbue 
them with cosmic meaning without first recognising our role in inscribing existence with our 
own likeness for a lack of awareness can cause a person to believe their projections have 
control over them rather than the inverse. The act of relinquishing the mental pen by which 
we author reality in favour of an abstract iron one, unnecessarily creates social imbalance due 
to an internalisation of certain submissive behaviours slowly eroding the potential for 
freethought and the zeal for revolution by creating a rift between the eternally saved and the 
eternally damned whose fate is decided in direct correlation to their level of commitment: 
‘men say, God has appointed Death/ On all who scorn his will, to wreak immortal wrath’.13 
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The closest corollary in Islam to replicating this form of determinism can be found in the 
concept of ajal to denote how Allah apportions a measure of lifespan before an individual’s 
birth which can neither be shortened nor delayed outside of supplications or deeds that are 
already known and accounted for in al-lawh al-mahfooz (Book of Fate) indicated by various 
Qur’anic passages, ‘He is the one who created you from clay, and specified a term [for you] 
and another fixed time [ajal]’,14 and, ‘God does not reprieve a soul when its turn comes: God 
is fully aware of what you do’15. Even factors unrelated to time which, instead, concern actual 
provisions (rizq) such as wealth and food are subsumed beneath this pre-mortal knowing and 
apportioning from the Divine storehouse of potentialities made actual: ‘[n]o misfortune can 
happen, either in the earth or in yourselves, that was not set down in writing before We [God] 
brought it into being’.16 A person’s decreed time of death as being in the purview and decree 
of Allah extends beyond the act of reaching old age to even include an inward compulsion 
towards the particular time and event that has been written for that individual as shown 
during the verses written in response to those who critiqued Muhammad’s decision to 
retaliate against those Meccans who were attacking them in Medina: ‘[e]ven if you had 
resolved to stay at home, those who were destined to be killed would still have gone out to 
meet their deaths’.17                                                                                    kkk                                 
kkkThe negative elements in Shelley’s portrayal of Oriental Fatalism derive from his 
scepticism of the unempirical since he believes those who follow the principles outlined 
above simply allow abstracted entities to possess absolute control over living beings by 
manipulating how they act or think within a predetermined set of boundaries instituted prior 
to creation. When Shelley airs on the side of enlightened cynicism he critiques the possibility 
of this mute deity (a shadow subsisting beyond and between cause and effect) as needlessly 
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instilling a hierarchy of willpower in creation and exasperating the very real duality between 
good and evil by establishing a partition between those who are fated to occupy eminent 
positions and those who should be content with their naturally subservient role. On the one 
hand, misnaming is employed in order to infuse abstracted entities not only with an existence 
separate from the Mind of humanity but ontological supremacy over and above the creative 
intellect of those who both will it into existence and, through continuous reimagining, allow it 
to subsist (e.g. the type of power held by a transcendent godhead in religious circles or 
monarchical kings in the political sphere). On the other hand, the misattribution of ideals 
Shelley values as being tangible forces for change in an anthropocentric universe such as, 
love and equality can have a positive or negative effect on humanity’s ability to distinguish 
falsehood from truth if twisted to benefit the self-serving agenda of an institution. Even if 
human perception was sensitive enough to pierce the veil of the noumenal realm and 
ascertain its existence, we would be none the wiser as to the rationale behind its decision to 
grant life outside of our own deluded interpretative attempts:  
[t]hese are blind fancies--reason cannot know/What sense can neither 
feel, nor thought conceive;/There is delusion in the world--and woe,/And 
fear, and pain--we know not whence we live,/Or why, or how, or what 
mute Power may give/Their being to each plant, and star, and beast
18
  
kkkAccordingly, it is this spirit of beauty free from uncritical deification (aka Shelleyan 
necessity as harmony) that transposes the solipsistic figurehead wielding the pen of fate 
without consideration of human emotions. It is important, however, to recognise the process 
by which this unknown cause has been conceptualised in light of Islamic tropes both as a 
means of denouncing the mariner’s worldview (synyonmous with the type of tyrannical, 
Oriental monotheism found in Southey’s poetry) as well as a way for Cythna to reformulate 
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(from within her native tradition) a more productive notion of atomistic fatalism from the 
spirit of Islamic ash’arism. In other words, when Cythna enacts her own will and defines her 
own mindset she purposely mirrors Qur’anic terminology which is inevitably distorted 
through a Shelleyan lens given his authorial position.                                                                                                                                                        
kkkAs Andrew Warren notes in The Young Romantics,
19
 Cythna prefigures Shelley’s notion 
of the One Mind in ‘On Life’ by showing an awareness of her singular mind’s situatedness 
within a grander universal movement paradoxically coursing through time at an atemporal 
level both constituted by innumerable caverns of thought whilst also being elevated beyond 
the sum of its parts to generate a singular stream of consciousness attune to the subtle 
movements of its constituent psyches. The dynamic that emerges between an individual mind 
like Cythna’s and the collective consciousness made One is characterised by a private inner 
life which is simultaneously altered and contorted according to the natural, primordial 
harmonies composing the Spirit of Nature (a mutable, asymmetrical, ever-changing constant) 
infiltrating the organic life of flora and fauna to the psychological residue of past nations now 
embedded in the fibres of existence: ‘[w]e live in our world, and mine was made/From 
glorious fantasies of hope departed’.20 Consequently, whilst Shelley resists attempts to name 
and know the One Power in any fixed, monolithic sense, he does not dismiss the utility of 
acknowledging the unnameable and unknowable on a discrete level. A deeper understanding 
of how groups have come to configure the One Power can elucidate not the disembodied 
force itself but the spirit of Nature and, by extension humanity, refracted and expressed 
amongst the countless interpretive communities established throughout history. Shelley not 
only bemoans language’s tendency to obfuscate but also acknowledges its propensity to 
encourage ambiguity in a manner that demands re-conceptualisation and serves as a warning 
against establishing strict dichotomies between the One Power and the One Mind. Instead, 
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the act of interpretation should be foregrounded as not only granting these principles positive 
or negative connotations but also determining how they are enacted within the world and to 
what ends. When Warren argues that Cythna’s, ‘transcription of her thoughts into language 
[as written on the sand] is therefore not Southey’s stable Book of Fate’,21 he recognises both 
as differing responses to the question of free will but which rely on similarly imagined 
dynamics between author and inscription in an attempt to negotiate between dictated (i.e. pre-
inscribed) events and self-willed (i.e. authored) responses. Cythna’s imprinted name is an act 
of agency as much aware of its insignificance and futility in the grander scheme as it is 
supportive of the need to dismantle ‘fixed image[s] (or ‘Idol[s]’)’ through an openness to 
[enact] change. 
22
                                                                                                                           
kkkAlthough Cythna’s act of impressing a personal mark upon Mother Nature can be read as 
exerting a type of creative will unavailable to those committed to a predestinarian view of 
fate – wherein a Divine Author pre-eternally records events – she is implanting herself within 
a body of sand whose seemingly infinitesimal and granular structure reflects her figurative 
entrance into atomistic worldview. Indeed, I read this part as Cythna implanting herself 
within the, ‘thousand unimagined shapes’, of Shelley’s Triumph of Life which are themselves 
reflective of the Lucretian atomism found within the fourth book of his De Rerum Natura that 
envisions, as Shelley perceives it, an ‘earth […] grey with phantoms [and a substantially 
intangible] air [that is] peopled with dim forms’,23 depicting the atoms of our decaying selves 
becoming the stimuli for others to perceive us and which, if perceptible, would grant us ‘new 
Vision’24 as to how seemingly disinterested matter relates to one another in a nonlinear 
fashion. My focus in this reading is not only to attach, ‘Cythna’s writing to the The Revolt’s 
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de-Orientalizing dialectic of the desert and the despot’,25 but to highlight her reimagining of 
the Book of Faith as an extension of Shelley’s intellectual propensity to internalise ideas or 
symbols of an ideology in a way that coheres with his own sensibilities rather than dismissing 
their value entirely for Shelley’s method of philosophising was to contemplate: ‘the 
Beatitudes until they became identified with his own favourite ideas.’26 By choosing the sand 
as her medium and highlighting the correlation between willpower and authorship underlying 
the original Book of Fate, Cythna is not disassociating herself from her geographical origin or 
from those traditions that constitute it but continues through a discontinuous act the tradition 
of medieval Muslim atomists who similarly used the sand to elucidate theological issues 
regarding free will via a culturally relevant and Qur’anically inspired lens. In employing the 
desert as a metaphor for the creative makeup of existence, Cythna is not wholly detaching 
herself from the deterministic heritage of her Islamic forefathers, instead she is making 
meaningful its content to better adhere with her own inward sense of how we relate to Nature, 
Necessity and society. Cythna offers an alternative to the Southeyan tyrant’s understanding of 
this fatalistic text which prioritises certain elements for the sake of self-empowerment and 
instead, channels sensibilities found in Shelley’s own mythographic schema where poetic 
language is reflective of: ‘the evolving self, which in itself is not to be considered as a 
reifiable entity but rather as an ongoing activity or process of enactment.’27                                                   
kkkFor Shelley, life events that fuel the progression of our being, propelling us into new 
contexts and shaping our character, are perpetually haunted by an equally persistent death 
drive emitted as a response to humanity’s entropic nature in an existential purging of waste 
that could be simply figured as a type of perspiration caused by the exhaustion of experience: 
‘[f]rom every firmest limb and fairest face/ The strength and freshness fell like dust, and left/ 
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The action and the shape without the grace/[…]These shadows, numerous as the dead leaves 
blown [...] from a poplar tree’.28 This ontological emission is composed, as Lucretian 
materialism conceives it, of atomistic and imperceptible bodies which help transmit the form 
of its host across space to be perceptible by others, ‘[m]ask after mask fell from the 
countenance/ And form of all’,29 which, in turn, creates a paradoxical situation where our 
inner compulsion towards decay at every instance enables us to both persist as well as exist 
by constituting the form through which we are able to interact with external bodies but only 
inasmuch as the spectre of who we were will allow: ‘[those] spent vision of the times that 
were / And scarce have ceased to be’.30 The past realises the present in order for the future to 
become past and, as time collapses in on itself, everything levels out to make the present 
moment all that truly exists within the One Mind; individuals can only know the other two 
temporal modes through the medium of a single instance. External reality being mediated by 
an estranged simulacra of itself, generates a space for Shelley’s sceptical idealism to 
acknowledge the materialistic imposition of Necessity as a constitutive, uncontrollable, 
increasingly indifferent force whilst promoting the need for sovereignty via critical thought 
and inculcating a morality refined through its attachment to high art as opposed to an 
exclusively duty-based ethics. The effusion model of atomism in Triumph of Life grants the 
balance between free will and determinism Shelley desires by recognising that a hybrid of 
self and not-self dictates our situatedness in the world since over time mankind, individually, 
grows increasingly distant from its former self whilst, collectively, gaining a truer sense of 
self through a shared contribution towards humanity’s unfolding identity: ‘[e]ach, like 
himself and like each other were,/ At first, but soon distorted seemed to be’.31 Likewise, it 
enables Shelley to explain how the One Mind can become a transcendentalised principle 
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abstracted over time from humanity’s combined experience whilst not being reified to the 
point of becoming a static, omniscient deity as it adopts the moment-to-moment situational 
awareness of those it derives its consciousness from. In citing Lucretius’ materialistic 
philosophy on life in the preface to Laon and Cythna, two principles may be understood as 
characterising the alternating dynamic between good and evil across historical cycles 
expressed in both texts for the atomic is characterised as infinitesimal and indivisible whilst 
the associative relations which bind them allows for the possibility of spontaneity resulting in 
a reframing of the despondency felt at the collapse of the French Revolution into a more 
holistic vision. Even if the symbolic battle between serpent and eagle generates momentary 
failure, the ‘tale of human power’32 relayed by the Temple of Genius highlights the 
indestructabiltiy of good as well as the possibility of breaking from the established order: 
‘[h]ow many hearts impenetrably veiled/ Beat underneath its shade, what secret fight/ Evil 
and good, in woven passions mailed,/ Waged through that silent throng; a war that never 
failed!.’33 Hence, The Revolt is posited as a tale that reminds humanity to remain hopefully 
for, even though good and evil are intertwined, history holds forth examples of, ‘race[s] of 
mightier men’, which if, ‘[s]uch man has been, [then] such may yet become!’, 34 and yet, 
these sporadic attempts at upholding liberty and equality do not exist simply as narratives but, 
if Laon’s perspective on the past esteems a Lucretian sense of entanglement and 
indeterminacy (i.e. interconnectedness and potentiality), Cythna’s summation foregrounds the 
Lucretian principle of entropy as turbulence by stressing that, although faded,‘[t]he good and 
mighty of departed ages’, have had an irrevocable impact on those still living, ‘[t]o be a rule 
and law to ages that survive’.35 The transitive quality associated with human bodies 
constituting history resemble the atomic encounters which initiate creation as described in De 
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rerum natura, ‘from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world,’36 this ethos 
of contact as the ground of existence coheres with Shelley’s desire to build sympathetic 
communities within chaotic times by acknowledging our contingent nature and appreciating 
the ways others leave lasting imprints on our being resulting in a phantom existence bereft of 
Divine Cause or guidance and always on the edge of loss and regeneration. This material 
immateriality cements Shelley’s Humean scepticism as there remains the possibility for 
variation generated from similarity indicating that causality is not as consistent or objectively 
verifiable as might be assumed given that the process by which phenomenal existence is 
generated is inseparable from its own ephemerality. In contrast to organic unity, perception is 
constantly confronted with substitution, conversion and flux.  
The Death and Rebirth of Form 
kkkThis process of generation and cessation as essential to reality is expressed in Ash’arite 
theology but the relational nature of atoms as sporadically commingling with one another is 
replaced with a disconnected vacuum where each atomic instance is created and destroyed by 
Allah resulting in a universe devoid of contingency outside of His Will for the sake of 
upholding His Oneness as the Primary Cause of existence. Although any two monads are 
separated by a void their harmony derives from a shared connection to God in opposition to 
any theory of infinite regress and in turn, produces atoms whose qualities are recreated 
continuously (subsisting independently of one another) and which are simultaneously non-
eternal as well as immaterial (pertaining to time and space). In an effort to circumvent 
overdetermination, Ash’ari thought downplays the notion of secondary causality by 
emphasising how objects (in being continuously altered and reacquiring their accidental and 
substantial qualities) are maintained through God’s sustaining Power which preserves unity 
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among discrete instances and enables events to occur according to a consistent set of 
preconditions. Given that creation does not originate independently, any action or movement 
cannot truly be said to have been produced by their respective agents due to an ontological 
distinction between those who acquire (al-muktasib) and the One who creates (al-khaliq):   
The created power of the agent can never be independent of God, Who 
creates in him at every moment such power or capacity (istita’ah) as is 
proportionate to the production of the intended action [He] creates the 
action as a physical occurrence, and determines the relation of the human 
acquirer (kasib) to it
37
  
kkkDespite radiating as an echo of God’s Names and Attributes, the world’s finite nature 
results in its ontological status as not-God which means that the actions and behaviours 
expressed within are capable of being taken to extremes (e.g. lying is a perversion of the 
Divine capacity to veil). In witnessing Allah’s Omnipotence, instead of becoming lost in 
outward forms, humanity is urged to acknowledge when Divinity as the Supreme Cause 
becomes marred by the impermanence and mutability of worldly logic and integrated into the 
causal processes structuring everyday life not for the sake of dismissing such mechanisms as 
unreal but rather appreciating how their contingent relation marks them with certain 
limitations. In this schema, humans are morally assessed on the basis of their reaction to 
scenarios as well as their intention when enacting said response (i.e. reaction, intention, 
action) whilst the will to shape one’s own situatedness in the world and the ability to 
intentionally actualise any of our desired goals entails such an omnipresent knowledge of 
seen and unseen causes coupled with an omnipotent command over their subsequent effects 
that no individual can assume to possess such Power self-sufficiently. Islamic determinism 
taps into the Romantic imagination not only as it pertains to foreign policy within the Orient 
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or allegorical fables inherited from The Arabian Nights both of which became sources for 
defining and depicting an Eastern style of fatalism but, as Shelley was engaged in 
Enlightenment thought, the Book of Fate offers a trope which relates to philosophical theories 
on causality and phenomenology from Malebranche’s occasionalism to Leibniz’s 
preestablished harmony.                                                                                                              
kkkIn The Revolt, this atomistic principle of life-in-death extends beyond the aesthetic 
granularity that the desert setting provides to incorporate the shifting states of being implied 
in the nomadic way of life that inhabits it for there is a spectrality to the granularity as; 
second selves haunt their other, ‘[m]emories, like awful ghosts which come and go’;38 past 
versions of self are purged and take on different forms, ‘[a]ll shapes like mine own self, 
hideously multiplied’;39 and even physically deceased bodies metaphorically traverse the 
bridge into an allegorical afterlife, ‘the dead, who leave the stamp/Of ever-burning thoughts 
on many a page,/When they are gone into the senseless damp/Of graves’.40 Laon’s journey, in 
particular, entails a continued forgetting and remembering of self as he strives to harness the 
light within that is reflective of his lover’s unabashedly positive and youthful vigour, ‘[i]n 
me, communion with this purest being/Kindled intenser zeal, and made me wise/In 
knowledge, which, in hers mine own mind seeing,/Left in the human world few mysteries’,41 
although, in this instance, Cythna serves as the symbol for a more universal revolutionary 
force, ‘a spirit strong and mild’,42 that has attuned itself to her being and which he hopes will 
forestall, ‘old age with its gray hair,/And wrinkled legends of unworthy things’.43 The 
moment in which he figuratively breaks the shackles of his old self is when he is chained to a 
rock after killing the tyrant’s soldiers in retaliation and subsequently forced to suffer without 
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sustenance in the heat until he is forced to crack his skin and draw blood, ‘[I] bit my 
bloodless arm, and licked the brazen rust’,44 destroying his chains not to move freely but to 
pass away out of shame from his past deeds, ‘I gnawed my brazen chain, and sought to 
sever/Its adamantine links, that I might die’.45 After witnessing demonic apparitions of his 
past selves, ‘[f]oul, ceaseless shadows [to which] thought could not divide/The actual world 
from these entangling evils,’46 a lake subsequently reveals his newly hollowed body seems 
more prone to channelling the light he once gleaned in Cythna’s presence but now heightened 
with the prospect of being taught by the aged hermit who saves him from imprisonment:  
[y]et in my hollow looks and withered mien/The likeness of a shape for 
which was braided/The brightest woof of genius, still was seen […] 'twas 
her lover's face/It might resemble her--it once had been/The mirror of her 
thoughts, and still the grace/Which her mind's shadow cast, left there a 
lingering trace
47
  
kkkThe notion of Lucretian atomism as a perpetual shedding of selves is depicted on a 
macroscopic level by the ouroboros or the, ‘many-coloured […] snake/That girds eternity’,48 
since the evolution of humanity entails adaptation as well as renunciation of various traits in 
response to the changing condition of society over time. Despite a natural accumulation of 
past experiences being stored within the One Mind, the rise and fall of civilisations results in 
a type of forgetting wherein certain patterns of thought are doomed to be repeated by those 
unaware of their position. Shelley emphasises this cyclical death-in-life motif by employing a 
seasonal structure to outline a human lifespan which is not only composed of innumerable 
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metaphorical rebirths in life
49
 but even in the face of death there remains a hope that we never 
cease to propagate new versions of ourselves vicariously through the memories and bonds 
forged during existence. For Shelley, an individual’s works or actions preserving their name 
for subsequent generations is a more compelling and believable prospect than a distant 
afterlife governed by the judgement of a singular omniscient Power but, in either case, the 
nature of a person’s immortality (memorially or otherworldly) is decided through an 
admixture of deeds and necessity: '[o]ur many thoughts and deeds, our life and love,/Our 
happiness, and all that we have been,/Immortally must live, and burn and move,/When we 
shall be no more’.50 Moreover, Shelley’s use of fire as a symbol for an individual’s state in 
death resembles Sufistic literature that incorporates luminous imagery in order to signal the 
eventual dissipation of self and commingling within the Divine Light once all veils have been 
removed but reconfigured as a symbol for the ongoing legacy of the deceased who enlighten 
other still perceiving hearts and minds: ‘his spirit thus became a lamp/Of splendour, like to 
those on which it fed’.51 Ironically, mankind’s entropic nature possesses a rejuvenative 
potential by signalling an existence that has forever altered the One Mind through the 
indelible imprint of a life complete but still in motion as part of that ongoing stream. This 
quasi-redemptive capacity within every human enables Shelley to grant humanity some 
agency since their drives and impulses grant the One Mind its perpetuity but, given the 
simultaneous movement of organic matter, there remains a need for necessity and will to 
coincide.                                                                                  kkk                                                         
kkkIn contrast to the notion that an Omnipotent Intellect designs creation with knowledge of 
all possible worlds and all potential outcomes within such worlds, Shelley transforms his 
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Saharan landscape into a Lucretian void where determinism is guided by the dynamic of 
potentially infinite rearrangements ultimately being realised into a finite set of necessary 
structures and patterns. It is Love, rather than Omnipotence, that is the structuring principle 
underlying these atomically interconnected causes as part of Shelley’s de-transcendentalising 
of Romantic Nature poetry in which he establishes a vision of sympathetic communion 
amongst human and organic and non-sentient life. The One Mind coupled with Necessity 
generates a universe simultaneously compelled to movement – whether in the process of 
death or rebirth – whilst also containing the definite occurrences of actualised instances. 
Throughout the poem, the Earth is presented as being a life-granting force without which the 
growth of humanity would be impossible but it is also a force that lacks control over its 
children’s behaviour resulting in the chaotic and unsupervised nature of an existence overrun 
with tyranny and war where every action has an adverse reaction: ‘[b]ut else, from the wide 
earth's maternal breast,/Victorious Evil, which had dispossessed/All native power, had those 
fair children torn,/And made them slaves to soothe his vile unrest.’52 Consequently, 
maternality, Intellectual Beauty and Love are contingent upon human behaviour infusing 
those concepts with power which transfigures the Ash’arite notion of kasb wherein human 
actions are acquired from Allah. On the one hand, Ash’arite occasionalism presents a 
theophanic worldview where the Divine Cause is perceived behind every outward form 
conferring upon believers a visionary capacity to appreciate the sublime manifested in all 
things which, to the perception of those unaware of this noumenal dimension, appears stable 
and self-sufficient but, if the veils were lifted, would reveal a disjointed combination of 
monads only harmonised as a result of being instantaneously recreated by the Divine Will. 
The mundane realm is perceptually transformed into a miraculous theatre of transcendent 
manifestation. On the other hand, Shelley’s material world sustains the variability of forms 
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and diversity of matter cultivating it as part of its own natural growth since the microscopic 
particles are both divisible enduring and infinitely creative resulting in the diversity of 
external forms born from various particle formations instigating deviations in nature of which 
humanity is but one expression. Every alteration in the universe can be reduced to changes 
caused by the alternating arrangement of atoms which are both sporadic whilst also 
determined in direct relationship with the events surrounding their every instance of 
actualisation. The result is a mechanistic worldview that accommodates the possibility for a 
swerve in the regular order which supplants a level of unpredictability in the natural laws not 
as a means of accounting for miracles in God’s design but establishing free will and radical 
potential in a void of fluctuating atoms.  
Scepticism of Causality   
kkkShelley plays on the Oriental image of the mirage transforming his desert into a 
dreamscape, where reality and illusion are indistinguishable, in order to depict his own 
sceptical belief in the interpretive role that the mind adopts when absorbing sensory 
information whilst assigning definitive causes to intuited effects. The moments of solitude 
experienced by both Laon and Cythna serve to exemplify the projective capabilities of the 
human mind and their manipulative hold over emotions resulting in several instances where 
the protagonists are unable to discern illusion from memory including whether their actions 
have genuine consequences or are merely tricks of the mind. When Cythna is taken captive 
her sanity begins to collapse due to the torture experienced at the hands of Othman and the 
isolation felt during her time in his submarine cavern resulting in: ‘a madness slow and 
creeping,/Which made the earth seem fire, the sea seem air […] And the sea-eagle looked a 
fiend […]Thus all things were/Transformed into the agony which I wore’.53 In the same way 
that Laon’s punishment leads him to denounce his old vengeful self and prepares him for the 
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eventual commingling with his beloved in the finale, Cythna’s solitude inadvertently 
cultivates her ability to instigate change in others by inspiring their highest sensibilities. Her 
transformation into Laone begins in this breakdown of cause and effect as her mental world is 
projected outward causing these natural processes to be overridden creating surreal inversions 
of how human’s experience reality at a default level just as she will momentarily destabilise 
the facade of social cohesion under the tyrant’s false unity through liberty and equality. 
Cythna not only realises her own projective capabilities to influence those around her but by 
being degraded and defamed by the tyrant himself as well as those carrying out his orders she 
has witnessed first-hand the dangers of humanity’s self-made illusions if reified to the point 
of worship within a monolithic power structure. The birthing of a new self amidst a disjointed 
causality is signified by the onset of an unexpected pregnancy which appears so miraculously 
during her time of need that she often questions its existence describing the baby as, ‘a dream 
divine’,54 and, ‘[a] doubt which would not flee, a tenderness/Of questioning grief, a source of 
thronging tears;/Which having passed, as one whom sobs oppress’.55 The blissful intoxication 
experienced upon receiving a child during this lonely period eventually turns into a sobering 
reminder of her dire state as the baby is stolen which indicates that quantifiable realities 
related to wealth and poverty (e.g. food as well as resources) can be augmented relative to the 
inward condition of the individual to the extent that even temporal perception, let alone 
events experienced within time, is modified to reflect the protagonist’s mournful or ecstatic 
consciousness.
56
 The mirage-like nature of the shifting sands outside invades not only the 
solitary mind in imprisonment but infiltrates the comforting privacy of the home as the 
couple lie together, Laon is plagued by malevolent dreams in which he imagines being 
accosted by evil forms birthed from the lowest depths of society:  
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the gaping earth then vomited/Legions of foul and ghastly shapes, which 
hung/Upon my flight; and ever, as we fled,/They plucked at Cythna--
soon to me then clung/A sense of actual things those monstrous dreams 
among
57
  
kkkThe safety of this imagined assault is broken when those phantoms manifest in the real 
world under the guise of Othman’s guards who lead both lovers to their respective 
punishments: ‘I rose, and all the cottage crowded found/With armed men, whose glittering 
swords were bare’.58 Clearly the dream does not instigate the raid but rather the sense of 
dread intuited in sleep from the soldiers already present generated these disturbing images 
and thus, the structure mocks the notion that cause and effect happens within a linear chain 
for whatever we take to proceed an event is not necessarily its cause since lack of 
understanding as to the complete context or a lapse in concentration results in faulty 
judgements. Likewise, when Laon is captured, he envisions both the ghost of Cythna as well 
as an old hermit with the former remaining nothing more than an apparition
59
 whilst the latter 
is revealed to be an actual human come to save the fallen protagonist
60
 and so, regardless as 
to whether one is more believable than the other, the reader is presented with a good omen 
and a bad omen but only one materialises into existence. This coincidence resembles the 
earthquake that miraculously intervenes to save Cythna purely because the plot demands it 
and, without such narrative aids, the larger commentary on revolution and idealism would 
remain unfulfilled. In all these instances, Shelley exploits literature’s fictionality to depict 
reality as merely an extension of dreaming wherein the line between consciousness and 
subconsciousness is blurred until both become inextricably linked and objective cause and 
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effect is exposed as unreliable given its reliance on intuited perspective disguised as 
empirical observation.                                                                                                                                  
kkkIt serves to contextualise this unpredictable causality within an Ash’arite perspective to 
better comprehend the impact of displacing theological reference points amongst different 
value systems. In Ash’ari thought, the relation of the prime cause to its secondary effects is 
conceptualised in such a way as to grant Allah primary power when realising and shaping all 
worldly events, ‘[i]t is He Who sends down water from the sky. With it We produce the 
shoots of each plant, then bring greenery from it, and from that We bring out grains’,61 
coupled with an acknowledgement that means (by way of angels) are employed to achieve 
the intended results not out of necessity but as part of a sunnah (habit) that Allah has 
established within the universe. The secondary causes are presented as possessing no will of 
their own, no internal capacity to alter their nature or generate effects outside of Allah’s 
decree and thus, some more seminal instances of angelic intervention to produce certain 
outcomes, are mentioned directly in the Qur’an from the Battle of Badr62 to the Angel of 
Death.
63
 The notion that natural laws are customary by design rather than necessity and the 
relegation of all creative control in the production of events to Allah as the One who sustains 
not only outward appearance but innate properties results in the Ash’arite’s atomistic 
occasionalism that states although we perceive habitual processes in creation those effects 
must be continually recreated by Allah otherwise they could be said to exist independently 
which, in contrast to the mechanistic clockmaker of the Deists, indicates God is perpetually 
engaged with His creation. The scepticism of causality within Islamic philosophy does not 
reveal an abyss in place of the Transcendent, instead God remains the unfathomable but 
nevertheless emotionally approachable and ontologically immutable centre through which all 
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worldly effects converge and without which universal laws would cease to persist. For al-
Ghazali, causal relationships are a formality expressing an action taking place on a 
transcendent level to the extent that sufficient conditions such as fire for burning, death for 
decomposition, or medicine for cure, are said to be inactive without the compelling and 
binding force of Allah creating action and determining reaction for they are themselves 
fraught with instability and impermanence. Al-Ghazali presents his argument for the 
grounding for causality being a supreme power as such: 
[There are] among the principles of existence grounds and causes from 
which these [observable] events emanate when a contact between them 
takes place [these principles], however, are permanent, never ceasing to 
exist; […] they are not moving bodies that would set; [and were they] 
either to cease to exist or to set, we would apprehend the dissociation 
[between the temporal events] and would understand that there is a cause 
beyond what we observe
64
 
kkkThis does not suggest properties are unnatural but as natural tools they are also 
instruments of God whose absence would result in them ceasing to possess any directedness, 
any consistency in form, and generally any type of presence let alone a meaningful role in 
existence: ‘nature is totally subject to God Most High: it does not act of itself but is used as 
an instrument by its Creator. The sun, moon, stars, and the elements are subject to God’s 
command: none of them effects any act by and of itself’.65                                                                                                           
kkkShelley’s reimagining of the Book of Fate frames this divinely driven scepticism of 
Islamic atomism in a manner which serves to maintain a transcendental absence rather than 
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presence;
66
 there are instances where Laon and Cythna pierce the outward veils and gain 
insight via the One Mind which illuminates creation not by exposing the ontological 
grounding of transcendent principles but, muted by the understanding that the individual 
mind dictates the form of illumination, provides a kind of knowing discernment. There is a 
collective emotionality that Cythna taps into which inevitably deepens her sensitivity to the 
suffering of others whilst also heightening her senses and generating a level of empathy 
which extends beyond the present moment to incorporate our shared past and future. As a 
result of this empathetic wisdom, she is granted a commanding presence derived from respect 
rather than fear with which she attempts to guide humanity towards a world of compassionate 
union governed by freethought: ‘I grew/Familiar with the shock and the surprise/And war of 
earthly minds, from which I drew/The power which has been mine to frame their thoughts 
anew.
67
 The Book of Fate becomes the One Mind witnessing its instantiation within the 
innumerable intelligences constituting humanity’s course over time as the individual psyche’s 
themselves preferably realise that thought and feeling is all that can be known due to their 
relation to the subjective realm. Conversely, the empirical world contains forces not only 
beyond our control but our intellectual reach subsisting as separate from human thought 
whilst partly intuited on some level through reason. Causality as part of the (presumed) 
objective sphere is characterised as repeatable in the same way that mathematical constants 
are taken as universally applicable with variances classed as anomalies whilst the One Mind 
denotes a universe where the thoughts and emotions of each individual are refracted and 
reflected off one another and where self-autonomy or the choices of others are all perpetually 
intertwined in a disjointed bond of sympathy rather than a linear chain of influence:  
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[m]y mind became the book through which I grew/ Wise in all human 
wisdom, and its cave,/ Which like a mine I rifled through and 
through,/To me the keeping of its secrets gave--/One mind, the type of 
all, the moveless wave/Whose calm reflects all moving things
68
  
kkkThere is an intuited causality in the effect of sense impressions passively being absorbed 
by an individual before becoming personal as they internalise those stimuli and engage their 
will with the object of thought indicated in Shelley’s conceptualisation of Man’s relation to 
the universe as, ‘an instrument over which a series of external and internal impressions are 
driven.’69 Aditionally, there is an internal movement from apprehension to reflection which 
retains a sense of autonomy within an otherwise unconscious process. In this split between 
active and passive participation, Frederick Burwick notes how worldly causality is, 
‘redefined as [a] reflexive [and] self-imposed’,70 state which can be influenced by the subject 
based on their perspective and so, a figure like Prometheus is capable of terminating his curse 
by acknowledging the tangible influence language possesses over seemingly cosmic and 
immutable events wherein a command of words becomes synonymous with command over 
self: ‘“[i]f then my words had power,/ […] let them not lose it now!”’.71 Prometheus and 
Cythna symbolises an undercurrent within Shelleyan thought that attains self-empowerment 
through language by exposing a psychological inroad into, not only challenging the objective 
existence of causality, but one which retains a portion of human emotionality when 
perceiving reality as a counteractive force against more undeniably deterministic factors 
guiding outcomes (e.g. parents, inherited social issues and birth defects). Hence, even though 
Shelley, ‘still regarded some form of Necessity as a strong and perhaps ineluctable force in 
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human social organization,’72 there is a sense in which Prometheus, Laon and Cythna are a 
contributing factor in the eventual outcome of Necessity but more so as a mind responding to 
events and enabling the conditions for a cause to have effect rather than a progenitor of the 
cause in question.                                                                                                                      
kkkAppealing to this Oriental inversion of the Qur’an, the psychological ‘book of fate’ is 
granted interpretive primacy once it distances itself from the voices of revealed religion, 
priestcraft and government to: ‘in silence turn,/ And read the blood-stained charter of all 
woe,/ Which nature soon, with recreating hand,/ Will blot in mercy from the book of earth’.73 
The mind-as-text works in tandem with the book of nature to fill in the blank pages of the 
other as the non-linguistic truths intuited in nature’s vast frame are rendered perceptible by 
poets: ‘all things speak/ Peace, harmony, and love. The universe,/ In nature's silent 
eloquence, declares/ That all fulfil the works of love and joy, –/ All but the outcast man’.74 
Poetry might transcribe the language of nature into a fixed form but it also allows the silence 
to persist inasmuch as the audience are encouraged to interpret the text, with as little 
mediation from the poet as possible, so that their voice adds a unique perspective to the 
plethora of emotional responses constituting the One Mind: ‘making the text the catalyst to 
the reader's interpretive parole rather than the encoding of Shelley's langue’.75 A space is 
fostered which, if not empty, silently gestures towards the audience who persist after the text 
concludes to write their own interpretation aided by a positively charged inspiration rather 
than a replicable template because: ‘all poetic veils ultimately tear away to reveal another 
silence at the end of the work […] and the entire [piece] takes on its fullest composite form in 
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the mind of the listener or reader’.76 Whereas, the disdain towards imposing a rational system 
upon Allah’s creation characterising Ash’arite occasionalism is a means of elevating Allah 
from becoming simply an object of human intellect and in turn, enabling the Creator to 
express Himself according to His own Sunnah (habit) as opposed to being confined within 
causal assumptions intuited by finite human minds.                                                                                                    
kkkBoth Ash’ari thinkers and Shelley employ their respective atomistic theories out of an 
appreciation for the intricacy of Necessity as charactiersed not by mechanistic processes 
wholly predictable and deceptively simple but rather tied to an order which is beyond human 
comprehension to quantify as it is nonlinear and nonprogrammatic and entails habits or 
patterns that will not definitively reoccur. The main interest of the Ash’arites was 
safeguarding monotheism resulting in their scepticism regarding causality which, in 
recognising effects as contingent on Allah’s discretion of judgment, establishes a metaphysics 
where natural laws could be relied upon for the sake of science or mathematics but only on 
the understanding that there is a supernatural order which is alone capable of miraculously 
shaping providence. Consequently, the universe is marked by contingency and dependency to 
the extent that its essential identity is in direct contrast to the independence and self-
sufficiency which characterises Allah’s Essence. Conversely, Shelley frames religious belief 
as solipsistic in nature, inculcating an uncritical desire to maintain the status quo due to an 
innate trust in a grander design: ‘they all pined in bondage; body and soul,/Tyrant and slave, 
victim and torturer, bent/Before one Power, to which supreme control/Over their will by their 
own weakness lent’.77 He hopes others denounce this form of slave morality disguised under 
the banner of sublime unity by humanising Necessity as being driven by mankind’s flawed 
but complex emotional response to life events rather than the immutable Will of an eternal 
Sovereign. There is an air of destiny in the cycles of good and evil that cultivate, on a 
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universal level, certain minds to be fitted for the age they are assigned to and thus, without 
individuals harnessing the latent potentiality inhering within them, revolutions inevitably fail 
not due to a divine degree but as a consequence of factors not aligning or being sufficient 
enough to produce the desired effect. Therefore, alongside Cythna’s propensity to 
detranscendentalise tropes grounded in superstition, Shelley maintains an inward attunement 
to something greater – a desire to re-establish harmony – as the sole purpose and value 
through which a successful life can be determined: ‘[a] child most infantine,/Yet wandering 
far beyond that innocent age/In all but its sweet looks and mien divine;/Even then, 
methought, with the world's tyrant rage/A patient warfare thy young heart did wage’.78 The 
individual must not only respond appropriately to their context in order to achieve this goal 
successfully but also clarify over time what exactly they are being compelled to achieve and 
how they intend to liberate hearts or cultivate communities with the aptitudes and 
shortcomings their natural disposition affords them. Unlike the continuous resurfacing of 
prophecy within Sunni historiography driven by Allah’s capacity to overturn the outwardly 
established order, Shelley establishes historic cycle of disparate revolutionary wills coming 
into and going out of existence and who leave traces of themselves in subsequent uprisings 
whilst never being collectively reified into a transcendent signifier. This Lucretian pattern of 
atomic diversity conceives of nature as produced out of a non-totalisable multiplicity and 
thus, hope can arise from stagnation through a swerve in the status quo. Prior radical voices 
can still be contemporary if the mind is reminded to think poetically in order to cultivate 
sympathetic bonds and in doing so, maintain interconnectivity amongst nature’s atomic 
strands. Islamic and Lucretian atomism posit a dynamic of emergence and disintegration 
underlying phenemonal reality but the former maintains this flux by assuming an overarching 
harmony in the form of God, the latter disenchants this theological notion by attributing such 
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volatility to physical processes (i.e. the coalescing and disbanding of atoms) which are 
infused, for Shelley, with added instability as a result of his sceptical epistemology.          
Summary 
kkkThe commentary on fatalism which emerges from The Revolt indicates that although 
revolutions may be lost from the outset, so too are revolutionary minds fated to eventually re-
emerge during times of despotism which, in turn, generates an unthinking yet unbreakable 
causal chain where: ‘Necessity, whose sightless strength for ever/Evil with evil, good with 
good must wind/In bands of union, which no power may sever’.79 Despite mankind’s 
visionary capacity to transcend their attachment to an objective existence in favour of 
formulating and artistically contributing their own version of said reality, Shelley’s 
necessitarian tendencies serve as a reminder that even the most creative individuals are 
constituted by predetermined physical, geographical, and contextual factors, as well as being 
subsequently shaped by equally uncontrollable events. It is this balance between scepticism 
and idealism that prevents the Shelleyan paradox from lapsing into hypocrisy and instead, 
allows his intellectual and imaginative sensibility to perpetually coexist rather than subsisting 
in spite of one another. Shelley chooses to personify both the worldviews he wishes to 
believe in as necessary fictions and the philosophical concepts that satisfy his reason. Such 
conflicting allegiances coincide with a need to poeticise the most appropriate values in 
service of his artistic vision at any particular instance. This reimagining of determinism seeks 
to maintain free will whilst also being attuned to the multitude of unknowable forces 
constituting life’s mysteries without allowing them to be affixed or directed by a singular 
manifestation of Power. There is both an emotional drive to will change enacted by humanity 
as well as a shared dependency on the actualising power of Necessity to materialise and 
determine the shape of such willpower characteristic of Shelley’s greater desire to achieve 
                                                          
79
 Ibid, canto 9, stanza xxvii, lines 3708-10, p. 206. 
209 
 
balance between reality and ideality or self-determination and Fatalism wherein: ‘[f]ortitude, 
endurance, hope, love are all of vital consequence; but they are not by themselves 
determining. The mood must coincide with the moment, the spirit with the hour’.80                                                      
kkkThe core transvaluative act taking place when Shelley has Cythna internalise and 
subjectivise the Book of Fate is a re-evaluation of submission to the Will of a Transcendent 
Power into a harnessing of some universal revolutionary spirit for the sake of conjuring 
beauty in response to injustice within blind cycles of perpetual war between good and evil. 
The mirage-like quality of his fluctuating Oriental selves emphasises the futility of pronouns 
when distinguishing cause and effect in order to maintain a negative sublime and de-
emphasise tendencies towards erecting a hierarchical structure. Shelley perceives the desert 
as a Lucretian void (or, in this case the world configured as a nourishing darkness) not 
enlivened and sustained by the spirit of an Absolute Existent but an empty expanse upon 
which reform is enacted by the human spirit of creativity. The poet praises such freedom 
afforded by cosmological vacancy which counteracts any propensity to seek homogeneity in 
service of an external, immaterial One and reject uncritically accepted conventions founded 
on terror and confusion as stated in the Lucretian epigraph Primum quod magnis doceo de 
rebus; et arctis Religionum animos nodis exsolvere pergo (I tell of great matters, and I shall 
go on to free men's minds from the crippling bonds of superstitions). Although Shelley 
inherits certain Oriental tropes (e.g. the association of rule with despotism) he depicts the 
desert as a space of potential freedom where people are no longer bound by custom or 
institutionalised thought which cultivates the type of freethinking encouraged by Lucretius’s 
atomistic universe. There is a tangible vivacity in The Revolt that often overpowers the 
typically solipsistic depiction of an Oriental landscape for the desert landscape fosters 
engaged minds like Cythna, Laon and their revolutionary band of mercenaries who seek to 
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enact change amongst those most disenfranchised and are provided an intrinsically malleable 
(i.e. shifting) zone within which to enact that uprising. The divergence in thought, therefore, 
can be understood as a byproduct of Shelley’s radical sceptical idealism leading him to 
believe, ‘what is needed is not to fill a void, but to evacuate one, to forget’,81  indicating that 
his standard for humanity (the prototypical Prometheus) does not steal the knowledge of fire 
from the god’s for the sake of Enlightenment in the sense of replacing one monolithic 
cosmology for another but rather burns away old systems and, from those ashes, continues to 
amalgamate new patterns of thought into a flexible mythography that prioritises human 
interpretive power. The God that emerges from this rational metaphysics is a pervasive spirit 
of love constituted by human emotion as opposed to constituting its source, ‘[o]h, that this 
deity were the soul of the universe, the spirit of universal, imperishable love! Indeed I believe 
it is’,82 and comes to know itself within history as each generation adds to the unfolding of 
human consciousness made sublime. To acknowledge a deity external to the human mind, 
Shelley feared, would instil a false consciousness within the heart of man which emphasised 
devotion to ecclesiastical dictates concerning correct behaviour and in turn, direct attention 
away from the goodness of humanity which would encourage true self-improvement. 
Therefore, although Shelley’s thought can sometimes be construed as Utopian due to his 
insistence on mankind’s promethean ability to enact change and spread positivity without 
Divine intervention, the price for self-determination is a looming uncertainty as to whether 
history will progress incessantly or whether subsequent generations will choose violence, 
loathing and retribution, over respect, optimism, and peace: ‘[historical development] must 
remain provisional; for [the] human being itself is a perennially provisional creation’.83 If 
poetry signifies the pinnacle of human creativity, due to its ability to straddle the line between 
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spontaneous emotion and formal expression, and if history denotes the unfolding of human 
emotion on an atemporal plane of existence, then the development of poetry becomes 
inseparable from the development of mankind as individuals contribute not just to a 
collective consciousness but a collective text: ‘[the] great poem, which all poets, like the co-
operating thoughts of one great mind, have built up since the beginning of the world’.84   
kkkCythna displaces the Divinity behind this pluraity in favour of a positivistic and 
naturalistic materialism that, even though sceptical of  the possibility of an objectively 
knowable phenomenal world,  is primarily concerned with immanence given that the aim of 
poetry is to, ‘[defeat] the curse which binds us to be subjected to the accident of surrounding 
impressions [...] purg[ing] from our inward sight the film of familiarity’,85 emphasising the 
embodied nature of perception as constituted by, as well as constituting, existence. In this 
schema, reality is sufficiently dynamic, non-linear and inscrutable without needing to account 
for an idealistic metaphysics by invoking an all-encompassing entity as Berkeley and Ash’ari 
theologians are led to do. The function of Prometheus or Cythna within Shelley’s 
mythography – revolutionary poets calling others to reclaim thought or language as their own 
– stems from his democritisation of language as de-transcendentalised or, in other words, 
language as free from the eternal duality of Signified and Signifier. What emerges from The 
Revolt and Prometheus Unbound is a universe where definition is mutable due to the titular 
hero’s displacement of language from the archetypally divine realm to the realm of human 
experience. In either case, mankind is urged to employ thought as a means of altering their 
mental landscape and in turn, contribute on a social level by psychologically combating 
against monarchical forms of ideology through a belief in metaphor rather than metaphysics. 
Although Shelley does not entirely dismiss the sense of an existence or existent beyond 
perception, his humanism causes him to anthropomorphise the sacred by elevating emotion 
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and imagination to the level of universal principles which compel creation and actualise 
potentiality whilst dismantling institutionalised superstition by positing that Love, Liberty or 
Necessity are reliant on their human counterparts to be granted expression: ‘spirit is [...] 
within [...] co-existing, co-eternal, in every way equal: unenslaved, unenslavable, unbowed 
and boundless’.86 Conversely, in positioning Allah as possessing absolute power and 
ownership over mind and reality  (creating both human cognition as well as extramental 
objects) revelation becomes the precedent by which transcendent meanings can be mapped 
onto human cognition with exegesis (whether outlined poetically or prosaically) serving to 
bridge the hermeneutical gap between God’s eternal expression and its linguistic 
manifestation as well as determine how this message resonates with ideas already derived 
from experience: ‘theology [becomes] less about human cognition and reason and more about 
what God [does] with human mental contents’.87 Cythna’s mental Book of Fate is poetic 
rather than revelatory as Shelley attempts to overcome the, ‘passivity or inertness of 
substances, the exclusive reference of all causal operations to God, [and] the 
intransmissibility of accidents’,88 perceived in the Islamic attempts to uphold Allah’s creative 
freedom. The transvalued book exists not at a pre-mortal and archetypal level in the 
Knowledge of God but subsists at the level of the One Mind as a means of signalling 
humanity’s creative freedom to author reality whilst also acknowledging the indebtedness of 
each individual to the minds that have shaped the world prior to their existence. Existence 
already poses a considerable burden upon humanity through contextually imposed constraints 
and expectations, whether social, mental or physical, without also imposing upon oneself a 
restraining Will that supersedes our ability to act or think of our accord. Humanity is tasked 
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with holding themselves accountable for how they react when faced with life choices despite 
also acknowledging Necessity might impose hardships indifferent to their current situation. 
Patterns become discernible over time inevitably leading to a sense of predictability which 
fuels further reinvigoration. Rather than becoming disheartened at the futility of such 
decision making in light of an eventual death mankind must instead, ‘burst the chains which 
life for ever flings/On the entangled soul's aspiring wings,’ for it is only when we are no 
longer a, ‘careless slave of that dark power which brings/Evil’, that mankind may laugh, ‘o'er 
the grave in which his living hopes are laid’89 and avoid relinquishing agency to an abstracted 
phenomena: ‘[a] fate/Which made them abject [but] in such faith, some steadfast joy to 
know’.90 In transvaluing this Islamic concept through The Revolt, Shelley is furthering his 
own mythographic, universalising aim to promote the Divinity in creativity without reifying 
it to the level of a deity by continuously grounding feeling and the faculty of choice in an 
awareness of mankind’s faults and situatedness. 
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Chapter 6 
Shelley’s Jihad: Pacifism Through Poetry and Spiritual Transsexualism in The Revolt of 
Islam 
kkkIn his study, Playing the Fool: Subversive Laughter in Troubled Times, Ralph Lerner 
examines Francis Bacon’s lamentation of Christianity’s waning influence within the social 
sphere born from a meek contentedness, ‘a religion, shorn of majesty, that knows its place 
and minds its manners’,1 which he seeks to enliven with his own vision for a society where 
religion serves as a structural device to govern social morals but for the sake of what Bacon 
deems sacred (i.e. reason, philosophy and science). Bacon’s usage of Christian imagery when 
outlining his project, such as light and salvation, no longer signify divine knowledge or 
sacrifice but rather, become means of elevating mankind’s creative ability to imagine new 
worlds and uncover old ones with the prospect of such enlightened minds developing a utopia 
that is attainable in this life as opposed to the hereafter, governed by a ‘public policy, not 
particularly humane, but broadly and visibly humanitarian [whilst] relentless[ly] refocusing 
of people's thoughts and acts on bodily well-being in this world’.2 Lerner conceives of 
Bacon’s, ‘An Advertisement Touching a Holy War’ (1629), as a ‘jihad’3 against traditional 
forms of governance and religion reflecting the political and theological break from perceived 
conventions signified by Islam and the transformation it sought to enact both in the idolatrous 
marketplace of Mecca as well as the anthropomorphising doctrines of Christianity by 
cultivating a nation that could carry out ‘an empire-building campaign’4 not under the yoke of 
monarchy or clergy but through merging, ‘philosophy, politics, and religion alike [and in 
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turn,] remaking [...] the world and [...] man's place in it’.5 Echoing Lerner’s interpretation of 
Bacon as channelling an Islamic spirit in his call for social reform, I intend to approach 
Shelley’s statement regarding The Revolt as composed, ‘without much attempt at minute 
delineation of Mahometan manners’,6 by assessing the impact of his authorial decision to 
present his own beau ideal revolution through the spectrum of an Islamic reformation 
indicating an ideological rather than physical conflict as Laon and Cythna, through their 
words and character, seek to redefine uncritically accepted social or religious concepts until 
the ‘Book of Fate’ becomes the Book of Mind,7 and holy warfare becomes a ‘patient 
warfare’.8 It would be shortsighted to argue that, by admitting no intentional relation between 
the history constituting the tropes and his presentation of them, Shelley invalidates any 
reading which seeks to reconstruct Islamic voices as interpretive avenues for understanding 
the ethos of his Eastern poem for such an approach fails to appreciate the self-aware 
continuity implicit within Shelley’s mythopoetics, a phenomena William Ulmer applies to 
Prometheus Unbound and which is equally appropriate to describing the dynamics at play in 
The Revolt:  
[Shelley] validates the conservative conventions [he] criticizes [...] in the 
very act of choosing them for criticism [and his] demythologization of 
myth, in the instant of its accomplishment, becomes another myth whose 
relation to the past is potentially as continuous as it is discontinuous
9
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kkkIn the previous chapter, I discussed Shelley’s transvaluation in relation to the Book of 
Fate (i.e. cause and effect), in this section I intend to contextualise how those more abstract 
findings relate to worldly affairs with the key term, ‘holy warfare’,10 being the linchpin 
through which all other concerns are filtered whether it be the honour and aftermath of 
martyrdom when fighting to maintain a set of values or the use of rhetoric over force when 
conducting a successful revolution at a domestic and foreign level. Even more so than Bacon, 
Shelley is choosing to frame his project of intellectual reform in terms of a holy war that 
establishes its identity by directly distinguishing, as well as aligning, itself with different 
aspects of a perceived Islamic conceptualisation of the term which is reflected both by 
Othman’s fatalistic theocracy as well as Laon and Cythna’s zealous enthusiasm to 
reconfigure national identity as a move away from superstition and idolatry towards an 
appreciation of language’s sublimity. I initially intend to explore a comparative analysis of 
Muhammad’s conquest of Mecca and Laon and Cythna’s deposition of Othman to gain 
insight as to how they, as messengers, differ or cohere at a behavioural and ideological level. 
I shall complement this broader historical examination of character with a section outlining 
their specific messages in relation to what ideals they are fighting for in order to determine 
whether these theoretical viewpoints, when translated into real world scenarios, are 
maintained.                                                                                                          kkk                              
kkkOn the one hand, Shelley employs Islam as a signifier for how sublime intentions risk 
being destroyed by fanaticism replete with its own institutionalised issues from superstition to 
arrogance that could plague even Athenian society; on the other hand, his transfiguration of 
religious martyrdom at the end of the piece indicates an awareness that Islam did not die out 
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during the early calpihate but rather continued to thrive in numbers.
11
 In having his 
protagonists echo Islamic personages as well as reappropriate Islamic discourse with 
alterations, it enables him to call upon its example for both the positive qualities and 
cautionary lessons it can provide for a new set of people and circumstances within the stream 
of thought. In channelling Islam to reconstruct a lost European identity, The Revolt becomes 
Shelley’s subversive call to a new jihad (denoting not simply views on warfare but also 
incorporating a holistic vision of reform) that delves into an individual’s reasons for 
struggling during their daily life as well as through cataclysmic events – whether governed by 
metaphysical beliefs or personal moral judgements – and cohesively encapsulates his grander 
aspiration to inculcate within humanity: ‘a virtuous enthusiasm [i.e. zealous piety] for those 
doctrines of liberty and justice, that faith and hope in something good, which neither 
violence, nor misrepresentation, nor prejudice, can ever totally extinguish among mankind’.12 
The resulting narrative creates a textual space where the identity of Islam as well as 
Europeanness are being simultaneously critiqued and transfigured in light of one another with 
such ‘metahistorical’ bond being mediated through the romance and epic narrative format 
which both rely on an allegorical temporality where characters and settings are on the cusp of 
fact and myth: ‘based on [an] interpretation of the past [subsequently] project[ed] into an 
idealised vision of Europe’s potential future’.13 In other words, Shelley is exploring an 
Oriental Other to trace what constitutes Europeanness but the universalising element which 
foregrounds human decency and refined sensibilities as not being the property of a single 
civilisation prevents this dynamic from becoming too polarising since Laon and Cythna are 
shown to be developing a response to Othman’s rule using a modified version of the rhetoric 
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available to them (fatalism, submission, and armed aggression)  but recontextualising its 
usage as a form of retaining social relevancy whilst empowering a new set of values. The 
suggestion that Shelley is depicting Islam as already possessing the tools for both its 
redemption and destruction might be met with scepticism but, I would argue, it reflects a 
wider conflicting sentiment regarding the Eastern faiths split personality as equal parts 
ignorant and sublime, an inevitable paradox from a people who were esteemed as hospitable 
and derided as hostile.                                                                                                                    
kkkEdward Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire emblematises the 
inconsistent impression of Islam through contemporary attitudes towards the prophet as 
simultaneously, ‘a solitary of Mount Hera, [a] preacher of Mecca, and [a] conqueror of 
Arabia,’14 whose following was gained through a doctrine that called to the, ‘same God who 
afflicts a sinful world with pestilence and earthquakes’,15 but also theologically rationalised 
Arab understanding of the transcendent to generate, ‘a creed too sublime, perhaps’, positing a 
Creator unaffected by idolatry, ‘abstracted from the unknown substance [of] all ideas of time 
and space, of motion and matter, of sensation and reflection’.16 It is this perceived dual 
identity of spiritual simplicity paired with complex ambitions that generated early schisms in 
the community after the loss of the prophet who functioned as a vessel to synthesise such 
behavioural and intellectual conflicts through a singular, undiluted vision: ‘Arabia, free at 
home and formidable abroad, might have flourished under a succession of her native 
monarchs. Her sovereignty was lost by the extent and rapidity of conquest’.17 The setting is 
also granted a split personality of its own as Paul Stock notes the synergistic quality of 
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Constantinople being a border zone between Europe and Asia, ‘neither simply a disguised 
European city in the throes of revolution, nor an example of authoritarian Oriental rule; 
rather, it is a combination of both’, and yet, this conceptual bridge between nations quickly 
becomes signposted so as to perpetuate strict boundaries which essentialise either side and 
undercuts any meaningful crossings, the dynamic is assumed to be characterised by: ‘a 
European history (presenting an ideal of past, and the possibility of future, revolutions) and as 
a non-European “other” – an unenlightened oppressive state, opposed to liberty and 
revolution’.18 Stock’s recognition that there exists a mutually constitutive element in the 
relation between the East and the West as presented in the poem remains geographically 
isolated, ideologically polarised and his metahistory is divorced from Shelley’s mythopoetics. 
The Conquest of Mecca and the Deposition of Othman 
kkkGibbon’s biography of Muhammad in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 
provides a suitable, contemporary reference point that Shelley would have been exposed to 
when outlining Laon and Cythna (their character, uprising and setbacks) and reveals how 
Islam did not simply provide a title but an, ‘author of a mighty revolution appears to have 
been endowed with a pious and contemplative disposition,’19 whose values and life 
experiences enabled Shelley to convey a particular message regarding the role of intellect and 
aggression in conducting a widespread shift in thought. The combination of Gibbon’s own 
opinions as well as his references to the companion’s own viewpoints depicts a man with an 
intrinsically different sensibility and belief system than those around him causing him to 
become a stranger in his own land despite being engaged on a social level, ‘Mahomet was 
addicted to religious contemplation [often withdrawing to] the cave of Hera, three miles from 
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Mecca’,20 indulging in sublime thoughts (Gibbon refrains from suggesting prophecy but a 
contemplative mind is at least granted)
21
 until he formulated a potent revolutionary message 
that both rewrote Arab national identity and offered an alternate power structure to the 
idolatrous political system practiced during his day. The basis of his community would 
become a, ‘congregation of Unitarians, who revered him as a prophet’, whose morale was 
satiated predominantly as a result of sublime language and its sonorous impact of its 
continued recitation, ‘he seasonably dispensed the spiritual nourishment of the Koran’, a 
mode of edifying his followers that, especially before the allowance of self-defence, ‘asserted 
the liberty of conscience, and disclaimed the use of religious violence.’22 Out of fear of his 
influence spreading, Abu Sufyan (leader of the Quraysh) called for Muhammad’s death 
which inevitably resulted in his exile to Medina as this, ‘holy outcast of Mecca’,23 gradually 
met more who believed in the same cause until, after ten years, they finally marched back to 
Mecca to dethrone those who had exiled them and broken their treatise but, ‘[i]nstead of 
indulging their passions and his own, the victorious exile forgave the guilt, and united the 
factions of Mecca’, and whlst there were a handful of casualties, these were ‘blamed [on] the 
cruelty of his lieutenant; and several of the most obnoxious victims were indebted for their 
lives to his clemency or contempt.’24 The immediate victory would be fleeting, however, as 
the Muslims were eventually surrounded by a nearby clan, the Hawazin, who perceived the 
gestation period of a newly installed government as the opportune moment to take control 
and channel the centralised rule that the Quraish had held for their own benefit and yet, after 
massacring countless believers, they were still unable to wrest control from a community who 
would go to great lengths to protect their prophet and their faith. I should stress that Shelley 
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chooses to disperse these responsibilities across Laon and Cythna as both fulfil the journey 
from exile to redemption (curtailed by treason) but the former is a vessel through which to 
narrate the atmosphere of conquest during Othman’s disposition whilst the latter practically 
amasses support through the force of rhetoric and so, despite functioning as a corollary to 
A’isha (Muhammad’s younger female companion), Cythna must also symbolise elements of 
the prophetic role due to Shelley’s thematic emphasis on revolution as driven by both 
genders. Apportioning the duties and narrative beats of an Eastern figurehead who previously 
redefined national identity between both characters does not dilute the pertinency of 
comparative analysis since Shelley intentionally amalgamates their journeys by creating the 
hybrid name of Laone, having both characters die for the other as if ontologically inseperable 
and intertwining their legacy during the metaphorical afterlife. I interpret The Revolt in light 
of how this general overview reveals a number of similarities between Muhammad and 
Laone (used here to signify their collective cause rather than simply denote Cythna); both 
were presented as revolutionaries whose messages imbued language with sublimity as an 
affront to the idolatrous monarchy in their native land who dictated public access to the 
divine for the sake of commerce and control resulting in a forced exile (ten and seven years 
respectively). Whilst they were shunned by the respective leaders of their original 
communities, they slowly amassed enough solidarity amongst a fledgling group of 
likeminded supporters that they were able to return home and depose the tyrants in a 
predominantly pacifistic manner until nearby forces attempted to sabotage their victory with a 
surprise assault at which point their narratives diverge as Muhammad succeeded in 
maintaining control whereas Laone is driven to self-sacrifice.                                                                                                                          
kkkClosely examining the events during the overthrow of tyranny as well as the subsequent 
fallout highlights specific points where habLaon and Muhammad are confronted with similar 
situations and each reaction, when analysed in tandem, reveals the ideological impetus behind 
222 
 
their decision making and serves to determine which elements of their worldviews are 
compatible with one another. Upon being asked for help by an allied tribe of the Muslims 
after the Quraish had violated their peace treaty, the Prophet enlisted ten thousand men with a 
view to curtailing the oppression across the province that had been authored by Meccan 
leaders and the hope of establishing a community directed towards a transcendent unity rather 
than allegiances dispersed across a fractured pantheon of idols. Likewise, Laon is driven back 
to the gates of his native city upon hearing of a revolution that (unbeknownst to him) his 
‘second self’ has generated to overthrow the monarchy and establish equality for the sake of 
love, Shelley amplifies this image of a disenfranchised community that develops solidarity in 
response to being downtrodden and who desire for others the justice that they were so 
fervently denied. In moving together as one to face their oppressor they become an image of 
the ideals they hold to be true, ‘a nation/Made free by love;--a mighty brotherhood/Linked by 
a jealous interchange of good’,25 leading by example in their conduct both towards those who 
wronged them as well as those under the yoke of monarchy who, silent but complicit, 
changed their disposition after being exposed to such a display of sincerity: ‘their own hearts 
grow mild,/And did with soft attraction ever draw/Their spirits to the love of freedom's equal 
law’.26 Unlike the Qur’anic recitation which indicates divine providence is directing the 
succession, Laone’s congregation are guided by, '[t]he friend and the preserver of the free!,’ 
and, on a more sublime scale, driven by an immense feeling of liberty which, although simply 
a principle, is realised to such an extent through the newfound community that it gains some 
existential value as it colours perception in a manner both subjective and collectively sensed: 
‘[t]he light of a great spirit, round me shone;/And all the shapes of this grand scenery 
shifted/Like restless clouds before the steadfast sun’.27                                                            
kkkRegarding the actual deposition that took place in Mecca, not only was general amnesty 
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granted to the population but the ‘chiefs of the Koreish’, after having acknowledged they 
could neither overwhelm the Muslim troops nor justify their prior condemnation towards 
them, were decidedly at the mercy of the prophet’s discretion when responding to the 
question, ‘“[w]hat mercy can you expect from the man whom you have wronged?"’, to which 
they replied with a general plea to forgiveness, ‘“we confide in the generosity of our 
kinsman"’, and in turn, received a collected response, ‘“[a]nd you shall not confide in vain: 
begone! you are safe, you are free”’.28 In a similar manner, the Prophet chastises an officer 
who becomes overly enamoured with the thought of conquest without considering the 
etiquette behind their expedition, stating ‘[t]oday is the day of battle. Today your lives and 
property are treated to be lawful (for Muslims)’, resulting in Muhammad stripping him of his 
position as such a reaction could tarnish their reason for revolt which, as highlighted in a 
sermon following their victory, was to establish a common bond where piety rather than 
wealth or clan would structure this Adamic fellowship, ‘[p]eople, We created you all from a 
single man and a single woman, and made you into races and tribes so that you should get to 
know one another’.29 Laon finds himself in a similar situation where certain members of the 
community call for justice through vengeance, ‘[a]nd he is fallen!' they cry, 'he who did 
dwell/Like famine or the plague [...] he is here!/Sunk in a gulf of scorn from which none may 
him rear!'’,30 prompting Laon to debate their morality should they wish to inflict the same 
hardship commited against them upon another party purely because the power dynamic has 
shifted rather than using this as an opportunity to demolish old institutions and erect 
monuments of the heart to Mother Earth:  
[w]hat do ye seek? [...] that ye should shed/The blood of Othman? [...] 
This one poor lonely man--beneath Heaven spread/In purest light above 
                                                          
28
 The History of the Decline and Fall, p. 531. 
29
 Muhammad Abdel-Haleem, The Qurʾan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49: 13, p. 339. 
30
 The Revolt of Islam, canto 5, stanza xxxi, line 1993-98, p. 108. 
224 
 
us all, through earth--/Maternal earth, who doth her sweet smiles 
shed/For all, let him go free
31
 
kkkIn either case, their reasons for reform overlap on a broad scale with regards to instigating 
a new era founded on a revised framework of timeless principles that wipes away past blood 
feuds and yet, when Cythna proclaims, 'Victory, Victory to the prostrate nations!/Bear 
witness Night, and ye mute Constellations’,32 Shelley is signalling a split between the Muslim 
community and his own band of revolutionaries for their wondrous submission is not directed 
towards a transcendent cosmic entity, the stars are unresponsive, instead they dethrone the 
patriarchal image of a kingly God along with their worldly representatives to empower 
humanity through an awareness of universal values: ‘[a]lmighty Fear,/The Fiend-God, when 
our charmed name he hear,/Shall fade like shadow from his thousand fanes,/While Truth with 
Joy enthroned o'er his lost empire reigns!'.
33
 Cythna, in particular, exposes the mental 
shadows imposed by institutions who benefit from monolithic worldviews with a clear 
ontological hierarchy for it enables sovereignty to be more easily wrested from the masses 
through a risk-reward dynamic where morality is inculcated through blame and those most 
sincere remain fixated on procuring recompense for the hereafter as opposed to infusing this 
world with beauty, wisdom and art: ‘mak[ing] this Earth, our home, more beautiful,/And 
[using] Science, and her sister Poesy,/[to] clothe in light the fields and cities of the free!’.34 
Both are revolutions of the mind since they encourage their people to question whether the 
identity unwittingly absorbed through immediate context alone is necessarily correct but they 
differ in that Muhammad called to this altered perception as a way of glorifying the Creator 
of mind whereas Laone’s movement is ushering an era where mind itself is glorified: ‘[t]he 
dawn of mind [...] far illumines space,/And clasps this barren world in its own bright 
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embrace!’.35                                                                                      kkk                                                         
kkkFollowing the deposition, neighbouring tribes disrupted the supposed calm of victory by 
launching a precautionary assault on Mecca out of a worry that this governance would spread 
its new mindset further afield, ‘[f]our thousand Pagans advanced with secrecy and speed to 
surprise the conqueror’, catching Muhammad and his followers offguard and slaughtering 
their forces by breaking them apart, ‘[the Muslims] numbers were oppressed, their discipline 
was confounded, their courage was appalled, and the Koreish smiled at their impending 
destruction’, until eventually the Prophet and his uncle ‘Abbas called out for renewed effort 
which strengthened morale and turned turned the tide, ‘the furnace was again rekindled: his 
conduct and example restored the battle’.36 The Qur’anic account of this battle attributes the 
Muslims renewed vigour not to Muhammad or Abbass’ rallying cries since those are outward 
expressions gesturing towards the actual angellic intercession which took place serving as a 
reminder that, despite their victory and physical strength, they still needed God’s aid:  
[y]ou were well pleased with your large numbers, but they were of no use 
to you: the earth seemed to close in on you despite its spaciousness, and 
you turned tail and fled. Then God sent His calm down to to His 
Messenger [...] and He sent down invisible forces
37
  
kkkThis rude awakening upon presumed success is replicated in The Revolt as Laon hears the 
tormented cries of his community besieged by a foreign army seeking revenge for the sake of 
Othman, ‘rallying cries of treason and of danger/Resounded: and - 'They come! to arms! to 
arms!/The Tyrant is amongst us, and the stranger/Comes to enslave us in his name! to 
arms!’,38 he responds by surrounding himself with his closest allies in a show of solidarity 
that would come to echo Peterloo: ‘[i]mmovably we stood--in joy [...]The old man whom I 
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loved--his eyes divine/With a mild look of courage answered mine/And [...] now the line/Of 
war extended, to our rallying cry/As myriads flocked in love and brotherhood to die’.39 
Ironically, after many companions had been mercilessly slain, an angel similarly reveals itself 
in time to save Laon but she is human and not driven by divine providence but rather love of 
justice and hatred of oppression who, despite previously cultivating the rebellion on the basis 
of her sublime rhetoric, has reached a point where she is unable to influence anything beyond 
her own immediate actions: ‘[a] black Tartarian horse of giant frame/Comes trampling over 
the dead, the living bleed/Beneath the hoofs of that tremendous steed,/On which, like to an 
Angel, robed in white,/Sate one waving a sword’.40 The reunion is too late, however, as the 
remaining revolutionaries are pushed back into exile through fear of death and live their 
remaining days in solitude exchanging painful stories whilst a plague befalls those who 
carried out the attack not as evidence for karmic interference but rather a narrative device to 
satirise superstitious belief in sacrifice for divine aid as a contrast to the bond between Laon 
and Cythna that persists during hardship (and eventually death). The difference in outcome is 
emblematic of a larger disparity that haunts all prior overlapping events; namely, the 
metaphysical worldviews underpinning these narratives inevitably influences not only the 
directives of revolution but determine the potential number of available outcomes (i.e. the 
possibility for divine intervention) which is why Shelley is so adamant the poem is: ‘a mere 
human story without the smallest intermixture of supernatural interference’.41 The poet may 
praise love and equality as worthwhile values and might even deem them forces for change 
when channeled correctly but he has become deeply sceptical as to whether they can salvage 
uprisings on their nature alone. 
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What Constitutes Holy Warfare? 
kkkDelving into contemporary attitudes regarding Muhammad as a revolutionary poet-
prophet reveals a man who, even within a society where poets were the ‘historians and 
moralists of the age […] inspir[ing] and crown[ing] the virtues, of their countrymen’,42 was 
able to stimulate an unparalleled movement which attuned a faith-based morality to the 
literary sensibilities of the Arabs by placing himself in the, ‘more humble, yet more sublime 
[position] of a simple editor’, whose messages and policies were delivered piecemeal on an 
earthly plane whilst originally, ‘subsisting in the essence of the Deity, and inscribed with a 
pen of light on the table of his everlasting decrees’.43 Although the likes of Gibbon derided 
the Qur’an as being unimpressive to European sensibilities, ‘the European infidel [...] will 
peruse with impatience the endless incoherent rhapsody of fable, and precept, and 
declamation, which seldom excites a sentiment or an idea’, he marvels at the respect 
Muhammad was able to elicit by capturing and modifying the imagination of his own people: 
‘whose mind [became] attuned to faith and rapture; whose ear [was] delighted by the music 
[and] sounds [of its] sublime simplicity’.44 Especially during the early years of his message, 
when he was actively being persecuted, the Prophet incited new behaviour or refined old 
values largely on the basis of his sublime rhetoric and introspective character which enabled 
him to channel the Arabian hospitality into spreading charity amongst, ‘the animal creation 
[as well as] the indigent and unfortunate’, not only on the basis of, ‘merit, but as a strict and 
indispensable duty’, resulting in, ‘Mahomet, perhaps, [being] the only lawgiver who has 
defined the precise measure of charity’.45 Gibbon also notes how Muhammad reinforced 
positive characteristics of the pre-Islamic Arabian mindset including, ‘courage, patience, and 
sobriety [as well as] the love of independence [that] prompts [one] to exercise, the habits of 
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self-command,’46 becoming an example of those virtues through his conduct and worldview 
as someone who: ‘despised the pomp of royalty […] submitted to the menial offices of the 
family […] mended with his own hands his shoes and his woollen garment [and] observed, 
without effort or vanity, the abstemious diet of an Arab and a soldier’.47 Despite being 
considered the conqueror of Mecca, Muhammad was still perceived as having a relatively 
tempering effect on the, ‘sanguinary spirit [of tribal Arabia]’,48 through the sublime tonality 
of revelation coupled with his own tutelage, ‘he breathed among the faithful a spirit of charity 
and friendship; recommended the practice of social virtues; and checked, by his laws and 
precepts, the thirst of revenge’,49 and  even select moments of warfare throughout his career 
are justified in Gibbon’s mind as being the natural right of man, ‘to defend, by force of arms, 
his person and his possessions’, as well as the natural response of someone who, ‘had been 
despoiled and banished by the injustice of his countrymen’.50 At this point, any decision to 
resort to aggression needed to be sanctioned by a rightful political authority on the 
understanding that said force was temporary and directed towards re-establishing a state 
wherein Islam could be practiced and preached via more conducive methods whether it be 
contributing towards societal improvement (e.g. intellectual advancements) or written and 
spoken transmission of hadith and Qur’an.                                                                                   
kkkThe Qur’an became the central mode through which the Prophet restructured Arab self-
conceptualisation whether it be to address socio-political injustices (e.g. female infanticide), 
introduce the concept of proportionality in aggression
51
, or curtail the ongoing cycles of 
violence and lawless anarchism generated by inter-tribal warfare all for the sake of creating a 
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society where order was achieved not through fear of retribution but by elevating the honour 
of others as Adamic creatures and ultimately: ‘endow[ing the] human struggle to remake a 
common world with existential weight.
52
  In this sense, jihad is a linguistic as well as lived 
reality which necessitates struggle to understand and propagate religious texts (jihad bil 
Qur'an) as a means of establishing a scripturally literate society capable of critical thought as 
to the appropriate application of verses within a given period rather than relying upon forced 
conversion or uncritical submission due to a lack of appreciation for the multifaceted nature 
of exegesis. The concept of jihad came to signify a perpetual struggle against the demons 
within or a counter to the evil forces without, resulting in a predominantly introspective 
principle that is cognisant of the symbiotic relation between an individual’s state of mind and 
the collective body of a nation as harmonious integration of disparate parts and required those 
parts to maintain a sense of mutual understanding over certain common principles. In being 
able to protect the sovereignty of a people on a political level as well as establish individual 
sovereignty on a moral level a sense of camaraderie is cultivated with the goal of fostering a 
stable society just as the ability to make pilgrimage and stand in unison irrespective of social 
or cultural differences is an echo of the eventual levelling that will take place on the Day of 
Judgment. Striving in the way of Allah to improve societal conditions requires balancing both 
material as well as spiritual priorities with the wellbeing attained through worldly gains being 
perceived as a means towards the more vital metaphysical ends indicating that reform is 
individualistic, at heart, and collective, in expression, as each member seeks inward solace 
through engagement as part of a harmonious whole.                                                                       
kkkWhen turning to Shelley’s inversion of jihad, it is clear from the outset that his Oriental 
setting is  a place where holy warfare is an inevitable facet of life, ‘[h]ow, to that vast and 
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peopled city led,/Which was a field of holy warfare then,’53 whilst also offering a brief 
insight into the conflicting approaches that Othman’s troops or the titular heroes adopt when 
interpreting this term as the former brutalises those who oppose it, leaving behind a trail 
composed of ‘the dying and the dead’,54 whereas the latter is like, ‘an angel in the dragon's 
den’,  which is similarly ‘fearless’ but in a more self-sacrificing manner trying to uphold 
universal principles, ‘I braved death for liberty and truth’.55 Each response reveals their 
differing conceptions as to what constitutes an inviolable principle, how best to preserve 
those values in a manner befitting of their station and whether or not there are metaphysical 
repercussion from enacting either mindset. As the poem progresses the split becomes more 
apparent with the tyrannical will who is, ‘bent/Before one Power, to which supreme 
control/Over their will by their own weakness lent’, allowing pride over the majesty of what 
they hold sacred to fuel an overly protective, even obsessive, attachment that facilitates any 
disregards for the sanctity of their own sovereignty let alone others and deifying that which is 
deplorable, ‘[a]ll symbols of things evil, all divine’.56 By contrast, those for whom, ‘the 
heart’s warfare’, determines their actions will be engaged in internally transcribing, ‘life's 
various stor[ies]’, such as, ‘a mother's desolate wail/O'er her polluted child’, to expand their 
capacity for empathy and their sense of beloniging as part of the One Mind united in mutual 
benefit rather than exploitation: ‘gather[ing] food/To feed my many thoughts [as insperable 
from the] tameless multitude!’.57 Laon, Cythna and the hermit are engaged in a war over 
warfare, all struggling to change the way conflicts are resolved by both attempting to 
maintain the old rhetoric of valour, dedication and martyrdom so as not to present themselves 
or their cause as enfeebled by comparison. For instance, Laon’s ‘soul-subduing tongue’ is ‘a 
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lance to quell the mailed crest of wrong’,58 whilst also reforming their definition within the 
public consciousness in order to remove the base connotations of self-serving arrogance 
mixed with prejudicial aggression inherited from the past. The notion of a patient warfare of 
the heart channelled through language is a concerted effort to redefine the directives and 
practices originally associated with righteous indignation circulating during the time by 
presenting itself not simply as a definitive break from tradition but by positioning itself as a 
truer expression of the positive qualities festering beneath the current order. By prioritising 
honour over pride, inculcating a universal commaraderie as opposed to erecting a hierarchical 
brotherhood and respecting the sublime in humanity rather than praising a divine human, 
Laon and Cythna hoped to align misinformed perspectives through a predominantly 
psychological warfare for, '[i]f blood be shed, 'tis but a change and choice/Of bonds,--from 
slavery to cowardice,’ whereas, refraiming thought patterns generates a lasting effect and, 
‘[p]our[s] on those evil men the love that lies [beneath] those spirit-soothing eyes‘.59                                               
kkkThe myopic understanding of how to interpret holy warfare and its struggle to maintain 
what is sacred, is a natural result of indoctrination under a singular rule that has authored and 
normalised an otherwise disingenuous interpretation requiring fresh eyes complemented with 
youthful vigour as well as a sound heart to adjust the parameters of sanctity and establish, 
‘[d]octrines of human power’, whose call for, ‘men [to] aspire to more’, is simply a reminder 
of past knowledge, ‘from the lores of bards and sages old’, shaped into a more relevant 
response via, ‘my [own] wakened thoughts’.60 Although Shelley often denies the use of 
violence to achieve his goals (e.g. the purging that Laon had to undergo after the 
unsympathetic murder of his fellow brethren) he still acknowledges steadfast passivity should 
not devolve into apathy and a palpable sense of threat is indispensable when conducting a 
successful revolution because righteous indignation, if channelled correctly, can more 
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immediately undercut any self-righteousness the tyrant presents as justification for their 
dishonesty and iniquity. The Romantic poet refuses to allow his audience to internalise their 
victimhood status often employing incendiary rhetoric such as, ‘I grow weary to behold/The 
selfish and the strong still tyrannise/Without reproach or check’,61 but often warns the readers 
not to repeat the cruelty perpetrated upon them and reminds them to regain as sense of 
collectedness before channeling aggressive feelings through counterproductive actions: ‘[w]e 
all are brethren--even the slaves who kill/For hire, are men; and to avenge misdeed/On the 
misdoer, doth but Misery feed.’62 In denouncing evil as illusory, associating it with deceit and 
fraud contrary to goodness which is more substantial and genuine, momentary outrage can 
briefly tip the scales of dominance in favour of those who will use that opening to make 
space for love through a return to passivity or leave a legacy in death. To fight for equality is 
not just a moral imperative but, at certain points in the narrative, takes on a fatalistic quality 
in which nature will always produce a set of reformers for every age who are driven towards 
denouncing discrimination by amassing an overwhelming surge of support that threatens to 
erase any trace of injustice until the cycle continues and the disenfranchised must wait for 
another zeitgeist where the balance is placed back in the hands of those who deserve 
responsibility: ‘[i]t must be so--I will arise and waken/The multitude, and like a sulphurous 
hill,/Which on a sudden from its snows has shaken/The swoon of ages, it shall burst and 
fill/The world with cleansing fire; it must, it will--/It may not be restrained!’.63 The purpose 
for such inflammatory language is to kindle ‘within the bosoms of [his] readers a virtuous 
enthusiasm for those doctrines of liberty and justice’64 which is not dissimilar to the righteous 
indignation for the sake of God often levied by the religious zealots that Shelley paints in a 
negative light indicating they channel some aspect of their sensibilities through the same 
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protective spirit to maintain the sanctity of their highest principles at all costs. Needless to 
say, Shelley’s redefinition of holy warfare within the context of the East is indebeted to the 
more recent legacy of the French Revolution as he is simultaneously grappling with 
eighteenth-century debates regarding royalism and civil liberty and responding to 
contemporary conceptualisations of successful reform as necessitating an intellectual, rather 
than rash or brutish, approach promoted by the likes of Wollstonecraft who, in her History of 
the French Revolution (1794), hopes this battle for identity is won by instigating an 
intellectual reform against meek slavishness and misdirected idealism. However, when 
discussing the role that negative portrayals of the Orient had on the construction of a 
European identity, it should be acknowledged that Muhammad was commended (however 
disingenuously) for refining and harnessing the positive qualities of Arabian behaviour whilst 
tempering their baser tendencies on both a spiritual and socio-political level in much the same 
way Laon and Cythna are reforming social conduct by redefining national identity and 
realigning metaphysical allegiances.                                                                                               
kkkTo understand the literary dynamics of this relationship between classical revolutionary 
and modern-day reimagining it serves to turn to Shelley’s citation of George Chapman in his 
dedication since the rousing passage declaring mankind’s right to freedom from the chains of 
governance, ‘there’s not any law/Exceeds [mans] knowledge; neither is it lawful/That he 
should stoop to any other law’,65 is haunted by the spectre of its messenger, Charles de 
Gontaut (Duke of Byron), whose own attempts at dethroning monarchy serve as a pale 
imitation of the steadfastness against divine law enacted by Greek heroes from classical 
myth. The epitome of Chapman’s heroes, Ulysses, shows signs of psychological distress in 
response to the injustices committed against him by the gods he is able to rationalise his 
suffering and acknowledge his indebtedness to ‘Athena as one who stands by him among all 
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dangers and without whose knowledge he never moves’,66 whereas Chapman’s Byron is 
largely misled as opposed to becoming attached to his cause through hardship and yet, he still 
allows his imagined victimisation to devolve into a form of self-pity that supports his 
delusions of grandeur. Examining both characters reveals a fine line between fatalistic 
disquietude and narcissistic projection; the former has a more grounded understanding of 
their position within history and strives to alter their current condition on the understanding 
that cause and effect is interconnected so their own deeds encompass a limited sphere of 
influence before requiring outside help whether at a cosmic or human level; the latter is 
depicted as reckless due to their perception of worldly events being so self-centred, ‘I will 
win [Fortune] though I lose myself’,67 to the extent that their desire to revolutionise perceived 
injustices eventually loses sight of its initial goal and becomes fixated on eliciting change for 
its own sake, Byron promises he will ‘ruin [society] again to re-advance it.’68 Shelley’s titular 
revolution of Islam inevitably revolves around a failed uprising that possesses glimmers of 
promise indicating that his allusion to the Duke of Byron exposes a post-French 
Revolutionary doubt regarding the potential for ideal causes to be plagued by illusions of 
grandeur, naively zealous reformers and internalised victimisation leading to isolationism, all 
of which frame his reconstruction of Islamic tropes and Muslim history. Laon and Cythna’s 
journey has inspiring elements as it pertains to their deposition of monarchy through a simple 
message of universal love as opposed to violence and yet, Shelley is acutely aware that the 
downfall of their plight is only a few Byronic mishaps away whether it be the result of Laon 
joining a revolt through hearsay, Cythna being naively deified by a group supposedly based 
on equality and freethought, or their general lack of foresight concerning events following 
Othman’s fall from grace. To contextualise The Revolt’s indebtedness to The Conspiracy and 
                                                          
66
 Phyllis B. Bartlett, ‘The Heroes of Chapman's Homer’, The Review of English Studies 17 (1941), 257-80, at p. 
276. 
67
 George Chapman, The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Byron, ed. by John Margeson (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988), II. i. 146, p. 99. 
68
 Ibid, I. ii. 35, p. 41. 
235 
 
Tragedy of Charles Duke of Byron within the context of my own reading of the poem as a 
transvaluation of Muhammad’s eventual victory in Mecca, I need to briefly cite Attar’s 
suggestion that the poem might have been inspired by later Islamic history with the tyrant’s 
name Uthman having ties to the ‘founder of the Ottoman dynasty, (1299-1326), then his 
successors Uthman II (1618), and Uthman III (1754), but also the name of the third Caliph in 
Islam, ‘Uthman Ibn ‘affan (644-56).’69 Attar draws a comparison between Cythna and A’isha 
who played a part in deposing both Othman and Ali as she was an ‘independent Arab woman, 
a feminist orator, a poetry lover, a learned religious scholar with vast knowledge of medicine, 
a defender of the poor and the oppressed’70 who might have been implicated in the aggression 
but was a victim of misinformation and denounced any association with the events 
afterwards.
71
 These echoes are made clearer when reading Gibbon’s description of A’isha as 
possessing, ‘[t]he youth, the beauty, the spirit of [to grant] her a superior ascendant [and led 
her to become] beloved and trusted by the prophet [as well as] the mother of the faithful’,72 
evoking a similar sense of fertility, maternity, sublimity, and loyalty embodied in Cythna 
who; ‘felt the sway of [Laon’s] conceptions’;73 listened intently to his, ‘holy and heroic 
verse,/[to which] Earth, sea and sky, the planets [became slaves]’;74 and cultivated his mind 
with her own thoughts, ‘endowed/with music and with light [and] flowed/In poesy’,75 to 
become a revolutionary in her own right even when she was no longer physically, ‘[t]he 
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Prophet’s virgin bride’.76 We are presented, therefore, with a set of mirrored selves that either 
reflect one another in name or role but whose differences in orthography and characterisation 
symbolise an insurmountable disparity between each pairing even as they replicate certain 
qualities and thus, I argue The Revolt is a precursor to the, ‘dispers[al of] identity into a ripple 
effect of irreconcilable crossings’, in Hellas.77 Condensing all of these refracted identities 
into a single arc complements The Revolt’s narratological purposes within the romance genre 
as Shelley is able to fully chart the rise and fall of an enthusiastic activist producing a hybrid 
revolutionary tale which is equal parts encouraging and cautionary by design:  
[balancing] Shelley’s desire to confront the failure of the French 
Revolution so as to account for it and, indeed, the possibility of future 
setbacks [whilst also censuring the] revulsion and despair of his 
contemporaries by reaffirming the value of imaginative ideals of 
millennial fulfilment
78
 kkk 
kkkIt is useful to recognise that the prophet became a symbol for how unity, founded on 
transcendental beliefs, might inspire more genuine solidarity than tribal bonds but could just 
as easily fall into disarray once the founder has passed away.
79
 It is a fear of sound intentions 
becoming disillusioned as well as a concern that subsequent generations might lapse into old 
habits which plague Laon’s journey. Amidst the refracted inversions of historical figures 
involved in Islamic revolutions to varying degrees, Laon and Cythna are positioned as 
Chapman-esque ironic warrior-heroes whose narrative function is to explore the possibility of 
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leading a secular revolution which subsequent generations would perceive as being equally 
impactful on a world-historical level as the legacy’s recounted in prophetic hagiography and 
classical epics when the gods fought on behalf of, or against, had existential value. Whilst 
Chapman cites figures such as Orpheus to directly denounce Byron’s flaws, Shelley uses 
these fractured selves in a more investigative manner as he explores what a, ‘holy warfare’, in 
the name of his most cherished principles would entail by having his protagonists responding 
to a version of Islam (perceived as theocratic and fatalistic) with their own internalisation of 
those principles and tropes. The way Cythna and Laon choose to respond to Othman’s 
tyranny channels not only Shelley’s own brand of sceptical idealism and radicalism but, by 
subtly alluding to Islamic history, possesses an unlikely affinity with a religious leader who 
redefined national identity by offering a new paradigm founded upon an amalgamation of 
ancient wisdom
80
 and whose community: ‘[dismissed] priesthood or sacrifice [in favour of 
an] independent spirit of fanaticism [that] looks down with contempt on the ministers and the 
slaves of superstition.’81 Shelley’s ideal revolutionary hero encapsulates both martyr and 
beloved; they are capable of engendering respect amongst those who were initially swayed by 
the false promises of kings or priests who claim to be working on your behalf in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty, whilst also stripped of the strong sense of self-preservation that comes 
with high status and instead, willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of humanity. In other 
words, a person who is self-assured to the point of having a strong enough ethical compass 
with which to shame those who do not and, at the same time, do not indulge in their own high 
opinion of themselves or become naively influenced by causes that might end up being 
detrimental to the task of realising Universal Love. 
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The Reasons for Fighting and the Methods of Revelation 
kkkShelley filters his critique on despotism through a damning indictment of theocratic 
societies which transcendentalise emotions as the central form of coercion rather than 
governing in a manner that esteems the individual’s faculties and places authors of sensibility 
(e.g. poets and artists) in positions of influence which, due to a shift from an insular 
omniscient Mind to the human heart, would inculcate a spirit of freethought as intellect 
becomes decentralised from an otherwise overriding and immutable force generated to 
instantiate powers already in control: ‘[m]en say they have seen God, and heard from God,/ 
Or known from others who have known such things,/And that his will is all our law, a rod/ To 
scourge us into slaves [and place] Man’s free-born soul beneath the oppressor's heel’.82  His 
desert scene becomes the stage in which, ‘[t]hat monstrous faith wherewith [Princes and 
Priests] ruled mankind’,83 is revised in favour of a faith in the tenacity of human willpower 
and creativity when responding to adversity and beauty both of which are unlocked during 
the union of fate and subjectivity where necessity attaches individual expression to a more 
ancient lineage of cause and effect with a decision to assist the greater drive towards 
maintaining harmony or spread inequality: '[e]ldest of things, divine Equality!/Wisdom and 
Love are but the slaves of thee,/The Angels of thy sway, who pour around thee/Treasures 
from all the cells of human thought’.84                                                                                              
kkkLove, both in a communal and intimate sense, becomes the new supplementary guiding 
force governing social interactions in a more tempered manner as such principles are no 
longer anthropomorphised into a dogmatically hardened yet, physically insubstantial 
figurehead, but rather recognised as emotions abstracted from the human realm which exceed 
any singular expression and in turn, provides the only legitimate gateway towards other 
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sympathetic acts: 'O Love, who to the hearts of wandering men/Art as the calm to Ocean's 
weary waves!/Justice, or Truth, or Joy! those only can/From slavery and religion's labyrinth 
caves/Guide us [...] To give to all an equal share of good,/To track the steps of Freedom’.85 
Shelley is re-envisioning the connotations of religious warfare within an oriental context by 
retaining the spirited conviction towards fulfilment of a greater cause whilst de-
transcendentalising the reasons for fighting as equality becomes the primordial principle 
bolstered by its angelic servants, love and wisdom, which lay the groundwork for its 
actualisation within the hearts and minds of a community striving towards liberty from 
monolithic creeds: ‘[t]hat love, which none may bind, be free to fill/The world, like light; and 
evil faith, grown hoary/With crime, be quenched and die’.86 The cosmological implications of 
shifting the source from which revolutionary change is sought and the ends to which societal 
reform is directed can be encapsulated in the line, ‘[a]nd earth, rejoiced with new-born 
liberty,/For in that name they swore!’,87 functioning as a secular foil for the Islamic phrase 
bismillah (in the name of God) to bless any action with correct intention and in turn, establish 
taqwa (God-consciousness) until belief in Divine Providence as a necessary pre-requisite for 
conducting worldly and spiritual affairs becomes engrained within every facet of public and 
private life. God’s power and domain remain far greater as He balances the human, natural 
and celestial world through destiny which infuses every instance with meaning not simply on 
a horizontal level of signification but also a vertical (i.e. celestial) plane: ‘[i]f God inflicts 
harm on you, no one can remove it but Him, and if He intends good for you, no one can turn 
His bounty away: He grants His bounty to any of His servants He will’.88 Accordingly, 
Shelley utilises Laon and Cythna’s opposition as a voice through which to project, and 
subsequently critique, a similar belief in the indominable will of a Creator God who is 
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paradoxically employed in the name of Mercy and adversity to dispense righteous justice: 
'King of Glory! thou alone hast power!/Who can resist thy will? who can restrain/Thy wrath, 
when on the guilty thou dost shower/The shafts of thy revenge, a blistering rain?/Greatest and 
best, be merciful again!’.89 Initially, it appears this type of fatalistic pride derives from a 
brash conviction in the unmatched power and unique existence of their particular deity is 
attributed to countless religions as a general indictment of how religiosity spreads anti-social 
behaviour under the banner of unity whilst spreading division: ‘[a]nd Oromaze, Joshua, and 
Mahomet,/Moses, and Buddh, Zerdusht, and Brahm, and Foh [...] each raging votary 'gan to 
throw/Aloft his armed hands, and each did howl/“Our God alone is God!”’.90 Conversely, this 
phrase can be read as a direct commentary on Muslim thought since the Islamic testimony of 
faith distinctly echoes the strict monotheism in Shelley’s closing proclamation, laa ilaaha 
illallaah (there is no god worthy of worship except Allah), with other beliefs potentially 
positing exclusivity in truth whilst shunning such a hardline Unitarian approach whether it be 
Zoroastrianism’s dualistic opposition between Oromazes and Ahrimanes, the Buddhist 
rejection of a singular creator god or unmoved mover, or the Hindu triumvirate consisting of 
Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva who collectively create, sustain and destroy. The 
acknowledgement of a monotheistic deity and an unutterable power characterising the 
messages of Muhammad and Laon reflects the central difference between these iconoclastic 
messengers who signify the entrance of eternity into time, although they either preach or 
embody the maxim that, ‘[t]here is nothing like Him, and He is the All Hearing, the All 
Seeing’91  or, implicated within Laon’s phrasing, that the ‘deep truth is imageless’ there 
remains an insurmountable gulf between the Qur’anic message brought to the Prophet and the 
felt revelation of collective sympathy sensed within Laon. Shelley’s intellectual interest in 
empiricism leads him to only affirm that which can be observed, the imagination can allow 
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the observer to move beyond the purely sensuous which tends to isolate individuals who rely 
solely on rational knowledge by allowing them to confer, as opposed to infer, relationships 
and as such: ‘[t]he difference is merely nominal between [internal and external impressions] 
which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and of external objects.’92 
Surprisingly, the discourse concerning reason as a simultaneous move away from superstition 
coupled with an imaginative engagement when observing the natural world is employed by 
Gibbon to describe Islam as founded on the prophet’s, ‘rational enthusiasm’, through which 
he draws others  away from deifying or worshipping mutable entities such as humans, 
inanimate objects or institutions, ‘[t]he prophet of Mecca rejected the worship of idols and 
men, of stars and planets, on the rational principle that whatever rises must set, that whatever 
is born must die’, awakening them instead to an, ‘infinite and eternal being, without form or 
place, without issue or similitude, present to our most secret thoughts, existing by the neces-
sity of his own nature’.93 Although the unutterable power or Demogorgon occupies a pseudo-
Kantian noumenal realm that Shelley’s sceptical idealism is unwilling to entirely dismiss he 
remains equally reticent believing in a force that perception cannot comprehend given 
language’s incapability of elucidating Its character, merely obscuring through tautology and 
affixing human concepts that must affirm through an apophatic theology. In place of 
affirming a mysterious transcendental energy Shelley chooses to affirm the immanent power 
of imagination (namely metaphor) which senses that force or, otherwise put, the ideal exists 
within man rather than a realm beyond.                                                                                                                   
kkkThe reverential consciousness of Islam, where Allah is spiritually understood as being the 
only True reality relative to any worldly alterations results in a contentment regarding 
destiny, is transfigured into a state of mind that promotes the natural state of man as largely 
unbound save for a primordial maternity that establishes sympathetic bonds where: ‘[t]o live, 
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as if to love and live were one,--/[requires neither] faith [n]or law, [and] those who bow/To 
thrones on Heaven or Earth, such destiny [will never] know’.94 The throne that Shelley seeks 
to denounce is both mental and actual with subservience to, as well as occupation of, such 
thrones cultivating a mindset that dismisses the maternal psyche in favour of a paternal 
psychosis, leads to an obsession with royalty (i.e. kingship) which inculcates slavishness 
rather than self-sovereignty and eventually causes the bonds of sympathy to be hijacked and 
horded for the adoration of a select few. Surprisingly, however, the relation between 
Shelley’s universal principles and those inspired to call upon them is framed within equally 
submissive terms, ‘Virtue, and Hope, and Love, like light and Heaven,/Surround the world.--
We are their chosen slaves’,95 and yet, akin to his repurposing of esoteric language to develop 
new avenues for conceiving past mindsets, he uses apostrophe alongside hyperbole for its 
artistic merit based on an understanding (derived from a love of classical art filtered through 
his scepticism) that literature can provide a gateway to the sacred without becoming religious 
(i.e. doctrinal). There is a shared appreciation of inward preparation as a necessary gateway 
towards social repair since our yearning for belonging will remain unfulfilled unless we can 
relinquishing any ego (inflated or self-defeating) founded upon custom and open ourselves to 
ecstatic experiences that encourage us to transcend the myopic scope of our local reality to 
realise there are sublime forces that connect humanity on a macroscopic level. Both Shelley’s 
universal principles and Allah are haadhir (present) as well as gha’ib (unseen) but the latter 
in an omnipresent sense whereas the former is an organic byproduct of natural laws shaped 
by human interaction for: ‘such is Nature's modesty, that those/Who grow together cannot 
choose but love’.96 Not dissimilar to the discourse used in Arab and Persian esoteric literature 
to describe the union between sublime Beloved and servantile lover, Shelley declares these 
maidens of reform to be awaiting a response from a disgruntled civilian who hopes to rectify 
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their situation by overleaping the boundaries of common conduct, 'with strong speech I tore 
the veil that hid/Nature, and Truth, and Liberty, and Love‘,97 a revelatory experience 
grounded not in the distant majesty of an immutable existent whose acknowledgement results 
in self-loss and a subsequent sensual reawakening but rather an intuited communion with the 
One Mind that grants the human spirit self-reflective distance to admire itself from afar: ‘I 
feel an echo; through my inmost frame/Like sweetest sound, seeking its mate’.98 Love, 
Equality and Wisdom have no volition of their own and are only positively reinforced 
inasmuch as humanity is able to actualise their potential within the world whilst God has no 
need of human action to instantiate His existence as a moral agent indicating that esteem 
should be granted to humanity (the poet-legislators in particular) and thus, rather than 
attributing all praise to God without equal, Shelley dedicates a shrine to collective human 
thought: ‘[a]ll living things a common nature own,/And thought erect an universal 
throne,/Where many shapes one tribute ever bear?’.99 In other words, Shelley tactfully 
divulges in outwardly devotional language to elevate certain humanitarian values within the 
public consciousness without instilling the belief that they are self-subsisting entities worthy 
of worship or gratitude precisely because they can determine lives irrespective of collective 
or individual willpower. Instead, the ‘unutterable power’ haunting Laon and Cythna’s 
spiritual growth is reduced to a sensed absence devoid of an ontologically verifiable presence, 
or rather, an emotionally charged instance which is synonymous with the moment of 
revelation (the sense of universal belonging) felt during an equal embrace with another and 
gains a derivative form abstracted from the humans currently experiencing said moment 
whereby: ‘[a]ll thought, all sense, all feeling, [roll] into one’.100 Accordingly, Shelley would 
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dismiss the Islamic emphasis on the Creator’s incomparability as counter-intuitive to the 
revolutionary aims driving the likes of The Revolt or Prometheus Unbound because such a 
conception inevitably generates a distinct ontological existent presiding over the universe and 
thus, projecting this static Being as the Ultimate Being inculcates passivity in Its followers: 
‘[w]hy do you take protectors other than Him, who can neither benefit nor harm even 
themselves?’.101                                                                                                                           
kkkEven though language is as obfuscating as it is clarifying, poets are able to speak from a 
position of self-awareness which infuses the emotions or values they espouse with fictionality 
and in turn, retains the truthfulness of a particular moment without becoming disillusioned as 
to the ontological universality of such a moment since reality, if unavoidably filtered through 
language, is mutable. Therefore, the revolutions of Muhammad and Laone’s (i.e. Laon and 
Cythna’s combined struggle) overlap inasmuch as they are linguistically driven, 
acknowledging a metalogic inherent in the sounds that constitute language, and which, 
beneath the interposed laws of grammatology, believe poetry or prophecy can tap into a 
universal resonance. The Qur’an is governed by a phonetic network of meaning (embedded in 
its pronunciation, rhythm, repetition, and word structure) these sonoral elements serve not 
only as ornamentation but awaken listeners to their createdness since proper recitation 
(tajwid) embeds oneself within the vibrations of a universal message being proclaimed by all 
other creatures at every moment. For Shelley, it is through the use of rhyme schemes and an 
attention to metre that, the ‘language of poets has ever affected a certain uniform and 
harmonious recurrence of sound, without which it were not poetry’,102 the strength of which 
is attested to by his phonemic reading of Shakespeare where devices such as, alliteration or 
assonance, are lauded for their ability to convey intense emotions that the audience has no 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the laws of all inferior existences. Where indefiniteness ends, idolatry and anthropomorphism begin’ (The Prose 
Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. by E. B. Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), I, p. 252).   
101
 The Qur’an, 13:16, p. 154.  
102
 The Selected Poetry and Prose of Shelley, p. 639. 
245 
 
choice but to enact whilst reading.  The visionary prophet, Muhammad, sought to engender a 
universal tribeless community united in their potential calling as God’s vicegerent on earth 
impoverished before a higher Power that, although utterly transcendent, grants insight into Its 
Nature allowing humanity to improve their own selves upon realising that their faculties are 
approximations of a flawless expression in the Divine Archetypes. In contrast, Laon and 
Cythna’s universal tribeless community103 is founded on the understanding that language is 
essential to moulding human agency because without intention being given direction through 
expression there can be neither a thinking subject nor an object of thought and thus, poetry 
most adequately enables humanity to transcend their current ego and occupy other states from 
a position of understanding. The paradigm shifts that Shelley equates with creativity are 
poetic rather than prophetic in nature which reflects the split between how Muhammad and 
Laon’s messages are conveyed; poetic language offers subtleties of expression, grammatical 
innovations, and offers a metaphorical (i.e. syncretistic) mode of thought whereas prophecy, 
Shelley believed, inevitably led to the imposition of abstract laws which could be abused by 
the powerful to generate a calculating discourse that thrives on immediate subjugation rather 
than immanent participation.   
Domestic Revolution 
kkkThe Revolt functions on a much more intimate level than purely a nationalistic or 
transhistorical one as the bond between sexes becomes both an integral foundation for 
conducting a truly sincere societal revision as well as an immutable principle that persists 
even during revolutionary collapse. For Shelley, if a freethinker cannot achieve equal union 
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amongst themselves and those members of society dearest to them (mothers, lovers, sisters 
and daughters) how can they purport to cultivate justice amongst an already indifferent or 
antagonistic community for, ‘[n]ever will peace and human nature meet/Till free and equal 
man and woman greet',
104
 and so, an examination of Shelley’s warfare benefits from a more 
nuanced understanding of the poem’s gender dynamics (i.e. the reason for fighting). In such a 
climate, the validity of an individual’s claim to be European becomes intertwined with their 
stance on marriage (whether in supporting it as an institution for upholding Christian morality 
or against it as a practice that actively curtails free love) invariably resulting in debates 
regarding what constituted Oriental identity in the position of Europe’s opposite for: ‘the 
degeneracy of some nations of the East, the Egyptians and Chaldeans [was often] traced to 
the marriages that were in use between brothers and sisters’.105 Ironically, an effect of 
othering is that, when critiquing one’s own homeland for abandoning and rallying against 
intrinsic values which had previously contributed to its respectable image, the scapegoated 
community becomes its alter ego as it emblematises a society based upon negatives (e.g. lack 
of ethics, lack of culture, lack of community) to justify its own choices regarding policy-
making or religion and in turn, offers a transgressive space for radicals to explore. In this 
section, I shall trace how the setting of The Revolt enables Shelley not simply to critique 
patriarchy through the oppressive regime of Oriental despotism but affords him a morally 
liberating space where eunuchs inhabit the court,
106
 polygamy is practiced and a faith that 
spiritually sanctions sexual intercourse as opposed to degrading its value, all of which serve 
to shock European sensibilities not through sheer horror but by also inculcating an element of 
wonder.                                                                                                                                               
kkkThe prospect of a more free form gender dynamic posited in The Revolt should not be 
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dismissed entirely as the product of exoticism since it has a basis within the Islamic tradition 
and thus, although subverted through a Shelleyan lens in terms of purpose and practice, is 
useful to consider alongside the poem’s own rendition given that such a precedent does exist. 
Notably, the symbolic interchangeability of the sexes is made conceptually possible, or at 
least complemented by, the scientific recognition of hermaphrodites since the popularity of 
humoral theory allowed for the possibility of crossing the boundaries between masculinity 
and femininity. In Medieval Arab medical theory, the chances of birthing either a girl or a 
boy was decided by scalable factors such as how potent the sperm was and which testicle or 
part of the womb produced the seed allowing for a rationally justifiable open-endedness to 
sex. It is important to grasp this fluidity within a Sufistic context where gendered identity was 
deemed malleable as an extension of Allah’s inimitable and delimited nature as human 
attempts to emulate Allah’s perfection required a balance of Jamal (beautiful) and Jalal 
(majestic) qualities:  
Sheikhs are (rhetorically at least) fathers and mothers. They are pro creators 
and nurturers who give and sustain spiritual life; and they possess two 
bodily fluids upon which life depends: semen and milk. As fathers they 
impregnate their feminized disciples and thereby bring about the creation of 
the disciple's new life, and as mothers they give birth to and nurture their 
new progeny.
107
  
kkkPredominantly, Sufis would also rely on masculine pronouns to refer to the authoritative 
aspect of teaching; students were encouraged to readily abandon their ego by entering into an 
oath (bay'a) with their spiritual father which entailed a subordination of the will for the sake 
of training the mind and body to be open to, and accept, the ultimate renunciation of self in 
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the ecstatic, visionary communion with God. The masculine terminology also relates to the 
concept of silsila (chain of transmission) where mentors and their mentees are subsumed into 
a lineage of believers stretching all the way back to the Prophet whose teachings remain 
undistorted and uninterrupted, the seed of prophecy becomes available for any seeker willing 
to embody that lifestyle until their character (akhlaq) has ‘been polished through their 
perfection in modelling themselves after the Messenger’ so that they may implant that 
message in the hearts of others.
108
                                                                                             
kkkEffeminising the student and associating the teacher with masculinity (regardless of sex) 
is a pattern reflected in Shelley’s tale as both frameworks seek to encourage sentimentality 
and curtail belligerence; Laon is taught the dangers of envisioning Cythna as his ‘second self’ 
wherein she simply becomes a belated echo of his inner voice denied any substantial 
selfhood; when in captivity he is confronted with that perverted desire to claim Cythna as his 
own, ‘[a]ll shapes like [his] own self, hideously multiplied’, engaging in a non-discursive 
relationship with a female version of himself and must learn to conceive of her not as self-
projected other but an Other who is self-complementary. Laon is freed by the aged hermit 
from the phallic pillar chaining him to past misdeeds, taught the importance of eloquence in 
producing change through an appeal to emotions, is unknowingly reintroduced back into the 
maternal circle of Laone, encounters his spiritually surrogate daughter, all of which 
contribute to his receptivity both to the cause itself and those not yet involved. The final 
stages of Laon’s transformation into what Teddi Lynn Chichester calls, ‘self-feminizing 
male’, 109 are signalled by two figurative deaths that reverse the strict sexual categories 
separating the lovers from true equality and allow them to both retain the beneficial aspects 
of their own sex whilst sympathetically attaching themselves to the experiences of the 
opposite gender. The first death occurs when Cythna adopts the name Laone, a feminine 
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reconstruction of the male protagonists name, not in a defeatist effort to renounce her will to 
Laon or out of a complacency towards being his shadowy self but born out of an awareness 
that if Laon is to shake off his patriarchal consumptive lust, evidenced by the cannibalistic 
hallucination in canto three, she must first show him that her spiritual station is expansive 
enough to accommodate them both. Chichester describes the new self: 
As a kind of compound being, "Laone" allows Cythna to enwomb her 
brother and transmute him into a sister-spirit, while at the same time he-she 
enables Laon, via his narrative, to enwomb his sister and thereby participate 
in her "strange tale of strange endurance," with its sufferings and triumphs 
that are uniquely female
110
  
kkkSufi circles often reimagined those females who have attained a high maqam (devotional 
station) as men, ‘when a woman is a man on the path of the lord Most High, she cannot be 
called woman,’111 so the likes of Rabi'a al-'Adawiya (d. A.H. 185 [801 C.E.]) came to be 
known as symbolic men which could be misconstrued as authenticating the patriarchal power 
structures of classical Arab society but was understood, instead, through hadiths which 
deemphasised outward form in spiritual attainment: ‘God does not regard your forms […] It 
is not a matter of form, but of right intention.’112 In relation to the principle of tawhid, the use 
of man to refer to a highly devout person is not meant to indicate a disparity between the 
sexes in capacity or desire but rather signifies: ‘the ideal human being who has reached 
proximity to God where there is no distinction of sexes; and Rabi'a is the prime example of 
this proximity.’113 In literary terms, her physical femininity in conjunction with her symbolic 
masculinity serves a similar function to Cythna’s newfound alias Laone, granting them a 
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level of universality wherein both genders can interpret their stories from a variety of 
perspectives which encourages a generative, as opposed to insular, notion of identity. Akin to 
the transsexualism of Shelley’s males who want to be feminine and females who associate 
with masculinity, Cythna and Rabi’a are able to transcend gender and social boundaries given 
their journey from slave (or dispossessed) to spiritual leader, inadvertently becoming 
revolutionary figures whose passivity and edifying words, challenges the dominant 
hierarchical mode of discourse more successfully than any call to violence.
114
 The second 
death takes place in stanza five where Laon confronts Laone like the poet figure in Alastor 
driven towards his own demise he wanders listlessly in the hopes of being reborn in the 
image of his beloved. Just as Cythna internalised a piece of him by changing her name, he 
now waits to be initiated into the nourishing space of the Kristevian Chora as his maiden 
who, behind ‘a veil shroud[ing] her countenance bright’,115 announces the death of his 
masculine self, attached to the semiotic realm, and ushers him into the pre-linguistic world of 
unified vision: ‘I had a brother once, but he is dead! […] This veil between us two, that thou 
beneath/ Should'st image one who may have been long lost in death’.116                                                       
kkkIt would be remiss, however, not to distinguish between a Shelleyan and a Sufistic 
understanding of both the male and female principles since Laon’s purpose for increasing in 
receptivity, empathy, and collectedness, is secularised and the gendered archetypal 
behaviours are detranscendentalised by comparison to his Muslim esoteric precursors for 
whom spiritual androgyny is a matter of emulation through loss of worldly classifications of 
self. In Ibn Arabi’s cosmology of the insan al-kamil (perfect man) he teaches that in order to 
become receptive to the jalali attributes of Allah (majesty, transcendence, power, 
independence) it is necessary to respond with their complementary counterparts such as 
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modesty and reliance because the jalali qualities replicated in man are related to ego and thus, 
in raising the believer up to God in terms of self-estimation it has the adverse effects of 
distancing them further as opposed to acting humble in the presence of Allah’s utter 
sovereignty raises your spiritual station. In drawing closer to Allah through his jalal qualities 
the spiritual proximity to His jamal attributes increases as appreciation grows then receptivity 
to Divine Beauty (ease, mercy, forgiveness) follows since the servant becomes aware that any 
struggle which comes about from Allah’s Justice or Retribution are out of Compassion, a 
desire to purify hearts in the crucible of hardship and make them supple. For Shelley, these 
gendered principles largely function on a metaphorical level, written with an awareness of 
their relativity and able to transcend form precisely because they gain significance through 
being enacted as opposed to essentially inhering within a divinely preordained system 
whereas the possibility for ambiguity in the Islamic usage of spiritual transsexualism derives 
from a sense of reverence with regards to Allah’s capacity to encompass all worldly 
principles in truth without need for delimitation and thus, the most expansive space for 
mystics to embody this type of transcendent nature is their inner selves.                                       
kkkThe reasoning behind ambiguous pronouns and the metaphorical fluidity of sex differs 
between both esoteric Islam and Shelley’s ‘imaginative transsexualism’,117 Sufis seek a form 
of emotional indwelling within Allah’s state of being by making God the centre of their focus 
and inculcating an undifferentiated unity within their own self-perception and habits, 
preferably not for the sake of lapsing into solipsism generated from self-loss but rather to 
gain a heightened awareness of their indebtedness as a created being with a view towards 
engaging in public life, setting up just rule and similarly honing their community’s 
receptivity. Shelley’s call to inclusivity is similarly founded on a desire to generate a 
universal brother and sisterhood that all attest to the sublime within, as opposed to without, 
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who strive to comprehend the universe we inhabit by generating fiction and art that attests to 
these beautiful truths (liberty, equality and love) in practice as much as theory. This is not 
purely for the sake of generating representations since their outward realities may become 
obsolete but contribute knowledge or emotion towards the One Mind’s perception as a 
collectively self-reflexive process that generates archetypes and mythos through innumerable 
subjective interpretations of reality taking place at every moment. 
Summary 
kkkShelley’s use of Islamic history to explore the dynamic between enthusiasm and 
fanaticism (i.e. a universal emotionality that is shared transtemporally versus the immediate 
drive to impose order for idealistic means) is a practice that continues beyond The Assassins 
in the spirit of Gibbon, Rousseau,
118
 and Voltaire,
119
 for whom Islam was suspended between 
anachronism and sublimity and the Prophet was, at once, a fatalistic impostor as well as, a 
‘reformer[,] a visionary[,] and the equivalent of [a] philosophical deis[t]’.120 Shelley splits 
these components between the Oriental despot and his subjects who respectively exemplify 
the potential to either erect a theocratic regime founded on manipulation or a humble 
rebellion to reframe national identity towards unity rather than hierarchy. To focus solely on 
Othman as an icon of negative stereotypes without also acknowledging Laon and Cythna as 
symbolic of this prophetic spirit of renewal fails to appreciate how the title is interchangeable 
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for both the order which is being retaliated against as well as the movement which is rising 
up since either side can equally be read as of Islam. Part of the transvaluative slant of my 
approach is a willingness to recognise that these renditions of Islam are invariably Shelleyan 
in character but just as The Revolt maintains the hopeful aspect of martyrdom in the face of a 
rupture, so too do I believe it is critically important not to forget the memory of Islam when 
discussing Shelley’s own poetic reincarnation.                                                                             
kkkThe journey of Cythna and Laon exemplifies how the Orient’s own traditions and 
symbols can be means through which to attain truths that Shelley viewed as progressive 
indicating that, although no singular worldview can provide total enlightenment, there 
remains in every intellectual heritage (religious or philosophical) the interpretive freedom to 
either uplift the human spirit on their journey for visionary experience or inculcate bad habits 
such as slavishness or a lack of critical thinking. These negative tendencies will curtail any 
meaningful development in the quest for questions given that just as many discrepancies in 
the conception of God exist amongst believers of the same belief as devised across the 
countless individuated faith groups:  
not only has every sect distinct conceptions of the application of this 
name, but scarcely two individuals of the same sect, who exercise in any 
degree the freedom of their judgment […] find perfect coincidence of 
opinion to exist between them
121
  
kkkThe theological and philosophical worldviews that humanity generates are simultaneously 
shortsighted, self-contained and dialogical for they are rooted in language and thought shaped 
by lived experience (a commingling of internal and external stimuli) where the innate 
propensity to contemplate or make meaning is afforded a limited set of tools (i.e. senses) 
causing logic to become inseparable from language. The mind’s inability to fully process 
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phenomena as well as its subjective biases misinterpreting objective data prompts individuals 
to fill in any epistemological gaps and generate their own reasoning rather than a Divine 
Logos granting mankind a pre-ordained consciousness that automatically intuits the names of 
things as they are. Shelleyan jihad, therefore, is a call against misusing language for personal 
gain and a rallying cry to strive towards greater empathy by breaking away from 
institutionalised forms of expression, acknowledging our intellectual heritage in order to 
revise stigmas inherited from past thinkers. Moreover, to conceptualise how new avenues of 
thought might be formed without blindly dismissing traditional notions by default. 
Ultimately, The Revolt centres on the power of poetic language and interweaves within the 
core of its narrative identity various allusions, concepts and iconography associated with a 
faith whose central miracle is linguistic resulting in a series of necessary conflicts and 
revisions which, during the course of its beau revolution turned allegorical afterlife, generates 
a clearer picture as to what might constitute Shelley’s revolution of Islam.    
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Conclusion: Overcoming Critical Anxiety of the Incommensurable in Romantic Orientalism 
 kkkIn developing his mythography, Shelley sought to free natural supernaturalism from the 
numbing effect of natural religion which projected and granted separate ontological existence 
to those innate sublime qualities possessed by mankind and, in deifying these abstract 
notions, inculcated a sense of slavishness within the general public through idolatry. Shelley 
demanded that others refrain from affixing meaning to these reified projections of self-
absorbed preachers and rulers to acknowledge a force such as Intellectual Beauty which 
subsisted as an extension of humanity as both its vessel and means of expression: ‘[d]idst 
thou, unknown and awful as thou art,/ Keep with thy glorious train firm state within his 
heart./ Thou messenger of sympathies [...] Thou- that to human thought art nourishment’.1 
The epistemological ivory tower within which the God of natural religion resides is discarded 
in favour of a new throne within the heart of man as Shelley’s call to disregard the deadening 
effects of institutionalised faith would require demystifying traditional concepts as well as 
replacing the existential void with a more anthropocentric metaphysics. In turn, Shelley 
hoped to engender a mode of sceptical idealism that was appreciative of the bounds of human 
knowledge and content with the obscurity of life’s mysteries rather than striving towards an 
ultimate revelation which would delineate all the particularities of a transcendent Creator. 
Shelley’s poet-prophet responds to the subtle beauty of nature and the melancholic awe of 
ruined civilisations by engaging their self-reflexive imagination resulting in a metaphorical 
transference not ushered by God’s guiding hand but rather the human capacity for 
selflessness driven by love. The individual becomes the immanent bridge within a world of 
sublime potential where the traditional notion of prophecy as revelatory (an enlightening 
removal of the veil) is forgone in favour of a sympathetic messenger who builds a rapport 
with the world they interact with as opposed to instilling a hierarchy from above – sharing a 
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felt expression rather than prosletysing a declaration of faith. Poetry, instead of scripture, 
becomes the means by which these spontaneous flights of fancy are captured without being 
contained as it participates in the human realm of language as well as the transitory sounds of 
Mother Earth, allowing for, what Jean Hall terms, Shelley’s ‘self-exceeding self’,2 which 
enables the subject to attain a heightened awareness by: ‘address[ing] himself (in the 
metaphoric sense) to ultimate things, and [...] address[ing] himself (in what makes wonderful 
poetic sense) to the personified spirit of his own divine humanity’.3 The source of selflessness 
which enables poets to transcend their immediate surroundings and draw inspiration from the 
lived existence of other entities (human or non-human) is born out of an awareness of the self 
as embodied – not only occupying but directly responding to a particular context.                                                                           
kkkThe concept of interanimation is pervasive across Shelley’s Eastern inspired poetry 
whether  he is alluding to Islamic history through The Assassins and The Revolt of Islam or 
evoking Sufistic imagery via the Persian poetics of Alastor there remains a focus on depicting 
alienated radicals and their synthesis (or lack thereof) within a grander web of human 
sympathies. Even the solipsistic mentalscape of Alastor presents instances wherein bonds of 
sympathy, characterised as the recognition of difference mediated by an interdependent 
reciprocity, are glimpsed; the Arab maiden is depicted as possessing a sincere desire for 
communion as she facilitates the Poet’s own receptivity for inspiration hoping that, in 
attending to his needs, she might eventually come to share his dreams rather than returning 
home exhausted every evening. Likewise, her idealised counterpart should not be wholly 
reduced to a submissive abstraction of his own repressed imagination but a subversion of the 
Ovidian Echo that adopts a more subtle, ‘passive/active combination [fitting for a] dreamt 
poet’, who is dependent, ‘on another for her existence, and at the same time [retains] agency 
                                                          
2
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as a poet’.4 Although both the Poet and Narrator are unable to bridge the divide between their 
sensed connection with Nature (fraternal or sexual) and a human community of feeling, they 
remain embedded within a metapoetic lineage of, ‘exiled lives devoted to "making both 
comedy and tragedy" out of their own existence’, as their single testimony becomes 
constitutive of, ‘"one great" poetic testament to the "immortal" beauty of erotic striving 
itself’.5 The Revolt of Islam depicts a loss of presence (whether due to martyrdom or 
isolation) as not necessarily signalling the end of transmission since perspectives can be 
unearthed through textual or oral memory which reconstructs their mindset as a contemporary 
voice and thus, affords others a type of intuition gained via an internalisation of vision in a 
figurative rather than literal sense. This interanimative memory becomes a poignant 
hermeneutical tool when exploring Shelley’s rendition of Islam for the faith, whose central 
miracle is the Qur’an, similarly established intergenerational societies driven by the 
transferral of memory via saintly and prophetic lineages connecting disparate localities across 
time. As part of his Oriental poetics, this conceptual framework is implicit within Shelley’s 
own commentary regarding large-scale communities of transmission helping to recollect and 
restore a lineage of poetic thinking founded on sympathy. A critical aim of my examination is 
to provide a response to Nigel Leask’s assertion that Shelley’s Orient must necessarily be a 
space of contamination that cannibalises from within, ‘figured as an (often oriental) female 
who [invokes] terror of a return of the repressed in the form of a hideous and contagious 
oriental disease’,6 by counterbalancing this imperialistic perspective with the notion that 
Shelley’s Eastern spaces, appreciated as vital to his exploration of imaginative sympathy, 
refigure the other within the self not merely as a vampiric leach but rather a, ‘living melody 
                                                          
4
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[which]/ Tempers its own contagion to the vein / Of those who are infected with it’.7 The 
Assassins depicts an Arabian landscape which incites an infectious impulse for equality, 
sovereignty and social cohesion founded upon a sensed interconnectedness within an 
transhistorical system of sympathetic voices that are gradually memorialised as part of the 
natural landscape:  
[t]o love, to be beloved, suddenly became an insatiable famine of his 
nature, which the wide circle of the universe, comprehending beings of 
such inexhaustible variety and stupendous magnitude of excellence 
appeared too narrow and confined to satiate
8
  
kkkAlthough this idealism risks repeating  a similar isolationist standpoint often levied 
against the Poet wanderer of Alastor, there remains the possibility of real bonds being formed 
through this natural theology in spite of the elitism it may conjure towards outsiders for it is 
only in being, ‘[e]xcluded from the great and various community of mankind’,  that affection 
can thrive amongst those willing and predisposed to the benevolent freethinking spirit of 
nature as opposed to following the utilitarian social contracts which govern commercial life: 
‘all formed, as it were, one being, divided against itself by no contending will or factious 
passions. Every impulse conspired to one end, and tended to a single object. Each devoted his 
powers to the happiness of the other’.9 Shelley presents the reader with tight-knit family units 
cautious of one another’s wellbeing; an almost naive level of hospitality granted to both 
strangers and animals; the prospect of enacting social change on a world-historical level if 
aided by a poetically versed leader; and even the mute, distant ruins of Alastor are depicted as 
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containing: ‘[t]he lore of ancient wisdom [...]sculptured in mystic characters on the rocks’, by 
the more relatable, ‘human spirit and the human hand’. 10  
My contention lies not with the central assumption that Shelley’s political radicalism, as it 
pertains to the East, does not solely destabilise imperialistic narratives but also fulfils a 
potentially ‘productive [role] in furthering the imperial will’;11 rather, in confining Shelley’s 
Eastern allusions within a matrix of power fixated upon ‘the rhetorics of liberation and 
domination’,12 all non-Western references are fundamentally divorced from those other 
intellectual discourses he is writing within whether his fraught relationship with religious 
values and their effect on society or his engagement with Enlightenment discussions 
regarding reason, scepticism and idealism. I appreciate the sentiment that Shelley’s Oriental 
poetics are in dialogue with competing colonialist rhetorics and new discourses of power are 
developed as a response to his counter-revolutionary message but condemning Shelley’s 
Eastern allusions as simply evidence of a fetishistic will to power destabilises the literary as 
an aesthetic entity and drains Islamic tropes of their tangible history with no hope of 
reclaiming, let alone, bridging either side. The myopic nature of Leask’s methodology is 
revealed when, in seeking to harness the specificity of material history by invoking 
colonialism, The Assassins Lebanon setting becomes a foil for British India’s attempt at 
developing ‘an idealised Upanishadic age’ and the aggression (albeit overexagerrated) 
attributed to the fidais is left unexplored for the sake of comparing them instead to ‘Indian 
“Thugs” with whom they were often compared.’13 Any reference to the historical Assassins 
as potentially providing unique insights into  their character are dismissed as simply the result 
of an, ‘anachronistically named [title]’,14 with the ancient regime of Jerusalem being deemed 
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representative of a singular, monolithic entity known as, the ‘“Islam” of the 1818 poem [The 
Revolt]’,15 as opposed to recognising the sect of Muslims to be, in much the same way Bryan 
Shelley’s Gnostic Christians are, radical revisionaries working from within their own 
tradition. It is commendable to remind those who would, ‘displace the real violence 
underpinning the project of imperialism’, by forgetting how ‘imperialist radicals [can fall into 
the trap of] construct[ing] cultural “otherness”’,16 but there is a risk of going to another 
extreme when exposing, ‘the anxieties and transports of Romanticism [to be] as much the 
product of geopolitics as of metaphysics’.17 Methodologically, Leask’s approach reflects the 
rhetoric intimated within the Romantic writers as both Islamic history and terminology are 
presented as simply window dressing amidst an antiquarian backdrop, too detached from the 
surrounding modernising discourse to provide any useful insights. Despite purporting to 
possess immediacy, specificity and relevancy superior to the transhistorical approach of 
comparing disparate ideologies there is a silencing of the native voice and an overt 
presentism in the sense of difference it supposedly reclaims. Admittedly, the problem with 
adopting a universalising approach is that, in its most Hegelian, the underlying Idea or 
principle of Sameness also risks privileging certain narratives and lineages due to the 
interpretive freedom that the contemporary analyst possesses when deciding how difference 
is intuited within the chain of thought. If everything is perceived to be a reaction to earlier 
positions then delineating gradation within epochs (let alone transhistorically) can often result 
in, ‘neglecting some philosophers while treating others at disproportionate length’.18 In either 
case, particularly as it pertains to Shelley’s Orientalism, the Islamic tradition is silenced due 
to privileging either aesthetic representation or material history, though both methodologies 
would see the potential value in comparing William Jones’s translations of Rumi or Hafez 
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with their originals or assessing Islamic historiography, from the perspective of Muslim 
historians, alongside Gibbon’s depictions in volume three of The History of the Decline and 
Fall of The Roman Empire. Such examples might give the impression that authenticity is 
sought in order to generate an antagonistic duality between orthodox and unorthodox 
interpretations, positioning the Islamic texts as possessing some truth that must be reclaimed 
by purging Romantic texts of their inconsistencies and prejudices. In focusing on 
mythography, I seek to counteract critical patterns that would erase Islam from the pages of 
Shelley’s Eastern-inspired poetry despite his mythopoetic practice attesting to the force of 
invoking religious or philosophical symbols and the potency of remaking, rearranging and 
recontextualising such concepts on the human psyche at an individual and social level. A 
reasonable critique of this approach would be to suggest that analysing Shelley’s Christianity 
or Shelley’s Platonism is a more fruitful endeavour as he possessed a higher level of 
familiarity with their doctrine in comparison to the incomplete, biased and translated texts 
shaping his response to Islam which risk producing a misshapen caricature. However, such 
line of thought is a historicist variant of the theological argument that Shelley’s criticism of 
Christian tenets causes his re-evaluation to be so removed from the original spirit as to render 
it irrelevant since the new form is founded on a fundamentally distorted image. Divesting 
Shelley’s allusions of their Islamic perspectives on the basis that unfamiliarity or 
misapprehension irrevocably warps its originary significance is no different to Jerold E. 
Hogle’s logic that, upon entering into a piece of writing, the Shelleyan One is drastically 
reimagined so as to become synonymous with its now transvalued status and in turn, stripped 
of all prior associative characteristics to the extent that these transferential processes become 
essential to, and override any sense of, an attainable or recoverable origin: ‘the poet draws the 
One toward transference and reinstalls that notion at the heart of the One's various forms’.19 
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Even though, as William Ulmer contests, transference requires a sense of otherness or the 
idea of a central identity for the potency of the former is incumbent on its relationality to the 
latter without this tension grounded within reciprocity, Shelley’s displacing of mythos loses 
its radical edge as a reformatory principle simply signalling a homogenous network governed 
by the monolithic principle of decenteredness.
20
 Pinpointing an ideal within the transferential 
process of allusion, allegory and reimagining is inevitably a volatile endeavour due to the 
instability in outlining the nature and genealogy of an original context on the supposition that 
retrieving such a source is possible. Given the questionable likelihood of establishing origins, 
it is important to determine the extent to which additional knowledge can supplement 
readings whilst still maintaining that there are relevant connections at the level of authorial 
intent. Despite acknowledging the need to distinguish unassimilable otherness from its 
transferential product, Ulmer views the process as exhaustive and favours an inner death 
drive as the outcome of this alternation between declamation and recuperation
21
 which still 
echoes the dismissive thought process of Leask with regards to incorporating Islamic history 
into discussions of Romantic Orientalism. In this schema, identification will forever be 
provisional due to allegorical reference or archetypal repetition creating a split identity within 
a piece characterised by distortion and repression. I argue that although transference 
generates symbolic ambiguity as the poem projects icons and concepts into the reader’s 
psyche without explicitly sanctioning their genealogy, there remain traces of its original 
forms latent within these depictions and thus, since allusions are not only founded upon 
forgetfulness but also remembrance, these connections should be foregrounded as: 
‘constituting the very substance of thought [rather than simply overlooked as] an arbitrary 
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legacy of a past that is now over’.22                                                                                         
kkkThe Muslim thinkers that I have placed in dialogue with Shelley’s poetry are themselves 
interpreters of a grander ideal relative to the umbrella term ‘Islam’, the Abrahamic lineage as 
a genealogy, or monotheism as an archetypal thought pattern, and as such, it would be hubris 
to assume they can replicate the same fixed, counteractive force as, Hogle’s One, Shelley’s 
displaced ideal or Ulmer’s unassimilable otherness.23 Nevertheless, there remains a shared 
critical sentiment that maintaining a dynamic, ‘clash of centrifugal and centripetal 
energies’,24 is necessary in grounding a discourse that, on the subject of Shelley’s self and 
antitype paradigm, can often establish a monolithic decenteredness. Unlike Ulmer who posits 
an innate antagonism within this clash, my intention with sustaining a tangible distinction is 
to inculcate a collective agency as part of this dialogue wherein the transferential process 
refrains from allowing either text or subtext to compromise the other by preserving difference 
on the basis of reciprocity: ‘the text cannot simply be replaced by a subtext [for] the official 
content of a work does not cease to exist [purely] because it is undermined from within’.25 
Neither the Qur’anic Text, nor the interpretations that convey these tropes, images and 
concepts across generations via cultural consciousness, disappears upon becoming subtext 
within Shelley’s poetics even as it assimilates other competing and unaffiliated worldviews. 
Shelley’s transvaluative design derives its will to displace myth from a sense of placement 
just as his interanimative framework maintains the value of embodiment by situating its 
renewal as a response to recurring impressions. Shelley’s sceptical idealism posits renovation 
as a form of preservation because for the former to be effective the latter must be present 
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which reflects Maurice Blanchot’s understanding that the drive to decontextualise language is 
derived from a position of centeredness, ‘we feel rooted and so we pull at this root with an 
uprooting force’,26 and yet, Romantic Orientalist scholarship often seeks to cut off the Islamic 
roots of Shelley’s Eastern allusions before their implication within his mythopoiesis  is 
allowed to flourish. This purported rupture between signifier and signifieds within Shelley’s 
Eastern works results in Islam becoming a foil for another event, class or ideal whether it be 
the Assassins as Freemasons or Laon and Cythna’s plight against Othman being confined to a 
commentary on the French Revolution which, although viable readings, promote an amnesia 
with regards to Muslim history. Unfortunately, Shelleyan scholars have ignored Islamic 
thought as a means of reflecting upon his philosophical and theological development due to 
internalising his self-assessment that The Revolt was, written ‘without much attempt at 
minute delineation of Mahometan manners’,27 and not fully appreciating how such omissions 
critically enact the dynamics of repression, projection and reification that Romantic 
Orientalists, such as Leask, find deplorable within Shelley’s colonialising imagination. As a 
consequence of this violence interpolated within the self and antitype duality, Romantic 
Orientalism often lapses into an elegiac rhetoric where restaging loss merely heightens 
humanity’s inability to recover squandered potential within life’s unceasing irreversibility 
indicating that the lack of texts attempting to reconstruct a Shelleyan Islam is a result of this 
melancholic notion of incommensurability: ‘Shelley's poetry internalizes the hierarchical 
structures and institutional violence endemic to Western culture’.28 In particular, such 
temporal estrangement causes the notion of borrowing to be seen as improper, undeserved 
and derived from an impositional zeal to conquer something at once alien and native, 
replicating a similar dynamic of division and reflection enacted by De Man’s symbolising 
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self which strives to appropriate a natural immortality it assumes to be intrinsic. The result is 
an Oriental reimagining that is perpetually aware of, ‘a distance in relation to its own origin, 
renouncing [both] nostalgia and the desire to coincide,’ due to being established, ‘in the void 
of temporal difference’.29 Ironically, the fetishishing process that is criticised for disfiguring 
and objectifying the Oriental female figure is enacted critically, Shelley’s Islam becomes a 
poetic device that temporally echoes Reinhart Koselleck’s neuzeit (characterised by 
interruption and forgetfulness)
30
 and symbolically reflects De Man’s division between 
allegory and nature as the faith’s material history (composed of lived responses to scripture 
and hagiography) is divorced from its allegorical identity within the poet’s writing. This 
dislocated temporality and inorganic allegory results in an enclosed perspective that 
privileges the present and foregrounds mechanistic discourses of power to the extent that 
contemporary realities, such as colonialism, are not only shown to shape Shelley’s figurative 
language but come to encompass both its past and future – a response to the age that 
consequently becomes complicit within the perpetuation of these structures. Even within the 
context of postcolonial theory, it would serve Romantic Orientalism to create critical avenues 
that do not replicate these cycles of dispossession read within Shelley’s appropriation of 
Eastern concepts as part of his wider project to universalise human reason based upon 
Western subjectivity and instead, as I have attempted by reinstating Islamic voices within 
Shelley’s oeuvre, establish transversal correspondences. More generally, conducting a cross-
disciplinary comparison between the Islamic sciences and Romantic poetry enables critical 
discourse to be invigorated in light of previously disconnected areas of study which have 
developed and evolved their own methodologies through scholars responding to unique 
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intellectual environments and thus, the capacity to rise above the myopic view of a particular 
tradition as well as the freedom to observe the extent to which interpretive practices are 
distinct or mutually shared: ‘open[ing] the possibility of ultimately establishing a 
transcultural metahistory of hermeneutics’.31                                                                                             
kkkSubsequent attempts at responding to, and critiquing, Leask’s position have offered novel 
approaches to incorporating Islam as a relevant perspective within Romantic Orientalism 
often caught between an appreciative awareness towards broadening the range of Eastern 
sources (i.e. through translation and travel) and the compulsion to remain firmly entrenched 
within an image of the Orient as constituted by a collective consciousness built on select 
tropes. Andrew Warren offers genre as a means of bridging the divide between intellectual 
lineage and geographic situatedness where choice of literary expression can channel the 
characterisation, setting and narrative conventions of a distant age through the self in a 
manner which evokes an Enlightenment Orientalism where, ‘the self was under critique as 
much as any “other”’.32 In focusing on Eastern appropriation as an extension of self, Warren 
seeks to portray the use of the Orient as not, ‘about the West internalising Eastern tactics 
[but] concerns internal threats and limits within Western ideologies themselves,’33 causing 
Romantic irony to become emblematic of this autocritical approach nested within their works 
via the double-edged awareness that destroying myths serves to generate new ones. By 
highlighting this insular detachment between subject and object, where difference collapses 
into sameness, Warren generates a number astute readings such as his assessment of how 
Southey reenvisions the dynamic between composition, legislation, and necessity when 
conceptualising his own Book of Fate but the self is afforded a level of nuance and 
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particularity (being at once mirror, reflection and onlooker) not granted to the Islamic 
elements
34
 and thus, the dilemma that Warren senses in Byron, ‘how does one escape the 
prison of the self? [or] how does one ever improve oneself?’,35 reveals an issue at the heart of 
criticism itself. How does Orientalist critique escape the solipsism of Romantic figuration and 
expand the available discourses in a manner which contributes to, rather than detracts from, 
its identity? For Warren, this impasse between actual and ideal initiates a crisis within the 
authors which, I argue is replicated within the Orientalist critique of such approaches, as the 
contradiction between what a person is versus what they say
36
 creates an existential form of 
Leask’s imperial anxiety similarly grounded within: ‘a historicism with which it can neither 
dispense nor quite come to terms with’.37  It is not simply the Romantic author who is trapped 
within their own viewpoint but the Orient is also positioned as, ‘impelled and ensnared by 
[historical] anachronism’,38 exacerbating the bifurcated distinction between past 
interpretations and contemporary representation as both East and West are driven by a 
repetition compulsion that is despotic in nature due to being a byproduct of the waste and 
excess implicit in Montesquieu’s Orient where: ‘repetition of the same [is presented under 
the] guise of the new’.39 Warren’s Romantics are so steeped in cultural baggage that they 
become entangled in the De Manian knot cited earlier; Shelley, Byron, and Keats inherit an 
image of the East that feels organic but, through irony, is cognisant of its artifice and in turn, 
their works grapple with the possibility of overcoming an Orientalist framework that falsely 
purports to be grounded in nature. The result is an erotic solipsism which both reflects and 
interrupts how the East is textually mediated from Byron’s use of, ‘dazzling sound and vision 
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[alongside] an-erotic haptics’,40 to Southey’s tendency, ‘to indulge in stylistic ornament and 
miraculous narrative machinery while simultaneously critiquing such excesses in the works 
of the “Orientalists”’.41 In contrast to Warren’s tyrannical, ‘recombinant poetics’,42 my 
response to, the ‘dilemma of generation’,43 is an interanimative mythopoiesis that captures 
the disfiguring principles of transvaluation (opening a potential discussion concerning 
representation’s repressive nature) whilst exploring the possibility for continuity within 
repetition to circumvent the temporal and geographical discontinuity assumed within, and 
critically inherited from, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Orientalist discourse.                    
kkkIt may seem that, in advocating for continuity, I am replicating a Burkean generational 
model which, ‘emphasises smooth transitions and grandual transformations’,44 but my study 
merely aims to loosen the rope of Romantic Orientalist discourse which strangulates Islamic 
allusions and prevents expressions of a much fuller significance due to a critical 
internalisation of the Romantic historian whose own self-perception is founded on alienation, 
dislocation and anxiety. I offer a transhistorical approach that forms connections to 
complicate, rather than cover, the fractures of succession. From this perspective, the 
Romantic imagination does not have to continually eclipse critical inclusion of Islamic texts 
as Robert Irwin argues when Mohammed Sharafuddin incorporates the Qur’an as a 
hermeneutical tool for assessing Byron, Southey, Moore and Landor: 
[the book] is at its best when it discusses the impact on romantic poetry 
of the Qur'an, or rather Sale's version of it [but] the influence of pseudo-
oriental literature on all these writers was surely more important
45
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I share Sharafuddin’s desire to add dimension to the, ‘idea of imaginative escape and 
libidinous investment contained in the notion of orientalism’, by incorporating, ‘the idea of a 
body of knowledge outside the self and independent of the subjective desire.’46 Nevertheless, 
his readings can overly idealise the transvaluative process resulting in claims such as, ‘[i]n 
Byron [...] Islam [...] plays its full part as itself’,47 which is likely based on the assumption 
that a meaningful incorporation of Islam necessitates the poets themselves veer radically from 
convention due to the importance placed on self-understanding within Orientalist rhetoric. 
Given that Sharafuddin inherits this need to tailor the extent of Islam’s inclusion according to 
the poet’s familiarity, he is reticent to draw from a wider frame of Muslim thinkers that might 
nuance his explanation of imagery or concepts being incorporated and, even from within the 
period itself, his citation of relevant Islamic literature contains some notable oversights, 
including Persian poetry. There is a resulting conflict of interest between Sharafuddin’s 
suggestion that Islam attains a level of authenticity so as to become freed from convention
48
 
and his overall admission that the faith is a foil for critiquing Western institutions (i.e. an 
appropriated symbol calling to its own irrelevancy). This paradoxical approach caught 
between allusion and alteration is mimicked in Gerard Cohen-Vrignaud’s, Radical 
Orientalism: Rights, Reform, and Romanticism (2015), where he subverts the Leaskian 
perspective of Orientalism as an outward-facing movement by arguing that The Revolt, 
‘originates ‘from inside’ Ottoman territory: it is of Islam rather than against it from the 
outside’.49 This brief dimensionality granted to the faith as possessing an internality of its 
own is undercut for the sake of introducing a universalising message through which Islam, ‘in 
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Shelley’s poem stands for any religion that props up political exploitation [...] much as the 
Irish were distinct religiously but still ruled by a larger oppressive “Christian” whole’,50 once 
again allegory serves to justify severing, rather than recontextualising, Muslim history.                                                                                                                                         
kkkMy approach aligns most closely with Samar Attar’s Borrowed Imagination (2014) and 
Humberto Garcia’s Islam and the English Enlightenment, 1670-1840 (2011) which neither 
impose upon Islam an alien rhetoric nor seek to diminish the potential value its terminology 
can provide Romantic discourse, preferring instead to understand the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century poets by reassessing their familiarity with, or exposure to, Muslim writers 
via first and second hand sources from Rousseau, Locke and Spinoza’s inadvertent 
transmission of Islamic philosophy alongside the aesthetic contribution’s that: ‘[t]he Arabian 
Nights, [...] the poetry of Arabia and Persia, [and] the numerous oriental tales [afforded the 
Romantic poets when] discover[ing] their inner voices.’51 Attar and Garcia stress the need to 
acknowledge and investigate the Arabic and Persian sources directly and read these voices 
alongside their literary renditions rather than entirely reducing them to an exotic perversion 
within the Romantic psyche, at which point it becomes nothing more than a dislocated 
appendage severed from its prior existence as part of a living corpus of textual responses and 
social struggles, whose notions are as fruitful to explore as Plato’s desire for beauty, 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics on friendship, or Ovid’s depictions of sex.52 Eastern poetry and 
history offered a wealth of literary sources and a series of archetypes that tangentially altered 
according to the age in which they were being written whether it be Dante and Petrarch 
lyrically imitating the troubadour songs or the esoteric imagery of Hafezian love poetry 
incorporated by the likes of Goethe. It is by assessing the associative matrix generating these 
allusions that antecedent traditions are reinfused with critical value and provide glimpses into 
the transferential processes underlying (in my case) Shelley’s mythopoetics.                                     
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kkkTo move beyond the agony of allegory, my study has aimed to reevaluate the illusory 
nature of retroactivity that would establish an unbridgeable gap between Shelley’s 
transvaluations of the faith and the exegetical, historical and philosophical context of these 
poetic tropes and which positions either side as incommensurable on the premise that any 
attempt to trace a transhistorical connection simply becomes entangled within the hall of 
mirrors constituting Shelley’s authorial voice: ‘[w]henever this self-receding scene occurs, 
the syntax and the imagery tie themselves in a knot which arrests the process of 
understanding’.53 The problem lies not in unravelling the relevant points of reference shaping 
the connotations of a piece since signifiers are inherently multifaceted but, for the sake of 
assessing Islam’s function within Shelley’s mythopoetics, new methods must be established 
so as to maintain displacement without the exhaustive effects of discontinuity where the 
antitype becomes a, ‘dark double of its symbolic orientation’,54 which perpetuates Romantic 
Orientalism’s long shadow over Islamic intellectual history. Scholarly balance lies in not 
relegating this impact to the past despite also highlighting how its altered form subsequently 
shapes the poetry of Romanticism. Consequently, I have contextualised Shelley’s usage of 
Islam within Ross Wilson’s suggestion that the poet does not, ‘create a new universe but 
rather renovates one that has gone dead’,55 or William Galperin’s premise that the everyday 
can only be discovered in retrospect but is nevertheless potentially recoverable by re-
establishing its status as a possible world previously underappreciated: ‘gyrations leading to 
the everyday’s emergence as something missed, recovered, and writable are reparative in 
fostering a sense of enchantment, or hope, that is [...] a prevailing afterwardness’.56 An 
uninterpreted object cannot be recovered just as an unperceived moment cannot be relived 
but the violence implicit in assimilating a pure object (an ideal) can be mitigated by a latent 
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utopianism implicit in the reparative notion of preservation espoused by Galperin and Wilson 
which present the possibility of a text previously read or a world already experienced to be 
remade anew through fresh perceptual associations. Even if transcendence is not possible, the 
act of returning as a means of consolation is always an option. As Tilottama Rajan notes, the 
potential for recuperation in the face of stagnation is a pattern that Shelley outlines in A 
Defence of Poetry as writing initiates decline through exposure causing the object to become 
inert after having translated pre-linguistic idea into static matter which, in turn, requires 
reading to unearth meaning that has been over-encumbered with the imprecision and excess 
of language in a way that both relies on the tangible nature of the text for the sake of 
expression whilst also discarding its tertiary qualities for the sake of recovering meaning: 
‘redirect[ing] the negativity of the text [by making it] a resource rather than a source’.57 The 
potential refashioning of a concept misrepresented through writing is made possible due to 
humanity’s capacity for abstraction as themes, concepts and images are embedded within an 
intricate archetypal network from which metaphoric associations can be drawn: ‘[a] single 
sentence may be considered as a whole though it may be found in the midst of a series of 
unassimilated portions; a single word even may be a spark of inextinguishable thought’.58 
Characterising mental acts as ‘inextinguishable’ and ‘unassimilated’ attests to the 
preservatory quality of thought even during assimilation and dissemination since the 
synthesising process of mind merely serves to highlight the extent of differentiation as 
expansive associations exposing referential inconstancy resulting in ideas containing, ‘within 
themselves the principle of their own integrity [incapable of being] subordinated to each 
other or to the originating thought.’59 By bringing interanimation into dialogue with Shelley’s 
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‘intervals and interstices’,60 the fissures that Orientalist scholarship posit as insurmountable 
gaps between Muslim thought and Romantic poetics are instead breakages whose negativity 
encourage informed insertions that foreground, ‘differential interpresence and [...] self-
difference,’61 transforming history into poetry as past images are reinfused with life through 
new inferences, ‘[words can] reanimate [...] the sleeping, the cold, the buried image of the 
past’.62 Recognising disarticulation as continuance rather than closure serves to circumvent 
approaches focused on spectrality, solipsism, or eroticism where, the ‘cyclical repetition of 
different elements in identical positions’, necessitates, ‘equating the unequal,’63 causing 
borrowing to become synonymous with inequality and associated with a position of privilege 
which critically justifies excluding Muslim history on the basis of discontinuity and 
extraneity. By bringing the past into conversation with the present through renewed 
associations, constancy and preservation can become key components of substitution and 
disruption. Shelley’s repudiation of an Islamic discourse behind his allusions is not reason 
enough to foreclose the introduction of Muslim voices into his texts because, as he did with 
Milton, an astute reader can reproduce meaning through negation: ‘infer[ring] the presence of 
something from its very absence: from the void it creates’.64                                                                                                                                         
kkkIt is interesting to note, Islamic anthropology has also more recently focused on the 
everyday as an analytical framework to expand the interpretation of the faith as a discursive 
tradition which opens up for the subject possibilities of action and thought by, instead, 
highlighting the importance of individual life-worlds (i.e. a person’s often conflicting 
intentions and allegiances produced as a response to life experience) to reveal how, ‘alterity 
and incommensurability’, shape faith in ways that, ‘[the] limits of discursive rationality [...] 
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cannot [comprehend through] a pre-constituted discourse’.65 Working within literature and 
engaging with questions of figurative representation, it becomes difficult for critics to 
prioritise experience, at an existential or phenomenological level, in the way an ethnographic 
researcher conducting field work might be able to but there exists the prospect of 
internalising certain principles of the everyday as a conceptual category by accounting for the 
diachronic and relational dimensions of symbols. I argue for the need to highlight the lived 
reality of those responding to these principles throughout history, including those receiving 
these notions (translated or inherited) during the Romantic period. My own work inevitably 
historicises and textualises Muslim voices by choosing to focus on Medieval history for the 
sake of charting valid lines of influence whether it be Ibn Tufayl, Rumi or Hassan-i Sabbah 
and utilising these thinkers as branching points from which to include a wider intellectual 
community from al-Ghazali to Ibn Sina that hopefully provide, at least within Romantic 
criticism, a glimpse into the intricacy of Islamic historiography as a diverse ecosystem 
spanning discrete and communal responses.
66
 Ebrahim Moosa has more recently called for a 
poetic approach to history by returning to tradition as a means of cultivating an emergent, 
rather than stagnant, form of knowledge that generates new responses to subjective, 
intellectual and moral concerns plaguing a community just as poiesis signifies the process of 
creative production rather than denoting the completed object. Viewed as an exchange 
between ethos and poiesis, the Muslim intellectual tradition is not called upon as an 
anachronism but as a cadence of regularity and discord revising itself whilst maintaining 
moral and spiritual principles with thinkers such as Ghazali: ‘disseminating into the reading 
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and interpretation of texts [...] an extravagant heterogeneity of knowledge’.67 This 
expansiveness results in Ghazali’s redeeming trait as a scholar being his ability to bridge 
schismatic thought and occupy, an ‘interstitial location’, where binary formulations become 
instructive not for how they can generate more evolved forms of homogeneity but for what 
they reveal about the gaps constituting their discrepancies, ‘far from coercing one into 
adopting one of the polar positions as the correct position, the polarities serve as a spectrum 
of variabilities.’68 In this threshold, or the dihliz-ian space, totalitarian epistemology remains 
open to reconstruction as canon is engaged in a process of radical defamiliarisation for the 
sake of increased longevity. Whether it be Ghazali’s, ‘liminal [...] hermeneutic of 
reconciliation’,69 or Shelley’s interstitial, ‘shadows that futurity casts upon the present [by] 
words which express what they understand not’,70 tradition is presented as a lineage of 
inquiry as opposed to the uncritical repetition of outdated images indicating that loyalty and 
interpretation are not mutually exclusive when it comes to custom due to its deep connection 
with human nature characterised by both possibility and limitation: ‘a historical sense 
involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence'.
71
                  
kkkThe responsibility of inculcating, ‘a sustained institutional practice of diversified 
language learning in imaginative depth’,72 is a task fitting of telepoiesis which denotes how 
creative acts can occupy times and places other than their own with a latent transformative 
potential of generating (through rediscovery and interpretation) new avenues of thought both 
within and across traditions. For Gayatri Spivak, telepoiesis aided in conceptualising methods 
that would rather reduce the subaltern to a collective without attending to more singular 
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experiences composing the demographic in question and in turn, granting them the possibility 
for self-synecdoche. Being aware of distance by recognising the diversity of discourses 
should not negate the potential for correspondence since the quality of sameness assumed to 
be necessary for interaction is reconfigured in terms of humility as any cultural, historical or 
ideological gap offers the potential for opening ourselves to an other. This prospect of 
creating towards, an ‘ever-distant future [with] a distant other’,73 emblematises a shared act 
founded upon difference that recognises the agency of whoever receives these structures as 
well as preserving the voices of those whose discourses constitute the projection. Instead of 
wilfully excluding Muslim thought and history for fear of misrepresentation or on the basis of 
misrecognition, Romantic Orientalist scholarship must foster approaches that allow Islam a 
space within interpretations by drawing links rather than assuming synonymity or 
incongruence with respect to its allegorical counterpart. In cases where abstraction through 
translation is unavoidable, it is important to contextualise representation for the sake of 
offering a platform where contentions are highlighted via inclusion and particularity as 
opposed to dismissal and universality. Regardless of familiarity there is always a shared act 
of metaphoric displacement when new significance is imputed upon symbols filtered through 
the lens of their author’s religious, philosophical, and political affinities. As ‘Mont Blanc’ 
exposes, signs can never be the property of any single speaker for they remain present (if not 
dormant) at all times but retain the countless voices that formed its evolution which blurs the 
distinction between derivation and antecedent until: ‘self and antitype are mutually 
constitutive, which is to say that they toss the origin back and forth between them, leaving the 
locus of causal power highly unstable’.74 Rather than reading this movement as a resurgence 
of the suppressed, an ‘erotic imagination [that] projects its antitype through an act of 
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repression’,75 I have attempted to establish a framework that enables contemporary critics to 
reencounter Islamic perspectives within the context of Shelley’s radical displacements not to 
salvage Muslim voices from an Orientalist poetics which assimilates alterity through 
transference but to highlight the interanimative possibility of continuation through doubling 
back that allows the relevant Islamic and Shelleyan discourses to be, at once, distinct and 
engaged. The consumptive model that exposes the disfiguring quality of appropriation 
remains useful for it serves as a reminder of how literary artefacts are responding to material 
history, of which institutionalised power is an element, but the pervasiveness of this mindset 
(i.e. an assumed irreconcilability on the basis of violence) risks cannibalising Romantic 
Orientalism. The diluting of Eastern values by Western perspectives renders the Orient a 
spectre incapable of existing as an embodied subject that acts as much as is acted upon. 
Critical imbalance becomes an extension of the position being refuted for it justifies the 
exclusion of an Islamic intellectual tradition on the basis that the Orientalist framework 
cannot accommodate it whereas my own methodology has sought to incorporate scholars for 
whom the afterlife is reconfigured as afterwardness in order to retain the embodied nature of 
what has been lost or unnoticed during perception as well as granting it an available future 
within the recurrent present (i.e. the history of what might have been).                                              
kkkReincorporating Muslim voices into the disordered and anxiety-ridden frame of Romantic 
Orientalism exposes how discourse is constantly converging with, or diverging from, other 
discourses through a complex matrix by which self and community are shaped negatively or 
positively and thus, feelings of uncertainty, inconsistency, and disunity become central 
characteristics of both traditions as individuals creatively mobilisie available mythic, 
’vocabulary in order to understand and make sense of their disrupted lives in moments of 
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deep uncertainty and existential concern’.76 Consequently, when placed in dialogue, the 
practice of disentangling and charting these various cessations and resumptions must be 
critically attended to in a manner that prevents the Romantic forms of anxiety from 
exclusively dominating the conversation by, ‘allow[ing] either side to transcend their own 
boundaries, and [...] make one’s own anxieties intelligible to the other’,77 or, framed within 
Rajan’s apt description, positioning ‘dissemination as communication’.78 I seek to reclaim 
metaphysics (i.e. Islam) from the discourse of Romantic Orientalism where translation has 
become the central mode of communication and the Other exists only after having been 
filtered through self by, instead, reinstating it as a part of Shelley’s mythopoetics where 
interanimation becomes the transactive principle founed on the notion that revision, reform, 
and renewal are underlying elements of apprehension itself. The aim, therefore, is not to 
over-exaggerate influence but to accommodate a wider variety of Muslim voices imprinting 
themselves through different avenues upon Shelley’s creative imagination in order to expand 
the critical perception of a faith often reduced to a political agenda (confined within a closed 
set of geographic locales) and instantiate it within the theological and philosophical debates 
Shelley is working through as he writes.  
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